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ABSTRACT
“Radioactive Dixie: A History of Nuclear Power and Nuclear Waste in the
American South, 1950-1990,” examines the political, social, cultural, economic,
environmental, and technological dimensions of the nuclear industry in the American
South. Today, the US South contains more nuclear reactors than any other region and
much of the nation’s radioactive waste. In “Radioactive Dixie,” I argue that this regional
distinction resulted from a decades-long effort by southern politicians, industry figures,
and government officials to transform the American South into a nuclear-oriented region.
Waving the atomic talisman, the nuclear industry served as one pivotal part in a larger
project of regional modernization, which intended to transform the South’s economy and
its identity. And yet, despite the promises of progress through nuclear things, the
American South’s transformation into a new nuclear South met a surprising degree of
resistance, prompting debates about energy, the environment, corporate and government
accountability, and risk. While some historians have called for an end to southern history,
“Radioactive Dixie” demonstrates the lasting relevance of regional frameworks, and why
studying a region’s energy system informs national and global issues concerning energy
and the environment. By studying the forces that shaped nuclear technology development
in the South and uniting top-down perspectives with local experiences, this study
illustrates the uneven, contested process of modernization in the region. “Radioactive
Dixie” shifts the focus away from metropolitan areas to rural communities—to the people
and the places near nuclear reactors that power sprawling, energy-hungry cities.
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INTRODUCTION
All over Alabama, the Lamps are out.
--James Agee, Let Us Now Praise Famous Men
The guards watched Darryl Malek-Wiley through binoculars on August 6, 1977.
Standing in the searing Alabama heat, Wiley was the lone protestor in Dothan that day.
The Catfish Alliance’s solitary representative in southern Alabama embraced their motto
of “No Nuke’s Y’all” and put on his one man show. Standing across from Alabama
Power & Light’s Farley nuclear plant, Wiley released one-hundred balloons into the air.
The plant’s “beefed up security force” prepared for a storming of the gates that never
occurred.1 Instead, as Wiley described decades later, the event amounted to “just me and
this trailer full of balloons.”2 On the anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima,
Japan, anti-nuclear activists throughout the American South released colored balloons.3
Activists affixed balloons with warnings about radiation and gathered outside of the
region’s nuclear power plants. Through the balloon release, activists observed past

1

“Balloons Released in Nuclear Protest,” The Tuscaloosa News, August 7, 1977.

2

Darryl Malek-Wiley, Interview by author, June 22, 2013 (recording in author’s
possession).

3

Ibid.

1

horrors and protested an atomic powered future. This future seemed all too real in 1977.
Across the region, nuclear power plants were under construction, with some already
sending power to the grid. If advocates viewed nuclear reactors as a valuable source for
employment and cheap, plentiful power, others saw an emerging tomb over the American
South. Looking back, Wiley described the region’s anti-nuclear dissenters as “young,
idealistic, and didn’t have a clue.”1 But in 1977, the atomic threat combined with a
gnawing dread about a changing region. The South now had shopping malls, air
conditioners, and shag carpet like everybody else, but these trappings rang hollow for
some. The long-standing appeals to progress, modernity, and a “New South,” the centurylong call for regional redemption, suddenly appeared misguided and even a little sinister.
The balloon spectacle in August 1977 meant more than a remembrance or a protest
against an energy source then; the act was a battle cry in the fight over the modern
South’s future.
“Radioactive Dixie: A History of Nuclear Power and Nuclear Waste in the
American South, 1950-1990,” examines the political, social, cultural, economic,
environmental, and technological dimensions of the nuclear industry in the American
South. Today, the South contains more nuclear reactors than any other region and much
of the nation’s radioactive waste. I argue that this regional distinction resulted from a
decades-long effort by southern politicians, industry figures, universities, and government
officials to transform the American South into a nuclear-oriented region. Waving the
atomic talisman, the nuclear industry served as one pivotal part in a larger project of

1

Darryl Malek-Wiley, Interview with author, June 22, 2013.

2

regional modernization. From this purview, bomb plants and nuclear reactors promised to
expand the South’s economy and help refashion its identity.
Technology, however, cannot make history itself. As historian David Nye has
explained, machines are not “like meteors,” that “arrive unbidden” and bring about
“impacts.”2 Nuclear reactors and energy systems are shaped by a variety of forces—
human and non-human. Society, politics, culture, and the environment all play important
roles in the creation, management and regulation, and interpretation of nuclear
technology.3 The American South’s nuclear history matters not because reactors marched
through the region wreaking havoc, but rather because, as David Nye put it, energy
systems are “the outcomes of complex negotiations between ordinary people in the
past.”4
Despite the promise of progress, the calls for a new, nuclear South met a
surprising degree of resistance from citizens. Modern environmentalism and the energy
crisis created ripples across the globe, and in the South, these trends combined with a
growing sense of unease about the region’s embrace of “nuclear things” and its

2

David E. Nye, Consuming Power: A Social History of American Energies (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); James C. Williams, “Understanding the Place of Humans in
Nature,” in Stephen H. Cutcliffe and Martin Reuss, eds., The Illusory Boundary:
Environment and Technology in History (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press,
2010), 20-21;Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas Parke Hughes, and T. J Pinch. The Social
Construction of Technological Systems New Directions in the Sociology and History of
Technology. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987.

3

Nye. 5.

4

Nye, Consuming Power, 11.

3

adjustment to larger transformations.5 From the 1960s to 1980s, as utilities built more
nuclear plants and industry buried more radioactive waste in the South, debates about
energy and the environment became headline news, letters poured into the offices of
elected officials, and South Carolina’s nuclear waste dump even elicited a mention on
Saturday Night Live. A new class of moderate southern governors, including Jimmy
Carter and Bill Clinton, broke rank from their predecessors and challenged the pronuclear agenda from decades past. While the accident at Pennsylvania’s Three Mile
Island in 1979 is generally portrayed as the defining moment in the history of commercial
nuclear power in the United States, in the American South, it shared the spotlight with the
Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant, Grand Gulf Unit 1, and the Clinch River Breeder Reactor.
And yet, in recent years, historians have emphasized the “naturalization” of
energy production, where power systems merge with landscapes in our mind.6 Electricity
comes from some unknown distant place, travels through the grid, and delivers a reliable
product. Historians Richard Hirsh and Benjamin Sovacool have argued that electrical
infrastructures “have essentially become invisible.”7 Only when infrastructures fail do

5

Hecht, “The Power of Nuclear Things,” Technology and Culture 51, No. 1 (January
2010): 1-30.

6

Richard F. Hirsh and Benjamin Sovacool, “Wind Turbines and Invisible Technology:
Unarticulated Reasons for Local Opposition to Technology,” Technology and Culture 54,
No. 4 (October 2013), 705-734. David Nye, Consuming Power, 7-8; James C. Williams,
“Understanding the Place of Humans in Nature.”

7

Richard F. Hirsh and Benjamin Sovacool, “Wind Turbines and Invisible Technology:
Unarticulated Reasons for Local Opposition to Technology,” Technology and Culture 54,
No. 4 (October 2013), 719.

4

these systems take on heightened visibility.8 But as Paul Edwards notes, “mature
technological systems,” like energy grids rarely have major hiccups, and in general, this
encourages a kind of mental distance between power sources and power usage.9 While
this conceptualization might reflect contemporary attitudes, the past suggests a markedly
different scenario. Hirsh and Sovacool have characterized more recent opposition to wind
turbines as “unarticulated,” but history can offer rich and vivid articulations of popular
attitudes about energy systems. “Radioactive Dixie” demonstrates that even
southerners—not typically known for their engagement in such topics—engaged deeply
in energy issues during the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, the energy crisis and nuclear power
controversies produced a torrent of constituent correspondence and grassroots activism,
dispelling any notion that energy systems in modern America have served as mere
backdrops.
Studying the history of nuclear power and radioactive waste illustrates the ways in
which energy infrastructure, and the disposal systems required by it, were hyper-visible
for a period of time. In the American South, the massive nuclear building spree and a
booming radioactive waste business, highlighted dilemmas about energy and the
environment, but also provoked bigger conversations about democracy, risk,
accountability, poverty, and power. Whether startled by rising electric bills or by the
cooling tower next door, for a time, people in the South grappled with questions about
energy, technology, and the environment. Undoubtedly, the risks surrounding nuclear
8

Paul N. Edwards, “Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organization
in the History of Sociotechnical Systems,” in Thomas J. Misa, Philip Brey, and Andrew
Feenberg, eds., Modernity and Technology (MIT Press, 2004).

5

power encouraged widespread fear and skepticism about its safety, far more pronounced
during the industry’s infancy than now.10 But as this study shows, interpretations of the
region’s nuclear industry were also grounded in southern history and in local history. The
South’s nuclear controversies do share commonalities with other places—whether in
California, France, or Russia, but they are arguably more meaningful when situated in
local and regional contexts.
While some historians have called for an end to southern history, “Radioactive
Dixie” demonstrates the lasting relevance of regional frameworks.11 At the very least, the
justification for a regional framework comes from historical actors themselves.
Politicians, industry figures, and southern universities coordinated their efforts to obtain
funding from the Atomic Energy Commission and laid the groundwork for the nuclear
building spree that occurred in the 1970s. Those people and their institutions, as I
demonstrate, viewed this project as a regional one, which promised to give the American
South equality with other places, if not supremacy in certain areas. A favorable
environment, with plentiful water and sparsely populated land, gave southern utility
companies few initial barriers to constructing nuclear plants. In the 1950s, southern states
banded together to attract industry but also to rewrite radiation regulatory laws in order to
10

The decrease in heightened fears may be attributable to the “technological momentum”
achieved after decades of operation and broad similarities between reactors (although
variation exists). See Thomas P. Hughes, “Technological Momentum,” in Merritt Roe
Smith and Leo Marx, eds. Does Technology Drive History?: The Dilemma of
Technological Determinism (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1994), 101-114; Hughes,
Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1983), 140-174.

11

Matthew D. Lassiter, and Joseph Crespino, “The End of Southern History,” in Matthew
Lassiter and Joseph Crespino, eds., The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism (Oxford
University Press, 2010).
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preserve “atomic rights.”12 By the late 1970s, however, the southern president and
nuclear expert, Jimmy Carter, devoted much of his presidency to stopping two nuclear
projects in the South. Carter, along with governors Richard Riley (South Carolina),
William Winter (Mississippi), and Bill Clinton (Arkansas), capitalized on the anti-nuclear
moment, and called for more thoughtful and equitable approaches to nuclear power,
radioactive waste disposal, and energy generally. Other formidable forces, such as
Senator Ernest Hollings (South Carolina) and Senator Howard Baker (Tennessee),
remained intractable in their devotion to nuclear projects, and as a result, the bitter
contests over atomic issues gave opponents small victories, and the South ultimately
found itself nuclear powered.
By studying the forces that shaped nuclear technology development in the South
and uniting top-down perspectives with local experiences, this dissertation highlights the
uneven, contested process of modernization. Histories of the American South after World
War II focus predominantly on metropolitan areas, obscuring and distorting larger
narratives of transformation and change. “Radioactive Dixie” shifts the focus away from
urban and suburban areas to rural communities—to the people and the places near
nuclear reactors that produced the power for sprawling, energy-hungry cities. To some
extent, studying nuclear power offers a way to show the interactions between these
places. Power lines connected the rural to the region’s growing metropolitan areas, but
the controversies over nuclear power also demonstrate how large-scale, high-risk

12

“Atomic Rights are Stressed: States Advised to Take Action,” Lexington-Herald, June
12, 1968.

7

technology systems disperse power in very specific ways.13 Risk assessment, rate setting,
and siting decisions necessitate certain value judgments about whose lives and whose
environments are “worth” more.
Living in a radiation plume exposure pathway reinforces a kind of hierarchy
between the places that supply power and the people that use it. As Langdon Winner
provocatively argued in 1980, “the things we call ‘technologies’ are ways of building
order in our world.”14 In tandem, Winner surmised that certain technologies, such as
nuclear power, might entail an “ongoing social process in which scientific knowledge,
technological invention, and corporate profit reinforce each other in deeply entrenched
patterns that bear the unmistakable stamp of political and economic power.”15 If artifacts
do “have” politics, as Winner suggests, this is not to say that technologies themselves
build order.16 Rather, the systems humans develop for assessing where to build reactors,
how to regulate them, and who pays for them, reflect particular arrangements of power.
In the American South, nuclear power plants and radioactive waste disposal bore “the
unmistakable stamp of political and economic power,” as Winner put it.

13

This does not suggest technologies act autonomously and disperse power, but rather the
systems devised to distribute power, to manage technology, to regulate its risks, and
calculate its benefits and downsides, offer types of order, or at least, reflect society and
culture.

14

Langdon Winner, “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” Daedalus 109, No. 1 (Winter, 1980):
127.

15

Winner, 126-127.

16

Winner’s views have been characterized as technological determinism, however, his
ideas about power and ordering remain relevant, as long as a simple causal explanations
are avoided. See Merritt Roe Smith, “Technological Determinism in American Culture,”
Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, 2-35.

8

“Radioactive Dixie” contributes to several fields of scholarship. First, this study
adds to twentieth century southern history, specifically the post-World War II era.
Recent trends in this field have emphasized suburban political conservatism, Wal-Mart
populism, the Civil Rights Movement and its aftermath, and the re-consideration of
southern history in new frameworks: national, global, and Cold War. Fundamentally, this
dissertation challenges prevailing trends in southern history by reorienting our focus to
the region’s rural communities. As of late, historians have become enamored with a type
of American South, one characterized by affluence, conservatism, and evangelical
Christianity.17 By disproportionately focusing on the “Americanization of Dixie,” and
casting aside southern exceptionalism, the place of rural communities, the presence of
poverty, and the new types of inequity created by technological and environmental
17

Matthew D. Lassiter and Kevin M. Kruse, “The Bulldozer: Suburbs and Southern
History Since World War II,” Journal of Southern History 75, No. 3 (August 2009): 691706. Since its publication, the focus on suburban spaces, conservatism, and an
Americanized or even globalized region has increased. For a few examples, see Joseph
Crespino, In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative
Counterrevolution (Princeton University Press, 2007); Kevin Kruse, White Flight:
Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton University Press, 2005);
Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South
(Princeton University Press, 2013); Michelle Nickerson and Darren Dochuk. Sunbelt
Rising: The Politics of Space, Place, and Region (University of Pennsylvania Press,
2013). Bethany Moreton’s recent work considers Walmart’s brand of Christian free
enterprise, along with the rural and working class populations it has historically appealed
to and employs in its stores. See Moreton, To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of
Christian Free Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009).

9

choices, has become obscured. Studying nuclear power and radioactive waste helps
illustrate how the modern American South became defined by certain geographies of
power and risk.
Although this study emphasizes cultural attitudes about the environment more
than providing a detailed history of environmental change, “Radioactive Dixie” adds to
the growing field of southern environmental history and the proliferating field of the
history of technology. Environmental histories of the American South have largely
focused on periods prior to 1945, with a few notable exceptions. Recent works include
studies of Georgia peach farming, PCB pollution in Alabama, the fire ant war, pesticides
in southern agriculture, and Gulf Coast environments.18 In the realm of energy and
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atomic projects, scholars have produced substantial work on the Savannah River Site,
atomic testing in Mississippi, and the relationship between energy and the environment in
south Texas and southern Louisiana.19 “Radioactive Dixie” builds upon these
contributions, and more fundamentally, positions itself within a longer thread of southern
political and cultural history.20 Inevitably, the histories presented here also offer insight
into the broader field of American political history.
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In chapter one, “Visions of a Nuclear South,” I analyze the political and cultural
meanings of atomic energy in the region during the 1950s and 1960s, why nuclear power
served as a powerful symbol for the South’s future, and how southern politicians
refashioned “New South” rhetoric to sell their new, nuclear South. The chapter explores
the coordinated effort among politicians, industry figures, federal officials, and southern
universities to obtain subsidies from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and to
develop the commercial nuclear industry in the region. Leading the wave of interest,
southern universities created nuclear engineering programs and sought funding from the
AEC for experimental nuclear reactors. To attract industry, southern states and a special
interest group, the Southern Interstate Nuclear Board, helped formulate legal agreements
between the AEC and states for certain regulatory powers. These mechanisms preserved
the “atomic rights” of southern states, while also providing an example of a cordial
relationship between the federal government and the South. “Visions of a Nuclear South”
traces the history of the region’s first nuclear plants and examines the forces that finally
galvanized southern utilities to invest in nuclear power.
Chapters two and three explore the history of two nuclear power plants along the
Mississippi River. “The Kudzu and The Reactor: Nuclear Power on the Mississippi
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River” analyzes the Grand Gulf nuclear plant in Mississippi, and “The Louisiana Way
and the Reactor: Nuclear Power on the Mississippi River” examines the Waterford plant
upriver from New Orleans. Both plants share a common owner, the utility conglomerate
Entergy, and a common waterway, the Mississippi River, adjacent to both sites. Using
Langdon Winner’s provocation about whether “technical artifacts have political
qualities,” and why large-scale, high-risk projects offer ways of “building order in this
world,” these chapters argue that the histories of Grand Gulf and Waterford are
emblematic of the New South’s muddled legacy, where the declarations of modernity,
progress, and economic opportunity rarely ignited the kinds of economic transformation
promised in the communities most directly affected by nuclear power. Like first iteration
of the “New South” in the late-Nineteenth Century, the corruption and political
opportunism rife within Louisiana and Mississippi in the late-Twentieth Century shaped
the development of both projects—down to the very concrete laid for the foundation.
In “The Kudzu and The Reactor,” I contextualize the story of Grand Gulf Unit 1
in the history of the community where it sits, detailing the interplay between the local
history and the meanings attached to the nuclear plant. The chapter then examines Grand
Gulf’s controversial history, where the plant triggered a major debate, led by Bill Clinton,
about corporate power, utility rates, and poverty that extended into multiple states.
Emphasizing the particular arrangements of power certain energy systems encourage, the
chapter also traces the battle over Grand Gulf’s tax revenues and why Mississippi’s past
remained ever present even as it adopted modern technology.
In chapter three, “The Louisiana Way and The Reactor,” I examine the history of
Waterford 3, a nuclear power plant located twenty-miles away from New Orleans.
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Located in St. Charles Parish, the Waterford unit sits upon a former sugar cane plantation
now surrounded by pyro-chemical industry and oil refineries. Waterford’s construction
further highlighted the sense that southern Louisiana’s willingness to attract any and all
industry carried potentially deadly consequences. Waterford embodies the formation of
Louisiana’s new “technological disaster subculture,” where older threats from nature
combined with newer threats from engineering.22 The public’s fears were well-founded.
Long accustomed to the “Louisiana way,” LP&L’s management of Waterford’s
construction proved deeply flawed, forcing a more stringent Nuclear Regulatory
Committee (NRC) after Three Mile Island in 1979 to launch a major investigation into
the plant’s safety.
In chapter four, “The Nuclear Burden of Southern History,” examines the history
of a low-level radioactive waste facility in Barnwell, South Carolina. In the late 1970s,
the Barnwell site received nearly eighty-five percent of the nation’s nuclear waste,
exposing the inequitable and the unresolved manner in which the United States dealt with
the by-products of the nuclear industry. Even as contemporary observers pronounced the
“Americanization of Dixie,” and bemoaned disappearance of regional and local
distinctions, anti-nuclear activists located a new form of regional identity through
environmental inequity. The activists railed against the South’s “disproportionate burden”
produced by a broken system of waste disposal. While many in South Carolina deplored
their state’s role as the “nation’s trash can,” the people of Barnwell rallied in support of
the local nuclear waste facility. This chapter analyzes why Barnwellians defended what
22
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most communities scorned, storing over twenty-seven million cubic feet of radioactive
waste. Finally, this chapter proposes that the South’s new burden looms in its future, not
in its past.
Chapter five, “Jimmy Carter and the Trouble with Expertise,” sets Jimmy Carter’s
nuclear and energy policy in the context of the battles over the Clinch-River Breeder
Reactor (CRBR) and the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP), two highly lucrative
nuclear projects in the South. In terms of political consequences, the fate of BNFP and
CRBR proved far more meaningful for shaping Carter’s presidency than the accident at
Three Mile Island. The chapter first analyzes a pivotal moment in Carter’s energy policy
in 1979 and then details his fight over CRBR and BNFP. I argue that Carter’s propensity
to master complex policy issues, and fashion himself as an energy expert and
environmental steward, trapped him in a delicate political climate. While Carter touted
his own expertise, his public criticisms of “red tape” and bureaucracy laid the
groundwork for the anti-regulatory and anti-expert mood during Ronald Reagan’s
presidency. Through his stubborn battles over Clinch River and Barnwell Nuclear Fuel
Plant, Carter, the native Southerner and “high-tech” President, challenged nearly three
decades of regional nuclear optimism by wielding his nuclear expertise.
Chapter six, “The Mind of the Nuclear South,” analyzes the anti-nuclear rebellion
that emerged in the South in the 1970s and extended into the 1980s. This chapter places
their critique of the nuclear industry within a long line of thinking about the region’s path
to modernity. As heirs to a tradition of “regional self-scrutiny,” these dissenters organized
a network of anti-nuclear groups across the region and helped shape a “mind” of the
nuclear South, one fractured by their critiques but still “progress-haunted,” as writer W.J.
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Cash claimed decades earlier. The chapter analyzes the apocalyptic imagery and language
activists employed, considering its significance in southern history. Southern anti-nuclear
activists drew upon regional history, environmental discourse, and fears about out-ofcontrol science and technology. In response to their critics, activists sought diverse
coalitions and whistle-blowers, which reflected a larger cultural turn towards
romanticizing the working-class, and intended to refute claims that activists only
represented a fringe group. Using the jeremiad form, the region’s anti-nuclear rebels
issued dire warnings about a nuclear-powered future and advocated salvation in the form
of decentralized, alternative power.
Chapter seven, “Nuclear Ghosts: Relics of the Tennessee Valley Authority’s
Nuclear Program,” examines the TVA’s nuclear program, specifically an abandoned
nuclear site in rural Hartsville, Tennessee. Locals mock the partially-constructed cooling
tower as a “used beer can.”23 This chapter contextualizes that empty, four hundred
million dollar concrete shell within the history of TVA’s controversial nuclear program
and the longer arc of regional modernization. It traces the interactions between the
Hartsville community and the TVA, how the agency assessed land values and local
history, and why TVA’s image as a benevolent force in the Tennessee Valley soured
further in the 1970s. “Nuclear Ghosts,” like many of the chapters before it, brings readers
to the rural South that persisted even after many other “rural worlds” were lost.24 The
chapter explores how nuclear power systems encouraged certain ways of valuing
23
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environments and communities, and why it reinforced a type of built order between rural
and metropolitan places.
To be sure, “Radioactive Dixie” is by no means a comprehensive history of every
nuclear power plant or every nuclear controversy in the American South. When C. Vann
Woodward reflected upon his career-defining work, Origins of the New South, he
expressed his relief upon seeing the definite article—“the”—dropped from the title.25
Choosing the definite article, “a,” for this study suggests a more limited framework, one
that chooses snap-shots of nuclear controversies instead. Likewise, the nuclear engineers
behind the scenes figure little into this study. While their stories are important, those
perspectives are for future historians to uncover. This history, generally speaking,
emphasizes what happened outside the reactors rather than inside them and is driven by
the question about how technology is “an extension of human lives.”26
When Henry Waring Ball of Greenville, Mississippi, stood before electric light
one evening in 1895, he found himself moved by its splendor, or what David Nye has
called “the technological sublime.”27 He reckoned that fellow pedestrians must have
“taken him for an idiot,” for the light was “so beautiful,” that he found himself transfixed
by the sight.28 Southerners of a different era found themselves transfixed by the sight of
cooling towers several hundred feet tall, rising out from kudzu-covered river gullies and
25
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the rolling Tennessee hills. Few, if any, described them as beautiful or magical. What an
atomic powered future portended for the region remained unclear, and southerners
wrestled with the full constellation of meaning attached to nuclear power. The conflicts
between another New South and preserving an older South collided as reactors were built
and nuclear waste was buried, and those collisions comprise the core of “Radioactive
Dixie.”
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CHAPTER ONE
VISIONS OF A NUCLEAR SOUTH AND ANOTHER “NEW SOUTH”
The South today is a marvelous mixture of romance and
business, history and hurry, magnolias and steel mills,
azaleas and acrilan, heaven and hell-bombs.1
--William T. Polk, 1953
In a 1952 article entitled “Dixie is Jumping,” the author J.L. Rhodes observed that
“atomic energy is one of the biggest things in Dixie at the present time.”2 The
construction of Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 1943 and the Savannah River Plant in
1951 marked the beginning of the American South’s nuclear history—a history
envisioned by some as “regional salvation,” and in subsequent decades, as regional
annihilation.3 Southern politicians and business leaders evangelized the atom’s grand
possibilities, incorporating atomic energy into their vision of economic development after
World War II. Perhaps the finest exposition of this early nuclear dream came from the
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governor of Florida, LeRoy Collins, in a 1956 speech given fittingly in Atlanta, the longstanding beacon of New South optimism.
Drawing upon New South booster Henry Grady’s story of the rural funeral held in
Georgia following the Civil War, where nothing but the corpse and the hole in the ground	
  
were native, Collins peered into the region’s future and predicted that if the South did not
embrace nuclear power quickly, a similar fate would befall them:
I suppose a nuclear counterpart of Grady’s tale of desolation would be a situation
in which the South dug its valuable uranium and thorium deposits and shipped
them off to Ohio for refining, while Illinois processed the material into fuel
elements for use in California reactors. Then the ‘waste,’ the radioactive fission
products, would perhaps be returned here for burial in the swamps of Florida.
Could this be our role in nuclear energy 20 years from now? We must face the
fact that it is not impossible. Be we southerners must not let it happen.1

Atomic energy presented a chance for “economic emancipation” and an
opportunity to become a “true equalizer between the North and South.” Collins called
upon southerners to “bring the atom to the South” in a joint, interstate fashion.2 In the
same year the Southern Manifesto was issued, which upheld states’ rights and white
supremacy in the fight against civil rights progress, Governor Collins seemingly offered a
path to regional redemption, one without the endless complications of dismantling Jim
Crow segregation, the bedrock of Southern society. While the South’s system of white
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supremacy increasingly appeared archaic and out-of-step with modern America, the atom
symbolized modernity, progress, and a future of endless promise and economic
opportunity.3 In the 1950s, southern politicians, the nuclear industry, the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC), and the region’s universities envisioned a new, nuclear South. Built
upon a foundation of nuclear weapons production, which escalated as the Cold War
heated up, southerners embraced atomic energy for many reasons. The expanding nuclear
industry presented economic opportunity, the possibility to enhance the reputation and
bolster the resources of southern universities, and to refashion the region’s identity. Early
successes occurred in the region’s higher education system, as universities pursued
funding from the AEC for nuclear engineering programs and other sciences. Only in the
late 1960s, as utilities across the country became convinced about the commercial
viability of nuclear power, did southern power companies embark upon a major effort to
build nuclear power plants. Throughout the South, nuclear reactor projects were licensed
and many were built. Despite the nuclear industry’s descriptions of the South as a
“nuclear region” today, that fate appeared far less certain in the late 1970s, when the
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entire industry experienced an array of obstacles. Until then, however, the region’s
nuclear proponents celebrated an atomic-powered future.
Promoters of atomic energy in the American South came from a closely related
network of elected officials, state agencies devoted to promoting atomic energy, the
Atomic Energy Commission, defense installations, southern universities, and an
emerging nuclear industry. While this trend largely materialized after World War II, the
advocacy for nuclear power fits within a longer thread in southern history, beginning with
the late nineteenth century efforts of southern boosters who sought industrialization,
development, and modernization. In the post WWII period, those efforts accelerated as
federal funds poured into defense and research-oriented projects.4 Atomic energy
promised an extension of those lucrative contracts and potentially private industry as
well. Southerners also saw atomic energy as a political and cultural tool.5 Anthropologist
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Joseph Masco has argued that nuclear weapons engendered a banalization of mass death
and nuclear ruination in the United States, which constituted a powerful form of
“radioactive nation-building.”6 The advocacy of nuclear development in the American
South constituted a type of radioactive region-building, to borrow Masco’s phrase.
Radioactive region-building took on heightened importance as the South’s de jure
segregation faced increasing scrutiny in the 1950s. Similarly, the regional turn towards
nuclear power occupied an important place in a broader history of energy and technology
in the South driven by the project of modernization fueled by cheap electricity.7 Electrical
systems are not a “thing” separate from society and culture, nor do they merely have
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“impact.” Rather, “social contexts” shape our energy systems, and the South’s position in
the 1950s encouraged atomic advocacy.8
In the United States, commercial nuclear power plants rely upon two basic
designs. Only boiling-water reactors (BWR) or pressurized water reactors (PWR) are
used for commercial purposes in the US, and because of this, a commercial nuclear plant
in Illinois broadly resembles one in Alabama, with differences occurring in
manufacturers used for parts, design modifications according to the utility or
environment, quality of management, operation, and structural integrity. Nonetheless,
nuclear power plants in the American South are more than technological artifacts; as
Gabrielle Hecht has shown, nuclear reactors are artifacts that possess a “social, political,
and culture life,” which interact with the world around them.9 For pro-nuclear advocates,
nuclear power offered material advantages but also presented symbolic purposes. Nuclear
boosters incorporated atomic energy into their “New South” rhetoric, harnessing the
symbolic values of atomic energy, in addition to advertising the economic benefits.
Southern nuclear advocacy coincided with a broader effort after WWII to improve
the South’s economy and to modernize the region, one spurred by wartime industries,
research facilities, and federal funding.10 And as LeRoy Collins’ speech detailed, atomic
8
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evangelizing echoed earlier New South schemes articulated by Henry Grady, the editor of
Atlanta’s Constitution, and post-Reconstruction era southern boosters. The first iteration
of the term “the New South” did not originate with Grady, although he proved to be an
eloquent and popular spokesman for regional boosterism and a refashioning of southern
identity. As early as 1862, a Union Officer “exhilarated by his army’s capture of the sea
islands in South Carolina and Georgia” started publishing The New South, a newspaper
for Federal troops in the area and one that few southerners read.11 The term, “the New
South,” reappeared five years after the Confederacy’s defeat in the American Civil War,
transformed by southerners searching for a positive symbol and “for a specific and
indigenous movement of social, economic, and intellectual regeneration.”12 Following the
Civil War, J.D.B. DeBow of Debow’s Review and other like-minded southerners called
for greater industrialization in the post-war South. Nineteenth century boosters
envisioned a “New South,” one capable of matching the North in its economic
opportunities and able to capitalize on the region’s many natural resources and pool of
cheap labor.
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But as C. Vann Woodward and Paul Gaston have noted, New South boosters also
invented an “Old South” in their quest to remake the region’s identity.13 By creating a
kinder, gentler past, where the South’s system of slavery appeared benevolent, its people
genteel, and Confederate soldiers resembled gallant heroes, southerners built the “New
South” upon a romanticized retelling of southern history.14 In doing so, what Woodward
described as myths of “incalculable potentialities,” the creation of the mythical Old South
laid the groundwork for the development of Jim Crow segregation and the convoluted
logic of white supremacy in the “New South.”15 While the myths surrounding the Old
South reverberated well into the twentieth century and supported the “invented tradition”
of segregation, what was actually “new” in the New South remained limited to pockets of
industrialization, the slow creep of modern day consumerism, and the influx of a
business-class into southern politics, one that challenged the political power of the older
planter class.16
Despite the New South booster evangelism in the late nineteenth to early
twentieth century, the region remained overwhelmingly poor with an agriculturally-based
economy and sub-standard education system. As often mentioned, Franklin Roosevelt
famously described the South as the “nation’s number one economic problem” in 1938.17
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To ameliorate crushing poverty and limited economic opportunities, the federal
government’s New Deal programs, such as the Rural Electrification Administration and
the Tennessee Valley Authority, expanded access to electricity, exploited the Tennessee
Valley’s waterways for hydroelectricity, improved agricultural practices, and created
employment opportunities. Not since Reconstruction had the federal government’s
presence in the South been as pronounced, and the incursion amounted to modest
improvements, particularly in the Tennessee Valley region. More importantly, the New
Deal reinforced the connection between federal funding, regional development, and
cheap, readily available energy.18
From the 1930s onward, “the South’s dependency on the federal government
increased,” as historian Bruce Schulman has documented.19 The emphasis, however,
shifted from social welfare to different federal projects, especially defense and research-
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related installations.20 Coinciding with this change, southern political power moved away
from the older ruling class of planters and “low-wage industrialists” to “business
progressives” who emerged in the 1950s.21 The “new Whigs” of post-WWII southern
politics retained their power by winning lucrative federal projects and funds that
accelerated the region’s transformation.22 With the triumph of the business progressives,
the “New South” quickly became more than a creed. Following WWII, a rural exodus
occurred, sprawling metropolitan areas like Charlotte and Atlanta supplanted older
southern centers of commerce, and the once “Solid South” underwent a political
realignment from solidly Democratic to Republican.23 According to Numan Bartley, the
South “possessed a modern economy” by 1960, and the region could be characterized as
“predominately urban” with a majority of its population located in metropolitan areas.24
The transition has been described by historians in various ways. C. Vann Woodward
called the process the “Bulldozer Revolution,” Schulman succinctly phrased it “from
cotton belt to sunbelt,” and James Cobb christened it “the selling of the South.” Whatever
the name for the process, the second era of New South scheming visibly altered many
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places, but as in the nineteenth century, the promise of progress and economic
development produced uneven benefits and created unintended consequences.
While military and nuclear weapons installations figure into narratives about
regional transformation after WWII, they spurred a more widespread interest in atomic
energy. In 1955, the Southern Governors’ Conference initiated discussion about a
“regional approach” to the nuclear industry, following this with a region-wide study
about the feasibility of interstate compact between southern states, one committed to the
“development of nuclear energy for the advancement of the region.”25 In the Southern
Regional Education Board’s (SREB) 1956 study, the report noted the recent trend of
industry migrating to southern and western states, concluding that “atomic energy can
help assure that continuance.”26 Unlike previous New South schemes, where the South
“sought outside help,” Governor LeRoy Collins viewed the region’s quest to harness
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atomic energy differently. Instead, atomic energy represented a “talisman” for a better
South, one able to ward off the albatross of segregation.27
And yet, even as nuclear advocates waved the atomic talisman, in the coming
years, other southerners waved another symbol— the Confederate flag—signaling their
defiance and commitment to preserving white supremacy. While other places heralded
nuclear-related developments too, only in the American South did atomic energy’s
symbolic possibilities compete with a foil of greater magnitude, at least in the United
States. Even as this disjuncture occurred, the promise of science and technology
seemingly smoothed over any barriers to remaking the region’s identity, and southerners
set about finding ways to attract the nuclear industry to their towns, cities, and states.
Building upon these efforts, the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB)
created a Regional Advisory Council on Nuclear Energy (RACNE) in 1957.28 The
council announced its intention to launch a “many-sided offensive” for the “creation of a
favorable climate for the development of the atom’s potential” in southern states and
across the region. 29 In order to achieve these objections, the council laid the groundwork
for a nuclear-oriented interstate compact: the Southern Interstate Nuclear Compact.
Represented by the Southern Interstate Nuclear Board, the SINB intended to facilitate
27
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cooperation between southern states, act as a liaison between the region and the federal
government, and to promote the nuclear industry.30 Despite its unwieldy acronym, the
SINB played a pivotal role shaping the region’s nuclear industry, the regulatory apparatus
for atomic energy, and lobbying for federal funds. By 1962, due to the SINB’s efforts,
Congress ratified the Southern Interstate Nuclear Compact, officially approving the
SINB’s purpose to encourage development of atomic energy for the South’s economy
and “the well-being of the region’s people.”31 In an era of massive resistance, where
southerners fought the Supreme Court’s 1954 ruling that segregation in public education
was unconstitutional, and provoked stand-offs between the federal government and
southern states, the SINB represented an example of a cordial relationship with the
federal government. While the SINB’s publications never explicitly discuss race or the
upheaval massive resistance produced, the organization fulfilled dual functions—
promoting the nuclear industry and offering a counter-weight to the negative portrayal of
the South as wholly hostile to the federal government and resistant to change.
Despite the enthusiasm surrounding atomic energy, early efforts by RACNE and
SINB focused on education, research, regulations, and reactor design.32 During the late
1950s, many southern utility companies viewed nuclear energy as an unnecessary source
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of power, one hampered by poor economics and a need for greater efficiency.33 In a
region of abundant fossil fuels, developing commercial nuclear power made little
economic sense.34 Moreover, concern existed about the financial liability from a
catastrophic accident as major barrier to commercial nuclear power.35 In a 1957 address
on nuclear energy to the Southern Governors’ conference, G.O. Robinson reminded the
audience that atomic energy was not a “panacea” for the region’s problems and cautioned
that a “factual and realistic approach” was necessary “to put the atom to work.”36 Ten
years later, southern utility companies embraced the promise of cheap electricity through
nuclear power; but in the first decade of nuclear boosterism, southerners saw other
avenues as more viable, particularly in terms of research and development.
Because of the barriers associated with nuclear power in the late 1950s, SINB
directed their momentum towards atomic energy in research and education. Oak Ridge
National Laboratory and the Savannah River Plant attracted engineers and scientists to
the South, and early proponents viewed nuclear engineering as a way to bolster the
reputation of southern universities and to attract federal funding for research facilities,
particularly with experimental reactors, medical research, and agricultural programs. By
expanding opportunities at southern universities, federal facilities, and other nuclear33
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related industries, the region could not only sustain its current influx of engineers and
scientists, but also encourage more in-migration and possibly produce more native-born
researchers and engineers. In 1950, the number of the engineers in the South lagged
behind the national average, and the region’s nuclear proponents sought to address the
deficiency by attracting federal funding, specifically through the Atomic Energy
Commission, for greater offerings in nuclear-related fields at southern universities.37
Following World War II, the Atomic Energy Commission subsidized research
facilities throughout the South, contributing to the “growth of science” in the region.38
The AEC funded nuclear programs through purchasing equipment, providing matching
funds, and loaned uranium fuel for experimental reactors. Other entities, such as the
Department of Defense, National Science Foundation and NASA, also made significant
contributions to these programs. From 1946 to 1965, the AEC contributed over sixtyseven million dollars for operation and equipment to forty-universities in the South, with
Duke University, Florida State University, the University of Virginia, and the University
of Tennessee receiving the most substantial financial support.39 Federal funding towards
atomic energy research undergirded larger changes at southern universities after WWII,
where institutions once viewed as “distinctly regional” in “character and tradition,”
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became global centers of technological and scientific innovation.40 Transforming
southern institutions also meant larger societal and cultural changes. Fueled by education
benefits for veterans after WWII, and an increase in federal funding, the region’s
educational institutions expanded, and atomic energy represented a burgeoning, lucrative
opportunity for southern universities.
In 1966, one southern scientist, Dr. William Pollard, a leading figure at Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, noted that among the many factors driving the “growth of
science” in the region was the addition of “increasingly expensive research facilities,”
and universities across the South welcomed costly, experimental nuclear reactors—in
part because of subsidies from the Atomic Energy Commission.41 ORNL possessed the
world’s first “major research reactor,” an air-cooled natural uranium graphite reactor,
which set the stage for a proliferation of experimental reactors in government facilities
and at universities.42 Government-subsidized experimental reactors provided prestige and
attracted prominent scientists and engineers, but they also fulfilled other objectives too.
When the AEC proposed building a particle accelerator in mid-1960s, William Pollard
wrote to AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg, lobbying for its placement in the South: “we feel
that the South as a region deserves serious consideration. The number of universities in
the South that pursue advanced research programs in the physical sciences has increased
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substantially in the last two decades.”43 And yet, despite the growth in science at southern
schools, Pollard conceded that research remained “small and substantially below other
regions.” This regional difference, according to Pollard, contributed to the loss of the
South’s “most important natural resource”: the “brilliant student” who either went
untrained in the “frontier areas of physics” or sought “advanced education elsewhere,
never to return to the region.” Continuing, Pollard argued that a particle accelerator might
help the South achieve “equality” with other regions and better enable the nation to
achieve a “balanced” scientific strength.” While “held back by its history,” Pollard noted
that region now “is trying very hard to help itself.”44 When the region scored a series of
“firsts” in nuclear research, the South’s nuclear advocates proudly advertised them and
eagerly sought out more funding opportunities.
Among those leading the way was Clifford K. Beck, a native of North Carolina,
who earned a PhD in physics from the University of North Carolina in 1942, worked at
the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, and became the head of the physics department
at North Carolina State University (NCSU), launching the first undergraduate and
graduate programs in nuclear engineering.45 Adding to these accomplishments, Beck
directed the efforts to design “the first privately owned nuclear reactor” or the “first
university research reactor” in the United States, constructed at NCSU and licensed in
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1953.46 Following NCSU’s lead, other southern schools soon acquired nuclear reactors.
Georgia Institute of Technology gained a heavy-water reactor and the University of
Florida acquired a small-scale reactor, while other universities planned research reactors
for the future and many schools purchased particle accelerators (Van de Graff
generators).47 Beck’s triumphs at NCSU, and the gradual expansion of the South’s
nuclear programs, were echoed by other “firsts,” which Southern Interstate Nuclear
Board’s 1962 report described under the banner “a region steps forward.”48
Despite these notable southern firsts, in the late 1950s and 1960s, the Southern
Interstate Nuclear Board’s chief concern related to closing the education gap, citing the
“firm knowledge” that “economic growth is inextricably linked to quality education.”49
Among the problems confronting the South, the region lagged behind in teacher pay,
suffered from an outmigration of talented graduates, and produced only six percent of the
nation’s PhDs but possessed thirty percent of the nation’s population.50 Harnessing the
atom’s potential also required redressing the South’s problems in education. For revenue
poor states, federal funding in atomic energy provided a source of capital, which allowed
universities to build cutting edge research facilities, lure scientists and engineers to
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southern schools, and potentially train southerners in high-paying, rapidly expanding
nuclear-related fields. From 1961 to 1962, the region’s private industry received over $38
million dollars in contracts by the AEC and related contractors, giving further momentum
to a growing network of industries tied to nuclear engineering and nuclear physics.51 In
less than two decades since the construction of “the secret city,” Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, in East Tennessee, atomic energy had become a significant source of federal
funding, one that buoyed the region’s private industry and educational institutions.
Pro-nuclear advocates claimed other regional victories. Besides ratifying the first
nuclear-oriented regional compact, Texas and South Carolina launched development
programs—the first of their kind, and the Port of Charleston became the first port
“cleared to handle radioactive materials.”52 More importantly, in 1962, Kentucky became
the first “agreement” state to receive some regulatory and licensing authority from the
federal government.53 As NRC historian J. Samuel Walker has noted, the South’s
interests in industrial growth, and exploiting atomic energy’s potential, coincided with a
long-standing commitment to “protecting states’ rights from federal infringement,” or
“atomic rights,” as one newspaper headline put it.54 Kentucky’s maneuvers to retain
some control over regulating and licensing nuclear energy and radioactive materials set
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the template for agreements between states and the Atomic Energy Commission. Eight of
the thirteen states to sign agreements with the AEC by 1966 hailed from the South, who
justified wresting partial control from the AEC by citing concern for public health but
also avoidance of “unduly restrictive” measures.55 An editorial in the South Carolina
newspaper praised the “foresight” of the South who had “outstripped the rest of nation in
assuming their right role in nuclear regulation,” and contributed to a “rare spectacle of the
federal government’s yielding…a large measure of control back the states.”56 In this
sense, the region’s history shaped its nuclear future; and in the case of Kentucky, vesting
greater authority in the state contributed to the lax regulatory practices, which
significantly contributed to the environmental contamination at the Maxey Flats
radioactive waste repository in Hillsboro, Kentucky.
Even as atomic energy spurred growth at the region’s universities and federal
facilities, commercial nuclear power attracted far more interest in the Midwest and
Northeast, and California initially.57 Plentiful coal, oil, and hydroelectricity discouraged
investment in nuclear power by southern utilities, who were generally stand-offish about
building reactors in the early 1960s.58 Although southern utilities were slow to embrace
nuclear power, the region’s first nuclear power plant was completed in 1962 and achieved
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criticality, or sustained a nuclear reaction, in March 1963.59 A joint investment of $29
million dollars by four companies, the Parr-Shoals plant, also known as the CarolinasVirginia Tube Reactor (CVTR), was located in Fairfield County, South Carolina.60
The plant’s arrival generated an enthusiastic response; an editorial in The State
heralded South Carolina’s entry into the “atomic age,” describing nuclear power as
“miraculous.”61 In the thrall of atomic energy, South Carolina Governor Ernest F.
Hollings argued that “training for jobs in the nuclear age” was the “best way to lift” the
state “from the bottom of the per capita income scale.”62Another editorial praised the Parr
Shoals reactor, located along one of the region’s “historic rivers which once supported
and carried the barges of cotton” and “now give us unbounded energy” with a “new and
mysterious source of power.”63 While most reports offered little more than enthusiasm,
other observers drew connections between the area’s past and the nuclear (or soon to be)
present.
The home of the new reactor, Parr Shoals, was situated along the Broad River,
and had been the site of a coal-burning steam electric plant and later a hydro-electric
plant built in 1914. Contemporary observers noted the area’s history of power production
59
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and its connection to the river, with one writer claiming that Parr Shoals “will have
become the only place on earth where so many types of energies—water, coal, and the
atom—have been used to make electricity.”64 The Parr Shoals plant produced an
interplay between past and present, echoing broader connections between the new
Nuclear South, the New South post-Reconstruction, and an even older history—one
characterized by the Native American tribe, the Catawbas, who inhabited the area and
“hunted in the pine forests” and “fished in Broad River.”65 The plant created a place
“strange contrasts” between the “primeval sound of the forest” and “the steel symphony
of the bulldozer.”66 Another writer similarly commented on the interplay between one
energy system and another, noting that the “vanished” water powered mill had given way
to the nuclear reactor with “spherical appendance like something out of a Buck Rogers
world.”67
The meditations that new technology encouraged were not unique to nuclear
power though. In 1914, at the opening of the Parr Shoals Generating Station, a hydroelectric plant on the Broad River, Mayor Lewis Griffith of Columbia, South Carolina also
pointed to the area’s past, one characterized by “Congaree Indians, who lived by hunting
and fishing,” and the men who “fought in our wars” and whose fame “was recorded in
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memory, history, and in monuments.”68 South Carolinian R. Charlton Wright, a director
of Parr Shoals Power Company, espoused the “civilizing” power of electricity, with the
“consumption of kilowatts” as the “modern measure of civilization.”69 According to
Wright’s plans for harnessing the Broad River’s water power dated back to the “War
Between the Sections,” when the city of Columbia was at its “lowest ebb,” and area
residents embarked upon a “vigorous crusade” to produce energy using the river.70
Efforts to harness the river’s power required environmental change, and the dam required
for hydro-electric created the Parr Shoals reservoir, which originally encompassed 1,850
acres.71 The arrival of hydro-power constituted the first major transformation in the
Broad River, which has been widened continually over the course of the twentieth
century through various energy-related projects.72
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Hydro-electricity constituted a renewable source of energy, one that would “flow
perpetually,” long after other “fixed and definite” sources of energy, such has coal had
been depleted.73 And as historian Christopher Manganiello has noted, the region’s
waterways possessed “social and cultural meaning.”74 In 1914, the hydro-electric
generating station represented a renewable energy source and a symbol of regional
renewal. Like hydro-power, nuclear energy offered a potentially renewable source of
power (particularly with breeder reactors) and served as a symbol for a New South, one
quite different from its other image as backward, regressive, or broken. The CarolinaVirginia Tube Reactor was as an experimental, demonstration plant, and only operated
from 1963 to 1967, but it signaled a growing interest in commercial nuclear power.
Decades earlier, southern utility executives downplayed the region’s need for
nuclear power, and the 1956 study conducted by the Work Conference on Nuclear
Energy and sponsored by the Southern Regional Education Board concluded that little
immediate need existed for nuclear power in the South. The report predicted that by 1965
only a few southern states would experience a major impact by nuclear power plants:
North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Virginia, and Delaware (a member of the Southern
Governor’s Conference). The study predicted an intermediate impact for South Carolina,
Alabama, and Oklahoma (another member of the conference), and only a minor impact
for the remaining states, particularly those with plentiful fossil fuels such as Texas,
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Louisiana, and Kentucky.75 In the 1950s, the conservative nature of utility companies
resulted in an aversion to risk, in part because they attributed their success to “cautious
business and engineering practices.”76 Even after light-water nuclear technology proved
more commercially feasible in the early 1960s; with a few exceptions, most major utility
companies viewed nuclear power as an unnecessary financial risk.77 In the South, this
reluctance created a cautious climate where companies studied nuclear power as a future
option but otherwise remained resistant to risking large sums of capital on a
commercially unproven technology.
Several developments in the nuclear industry propelled the “great bandwagon
market,” where utilities suddenly embraced nuclear power in the late 1960s. The
bandwagon market rapidly changed the attitude towards commercial nuclear power in the
South.78 Among those developments, in 1964, utility Jersey Central published a report
arguing that building a nuclear reactor in the Northeast was more financially lucrative
than a coal plant.79 While some challenged the validity of the report’s claims, others
hailed it as a “economic breakthrough” for commercial nuclear power.80 Other
developments in the utility industry that further contributed to changing perceptions
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about nuclear power were “pooling arrangements,” which became popular after WWII.81
Pooling arrangements between independent utility companies required joint investment in
new facilities and power-sharing through “interconnections.”82 By combining resources,
utility companies increased capital resources and fostered a willingness to invest in more
expensive facilities, often based on speculative estimates of future energy consumption.83
Moreover, a method called “design by extrapolation” where plant designers
scaled “up” from smaller facility size to larger ones without practical experience
operating large-scale reactors led to an uptick in proposed reactors.84 And finally, despite
the slow growth of the nuclear power in the South initially, the Tennessee Valley
Authority’s 1966 announcement of its plans to build two nuclear reactors changed
perspectives. If TVA, located in an area with abundant coal, found nuclear power viable,
perhaps other utilities should too. TVA’s decision accelerated the arrival of the great
bandwagon market, where utilities went from reluctant to enthusiastic about the prospects
of nuclear power.85 With TVA’s atomic declaration, and a host of other developments,
utilities across the nation hopped on the nuclear bandwagon, with the market peaking in
1966-1967.86 As LeRoy Collins envisioned a decade earlier, southern utility companies
quickly pursued nuclear power plants as a viable option by the late 1960s. In the wake of
81

Walker, 28.
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the bandwagon market, applications for nuclear plants proliferated throughout the US,
but in the South, plans for nuclear power portended greater changes. According to one
observer, the rapid adoption of nuclear power signaled a “new break of dawn,” after “a
very dark night, the South is beginning to find itself a national leader.”87
Following a tumultuous, violent period that culminated in the demise of Jim
Crow, atomic energy supplied imagery that evoked a high-tech, prosperous future for a
region and a people that had appeared antiquated and even primitive in national media. In
November 1965, Florida Power and Light announced plans to build the region’s first
commercial reactor, and other utilities quickly followed suit.88 The SINB’s annual report
to the President christened 1966 as the “Year of Commitment” for the “development of
the peaceful atom in the South.”89 In 1966 and 1967, plans for sixteen nuclear reactors
were announced in SINB member states, which the organization hailed as a “$2.3 billion
in twenty reactor generating units,” one that illustrated the South’s nuclear industry
finally equaled and even surpassed other regions.90 Moreover, on July 21, 1966,
Delaware Governor Charles Terry signed the Southern Interstate Nuclear Compact,
which completed the ratification process, and the Southern Interstate Nuclear Board (and
87
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compact) now represented seventeen southern states.91 After a decade of studying and
lobbying for atomic energy, the SINB’s efforts materialized with significant financial
investments and plans for nuclear power plants.
Of the South’s forty-one currently operating commercial nuclear reactors, the
NRC granted thirty-nine construction licenses between 1966-1976 (see figure one). The
surge in regional interest resulted in ten reactors achieving criticality, or “going online,”
by 1976. By comparison, Midwestern and Northeastern states also vigorously pursued
nuclear power. Before the mid-seventies, these regions had more operating reactors than
the South, with nineteen reactors in the Midwest and eighteen in the Northeast.92 The
West lagged behind for a number of reasons, primarily due to environment reasons,
particularly seismic risks and aridity, and robust anti-nuclear sentiment in certain states.93
Although TVA’s aggressive pursuit of nuclear power accelerated the bandwagon
market, the earliest operating reactors in the South were owned by a variety of utility
companies and largely concentrated in states along the East Coast, such as Florida,
Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina (see table one). By December 1975, ten
nuclear reactors in the South achieved criticality—or went “online,” with a five to eight
year period from receiving the construction permit to beginning commercial operation.
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After the first wave of reactors, the pace slowed from permit to operation, as regulations
became more stringent and costs soared. From January 1976 to December 1980, nine
reactors started commercial operation, with the average time spanning 7.5 years and at
least three reactors requiring nine years from permit to operation. Of the remaining
reactors in operation today, all twenty reactors received their construction permits
between 1972 and 1977 but only began commercial operation from 1981 to 1996, with
the average time from permit to operation increasing to nearly twelve years. TVA’s Watts
Bar Unit 1, the last commercial nuclear reactor received its permit in 1973, and after a
long odyssey, achieved criticality in 1996.
While the pace slowed considerably from the early pre-1976 licensing blitz, the
South (see table two) contains more nuclear reactors than any other region—a product of
a conducive political environment, lobbying efforts, and efforts to cultivate nuclearrelated programs at southern universities. If cancelled reactors are considered, the South
would have surpassed other regions by an even greater degree (see figure three). This
example of regional exceptionalism continues today. Since TVA’s Watts Barr went
online in 1996, the nation’s only new reactors currently under construction or
approaching commercial operation are located in the South. In Parr Shoals, South
Carolina, where early proponents celebrated the arrival of hydroelectricity a century
earlier, the first privately funded nuclear reactor operated from 1963 to 1967, and where
the V.C Summer nuclear plant first began operation in 1984, two new reactors are under
construction—V.C. Summer, Unit 2 and Unit 3. In 2016, TVA’s Watts Bar Unit 2 is
scheduled to finally achieve criticality, and Georgia’s Vogtle Unit 3 and 4 are undergoing
construction as well.
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Spearheading the South’s nuclear revival is the Southern States Energy Board
(SSEB), the current-day iteration of the Southern Interstate Nuclear Board, renamed in
the late 1970s to reflect a broader mission. Special interests groups like SINB and SSEB
fly under the radar; they operate behind the scenes, orchestrating favorable legislation,
subsidies, and act as well-financed coordinators and cheerleaders for an industry. These
groups provide the mechanism where politicians, industry figures, academics, and federal
officials coordinate the promotion, or at the very least, the existence of the region’s
nuclear power industry and energy production.
The SSEB’s stated purpose is the development of the region’s energy resources
generally, but nuclear advocacy remains a priority. Signaling a nuclear power revival, the
Southern States Energy Board released a forty-page document entitled “Nuclear Energy:
Cornerstone of Southern Living, Today and Tomorrow” in 2006. Recycling an older
argument that cheap electricity fuels economic growth, and pointing to concerns about
climate change, the SSEB argued that the “South’s thirst for electricity will require
unprecedented growth in bulk power supply from nuclear and coal.”94 Echoing these
themes, a March 2013 presentation given by the non-profit organization the Savannah
River Site Community Reuse Organization and consulting firm, the Nuclear Worldwide
Inc. (NWI), highlighted the South’s assets, calling it a “Nuclear region,” with a “nuclear
friendly citizenry,” and noting that the “southeastern US is the center of gravity for
nuclear energy development.”95
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Despite the nuclear industry’s recent rosy characterizations, and the celebratory
declarations of the South’s “new atomic age” in the 1950s and 1960s, the proliferation of
nuclear power plants in southern states has been widely debated and highly controversial.
Nuclear projects highlighted differences in power and place; they sat uneasily in a region
lurching between the Old South and the New South. Touring the region in the 1950s,
writer William Polk noted that while an older southern economy relied upon cotton and
tobacco, the New South manufactured consumer items and bombs. The H-bomb plant
“rising in the Savannah River” symbolized the New South, and the double-cannon
“which couldn’t hit a forest” in Athens, Georgia symbolized the past.96 If the region
appears to possess a more loyal “nuclear citizenry” than elsewhere, this destiny appeared
uncertain in the 1970s and 1980s, and the following chapters examine the making of a
radioactive Dixie and what this history tells us about the modern South.

TABLE 1.1: EARLY REACTORS IN THE US SOUTH
Reactor Name

Location

Company*

Construction Commercial
License
Operation

Arkansas
Nuclear Unit 1
Browns Ferry
(Unit 1&2)

London, AR

Entergy

12/06/1968

12/19/1974

Limestone
County, AL

Tennessee
Valley Authority

5/10/1967

8/1/1974 (1);
3/1/1975 (2)

Brunswick
(Unit 2)
Hatch (Unit 1)

Southport, NC

Carolina Power
2/7/1970
& Light
Southern Nuclear 9/30/1969
Operating Co.

96

Vidalia, GA

Polk, 20-25.
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11/3/1975
12/31/1975

Oconee (Unit
1, 2, and 3)

Seneca, SC

Duke Power

11/6/1967

Turkey Point
(Unit 3 & 4)

Homestead,
FL

Florida Power
and Light

4/27/1967

7/15/1973;
9/9/1974;
12/16/1974
12/14/1972;
9/7/1973

TABLE 1.2: REGIONAL CATEGORIES
Midwest

Northeast

South

West

Illinois
Missouri
Nebraska
Ohio
Michigan
Iowa
Wisconsin
Minnesota
Kansas

Pennsylvania
Maryland
Connecticut
New York
New Jersey
New
Hampshire
Vermont
Maine
Massachusetts
Delaware*

Arkansas
Alabama
North Carolina
South Carolina
Texas
Georgia
Florida
Virginia
Tennessee
Louisiana
Mississippi

Washington
California
Arizona
Oregon
Washington

51

States without
Commercial
Nuclear Power
(Current or
Former)
Alaska
Colorado
Hawaii
Idaho
Indiana
Kentucky
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
North Dakota
South Dakota
Rhode Island
Utah
West Virginia
Wyoming

Figure One: Construction Permit Licenses By Region,
1966-1976 (Operating Reactors)
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CHAPTER TWO

THE KUDZU AND THE REACTOR: NUCLEAR POWER ON THE
MISSISSIPPI RIVER
These people are out in Mississippi trying to operate a nuclear plant –they’re not
qualified to operate a car.1
I think I know how people feel in countries such as those that are memorialized in novels
like Animal Farm and 1984. You never know where you are. Power is total, arbitrary,
and absolutely unconcerned with the interest of the ordinary citizens.
---Bill Clinton (1986)

Without wings, there are three ways to see the Grand Gulf cooling tower: by boat,
by car, or by looking east across the Mississippi River from Louisiana. Enterprising
travelers might take the historic Natchez Trace, cross through Port Gibson, a small,
historic and hard-pressed community, and then over a series of rural roads that seem to
lead nowhere. Mississippi’s only nuclear reactor sits in the outer reaches of sparsely
populated Claiborne County (population, 9,000), towering over rich farmland and river
gullies consumed by kudzu. Any vague notions of nuclear power as a symbol of
modernity and technological triumph appear out of joint with the surroundings. Hunting
down nuclear reactors in rural Mississippi brings visitors to a land that time forgot. From
a car, a distant view of the cooling tower surfaces first, framed by trees draped with
1

Congressional staffer Richard Udell, quoted in Bryan Burrough, “Nuclear Fission: A
Huge Atomic Plant, Long Ignored, Stirs Up Fight at Middle South,” Wall Street Journal,
June 15, 1984.
53

Spanish moss. Fortunate travelers might pass a few ambling cows wearing quizzical
expressions, as if to ask why anyone would venture to this place. The power produced by
the reactor leaves the kudzu landscape and moves elsewhere, to more populated, more
developed towns and cities. That Grand Gulf tower, though, stands still, saturated in
history, tragedy, and poverty.
The history of Grand Gulf emblematizes the New South’s muddled legacy, where
the declarations of modernity, progress, and economic opportunity rarely ignited the
kinds of economic transformation promised in the communities near nuclear power
plants. When Grand Gulf neared commercial operation, debates ignited over rising utility
rates, tax revenue distribution, corporate accountability, and federal regulation. Grand
Gulf appeared less as a beacon of progress and far more as a debacle—one that ensnared
ratepayers in three states and stripped a poor, predominantly African-American county of
its ability to tax nuclear plants. In response, Grand Gulf stirred a populist revolt, where a
new class of moderate southern Democrats, including Bill Clinton, adopted the issue,
producing politically well-timed but much needed critiques about poverty, inequality, and
corporate power in post-Watergate America and in the “new” South.1 In tandem, Public
Service Commissions, rate-payers, and anti-nuclear activists joined the fray. The nuclear
project hidden away in an isolated corner of Mississippi provoked a power grab in the
South during the 1970s and 1980s.

1

Historian Thomas R. Wellock describes the battle over the San Joaquin Nuclear Plant in
populist terms. See Wellock, “Stick It in L.A.! Community Control and Nuclear Power in
California’s Central Valley,” The Journal of American History 84, No. 3 (December
1997): 942-978.
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Whether studying a nuclear reactor in the former-Soviet Union or in the United
States, technological artifacts—especially high-risk ones—offer “ways of building order
in this world.”2 In his 1980 article, “Do Artifacts Have Politics?,” Langdon Winner
explored whether “technical things have political qualities,” and “can embody specific
forms of power or authority.”3 Winner drew upon Lewis Mumford’s earlier assertion that
two types of technologies have existed “side-by-side” historically, one democratic, and
another authoritarian.4 Lewis Mumford’s binary between centralized, authoritarian
technology and decentralized, democratic technology leaves little room for ambiguity,
and historians of technology characterize his views as deterministic, albeit softened
somewhat.5 Winner’s article, and the groundbreaking work of Thomas Parke Hughes,
animated a discussion about the political and cultural dimensions of technology.
Hughes’s work encouraged historians of technology to interpret technological
development as a product of internal and external dynamics, rather than viewing
engineers or technology as impermeable from influence. In this sense, political, cultural,
economic, and environmental contexts shape technology. While contemporary scholars
generally avoid notions of technological determinism, where technology itself drives
history, I agree with Winner’s contention that some technologies require or rely upon
2

Langdon Winner Do Artifacts Have Politics? Daedalus, Vol. 109, No. 1 (Winter,
1980): 121-136.

3

Langdon Winner Do Artifacts Have Politics? Daedalus, Vol. 109, No. 1 (Winter,
1980): 121-136; 121.

4

Lewis Mumford, “Authoritarian and Democratic Technics,” Technology and Culture
Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 1964): 1-8.

5

Merritt Roe Smith, “Technological Determinism in American Culture,” Does
Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, 2-35.
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complementary systems of power and knowledge distribution. This chapter examines
how certain technologies, or rather the systems constructed to manage them, invite
particular arrangements of power. If technologies are formed by external and internal
dynamics, and offer ways of “building order” in our world, they can also embody
political and cultural meanings grounded in specific local, regional, or national contexts.
Technical artifacts often produce meaning in unexpected ways with considerable variance
from one place to another, suggesting that even when structures are roughly the same,
what these objects project may differ.
Grand Gulf and the “Most Broken Country”
The town of Grand Gulf largely exists as a ghost town today, dominated by
Entergy’s plant and the Grand Gulf Military Park.6 Long before white settlers traveled
there, indigenous people inhabited the area, and the nuclear plant occupies land that once
contained a large burial mound dating to 50 A.D. to 200 A.D..7 Although two-thirds of
the burial mound were bulldozed, and some were objects removed by “relic hunters,”
archaeologists in the 1970s managed to excavate the mound, finding objects indicative of
Hopewell culture, such as small pieces of pottery and pressed Copper.8

6

Mississippi Historical Society Vol. V (University Press, Oxford, MS., 1902), Grand
Gulf Vertical Files, State of Mississippi Archives.

7

Samuel O. Brookes, “The Grand Gulf Mound: Salvage Excavation of an Early
Marksville Burial Mound in Claiborne County, Mississippi” (Mississippi Department of
Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi, 1976), 4-5.

8

Ibid., 6.
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Early white settlers named the area “Grand Gulph” for an eddy in the Mississippi
River.9 By the 1820s, Grand Gulf was a “flourishing” community along the river,
supported by the cotton trade, slavery, and its convenient location. Decades later,
misfortune visited Grand Gulf through illness, environmental disaster, and war. During
the 1850s alone, the town suffered through a yellow fever outbreak, a major fire, and a
tornado. Following these disasters, the river’s path moved westward, causing the “Caving
of the Gulf,” where much of the town caved into the Mississippi. A community once
home to at least 900 residents dwindled to less than two hundred, or as another observer
put it, “the place was left to die.”10
With the onset of the American Civil War, Grand Gulf’s existence appeared
precarious once again because of its prime location near the river and Vicksburg. As
Union troops moved through the area in 1862, General Ulysses Grant allegedly described
Grand Gulf and the surrounding land as “the most broken country I ever saw. The whole
country is a series of irregular ridges, divided by impassable ravines grown up with heavy
timber, undergrowth and cane.”11 Despite the hostile terrain, Union forces routed
Confederate troops in the spring of 1863. In a letter to General William Sherman, Grant
again described the area as “extremely broken” and concluded ominously that “the road

9

Mississippi Historical Society Vol. V. (University Press, Oxford, MS., 1902), Grand
Gulf Vertical Files, State of Mississippi Archives.

10

Ibid.
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Katy McCaleb Headley (compiled by) Claiborne County, Mississippi: The Promised
Land (Port Gibson-Claiborne County Historical Society, 1976), 358.
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to Vicksburg is open.”12 In December 1864, the U.S.S. Rattler, a Union gunboat
patrolling the area, ran aground during a heavy gale and sank, but not before “the rebels
had set her upper works on fire.”13 Even if the Rattler’s demise granted Confederate
troops momentary satisfaction, the calamities from war and from natural disasters
doomed Grand Gulf. While the community never recovered from the trials of the midnineteenth century, its history found a resurrection of sorts a century later. In 1962, as
white resistance to African-American civil rights reached a fever pitch in Mississippi,
Governor Ross Barnett attended the dedication of the Grand Gulf Military Park, which
continues to preserve the remnants of Grand Gulf—a historic church (not original to the
area), scattered traces of the Civil War, and a crumbling cemetery mostly filled with
victims of yellow fever. The park’s creation no doubt came from a revival of interest in
the Civil War and southern history that coincided, not surprisingly, with the civil rights
movement.
While the reactor sits nearby, ghosts, rather conveniently, remain unaffected by
nuclear power. The predominately African-American community of Port Gibson, which
General Grant purportedly described as “too beautiful to burn,” and the surrounding
Claiborne County, live with a nuclear present. If not a ghost town, Claiborne County, like
many other rural places, has experienced a slow decline in population and suffers from
abysmally high poverty rates, with over thirty-three percent of residents living below the

12

Letter from Gen. Grant to General Sherman, May 3, 1863 (Grand Gulf, Mississippi)
Grant (U.S. Papers), State of Mississippi Archives, Jackson, Mississippi.
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Letter from Lieutenant Commander E.Y. McCauley, January 1, 1865, Official Records
of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion Series I, Vol. 26 (U.S.
Government Printing Office 1914), 769.
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poverty line.14 As historian Emilye Crosby has noted, slavery and sharecropping
“shaped” interactions between black and white residents of Claiborne County “well into
the twentieth century,” and the implications of those historic legacies remain visible
today.15 The history of Entergy’s Grand Gulf plant and its location in Claiborne County
matter for many reasons, among them, it illustrates the dilemma of rural communities in
the modern South, the shortcomings of nuclear power as an economic engine, and the
complicated political terrain during the post-civil rights period.
In 1972, Mississippi Power & Light, (MP&L) which was then a subsidiary of
Middle South Utilities System (which later became Entergy), announced plans to build
two nuclear reactors in Claiborne County.16 Because the financing of Grand Gulf
exceeded the costs for one relatively small utility company, MSU created “Middle South
Energy, Inc.,” which would technically own and pay for Grand Gulf, while MP&L would
“design, construct, and operate” the plant.17 For clarity, the chapter refers to MP&L and
not the larger subsidiary, MSE (a subsidiary of MSU). At the time, MP&L served fortyfour counties in Mississippi and over 200,000 customers. Like many other utilities during
this period, MP&L’s plans for two reactors reflected the widespread belief that economic

14

Claiborne County, United States Census, 2010,
Quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/28/28021.html.
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Emilye Crosby Little Taste of Freedom: The Black Freedom Struggle in Claiborne
County, Mississippi (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2005), 3.
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growth and cheap, abundant energy correlated closely with one another and bloated
estimates of power consumption in the immediate future.
The planned site encompassed 2300 acres bordering the Mississippi River and the
Grand Gulf Military Park. As part of the licensing process, MP&L conducted an
environmental assessment, and the formal environmental impact statement depicts Grand
Gulf’s site as it existed in 1972. The flood plain of the river spanned sixty miles, flanked
at its edges by loessial bluffs, which may have inspired Grant’s description of the
inhospitable terrain, an unpredictable mix of a powerful river and unstable bluffs.18 Close
to the river, the site also contained two lakes, swamp land, and pools of still water, which
periodically disappeared during seasonal floods. Today, Grand Gulf’s reactor occupies
the eastern part of the site separated from the river by bluffs with steep slopes.
When MP&L surveyed the aquatic species potentially affected by Grand Gulf,
they noted that while over one hundred species of commercial and sport fish were found
in the lower Mississippi, in recent years, deadly fish kills had curtailed a once abundant
source. In the early 1960s, as Pete Daniel has traced, a series of “massive and disturbing”
fish kills occurred in the lower Mississippi—south of Memphis. A number of chemicals
contributed to the problem, among them endrin, used as an insecticide and rodenticide.19
The fish kills of the 1960s demonstrated the dangers of industrial and agricultural run-off,
in addition to unregulated hazardous waste disposal. Moreover, the incidents exposed
their far-reaching effects; potent chemicals released upstream not only traveled
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MP&L, Environmental Report, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (1972), 2.5-1.
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MP&L, Environmental Report, 2.7-1; Pete Daniel, Toxic Drift: Pesticides and Health
in the Post-War World II South (LSU Press, 2007), 84-85.
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downstream, but fish absorbed these chemicals in surprising quantities, leading to the
jarring image of hundred pound gar and thigh-thick catfish bleeding from their gills and
dying in large numbers. Comparatively, thermal pollution from a nuclear reactor
appeared far more benign.
Forests, mainly bottomland hardwoods and loessial bluff hardwoods, such as
sugar-berry and sweet-gum trees, occupied much of the site. During summer-time, the
forest’s understory revealed dewberries, while the bluffs put out poison ivy and Japanese
honeysuckle, an invasive species that thrives in the warm climates.20 Grand Gulf’s forests
and fauna were also home to over ninety-six avian species, as identified in 1972, ranging
from Carolina chickadees to owls to bobwhite quail. The Middle Ground Island, in the
site’s western portion, welcomed thousands of blackbirds for roosting. Amidst the
thriving bird population were an array of mammals, reptiles, and amphibians.21 Even as
natural and unnatural events left Grand Gulf bereft of humans, the terrain teemed with
other life forms.
Like other environmental studies conducted in the early 1970s, the survey noted
the possibility that certain rare or endangered species might inhabit the area: the red wolf
(canis rufous), the puma (felis concolor), the American Alligator (Alligator
Mississipensis), and the eskimo curlew (Numenius borealis).22 While alleged sightings of
cougars in the southeastern United States still occur, other species have since disappeared
from the region. The last reported sighting of the avian species, the eskimo curlew, in the
20
21
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MP&L, Environmental Report, 2.7-13.
MP&L, Environmental Report, 2.7-13-26.
Ibid., 2.7-26.

61

Southeast occurred in 1987. Near Grand Gulf, only one American Alligator was spotted
during the survey, and no sightings of red wolves had been reported since 1946.23
In this regard, Grand Gulf’s environmental impact statement (EIS) helps illustrate
the site’s environment as it existed in 1972, but it also pointed to an environment that
existed only in the abstract or the imaginary—perhaps somewhere a cougar or red wolf
roamed. Nothing in the site’s two thousand acres constituted enough of an environmental
jewel, according to MP&L and the federal government, to halt plans for Grand Gulf.
After all, humans had abandoned much of the vine-swarmed river gullies a century prior.
And unlike many other forms of industrial development, the large size of nuclear plant
sites and relatively small portion of land used, in some ways, actually preserves the land
from destruction.24 For Grand Gulf, MP&L estimated only 300 acres, ninety-percent of
which was forested, required clearing.25
While MP&L noted alternative sites in its EIS, Grand Gulf proved more
appealing for environmental reasons and allegedly because of the economic benefits for
Claiborne County. MP&L’s EIS statement, which often included socioeconomic details,
noted the county’s decline in population and economic opportunities over the course of
the twentieth-century, underlining the high employment rate, low per capita income, and
percentage of residents receiving public assistance. As the EIS stated, Claiborne County
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“has long been one of the most impoverished areas in the United States,” and the other
alternative sites possessed more economic resources.26 From MP&L’s perspective,
Claiborne County offered an ideal setting for a nuclear plant. After several years of
licensing procedures, and a public hearing that lasted only 17 and-a-half minutes, the
Atomic Energy Commission granted MP&L a full authorization for construction in
September 1974.27
At the ground-breaking ceremony one month later, Mississippi Governor William
Waller extoled the moment; it provided “matchless evidence that Mississippi and her
people are moving forward to a glorious destiny.”28 The president of nearby Alcorn State
University (one of Mississippi’s historically black colleges), Dr. Walter Washington,
praised the plant’s potential to raise the standard of living for “all citizens,” and other
locals expressed their hope that the plant would breath “new life and a new prosperity”
into the area.29 The ceremony, in some respects, resembled any other of its kind with
vague platitudes about the future and the benefits of a project. Considering the area’s dire
poverty and poor infrastructure though, a nuclear powered future meant tangible
improvements and significant tax revenues. While the employment numbers touted by
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utility companies never guaranteed local jobs, particularly in the South where
construction work was at least partially comprised of union labor and required some
degree of skill, the other benefits offered enough to engender community support. Even if
that entailed living in the shadow of a nuclear reactor, a bargain likely appeared better
than the alternative.
Despite this, some observers expressed skepticism about the project’s benefits for
Claiborne County. In a pamphlet published by the Black Economic Research Center,
which is undated but likely written before construction began, writer Joseph Huttie Jr.
raised a number of concerns about Grand Gulf. Noting the county’s poverty, Huttie
surmised that local residents saw the “station as a guaranteed way to a better and more
productive life,” and because of this, posing questions to locals remained “difficult.”30
Huttie contrasted the gross disparities between the average per capita income for
Claiborne County residents, approximately $1,860 and the estimated wage for a Grand
Gulf Construction worker—$23,000 to $26,000. Despite the promises made by MP&L
officials, the pamphlet pointed to a study conducted by the utility itself, which conceded
that construction workers would likely come from outside Claiborne County. In fact, as
the document acutely notes, even the term “local” meant something different to MP&L;
“local” translated to the nearby cities “Vicksburg, Natchez, or Jackson.” Even if the
county received increased tax revenue, nothing guaranteed any sort of long-term,
widespread economic development in Claiborne County itself. While anti-nuclear
activists would oppose Grand Gulf for other reasons in the coming years, the pamphlet
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redirected attention to equally relevant concerns. Among them, a project “with the
magnitude of Grand Gulf” would soon occupy a predominantly black, impoverished
county, where African-Americans had “historically been little more than second class
citizens.”31
Even though the locations of nuclear plants in the South do not strongly
correspond to racial demographics, and Claiborne County possessed exceptional
characteristics regarding poverty and demographics in comparison to other sites, Huttie
rightly contended that history could not be “ignored.”32 In a place with few means, where
equality and protection under federal law had routinely failed its black citizens, building a
high-risk system of electrical generation raised serious questions. What guarantees would
be made by local, state, and federal officials to guarantee the safety and the well-being of
people whose safety and rights had been ignored or willfully neglected by such entities?
Moreover, Huttie perceptively observed that even if the plant operated safely, Claiborne
County’s future only offered minor changes, “in which the already rich get richer while
the poor stay poor.”33
Tornadoes, Toads, and Three Mile Island: Obstacles to Building Grand Gulf
Like many nuclear plants under construction in the 1970s and 1980s, Grand Gulf
encountered obstacles—both internally and externally produced. Beyond general issues
that utility companies confronted, such as rising costs and a moving regulatory target,
Grand Gulf’s problems also reflected a larger power struggle, spanning three states and
31
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ensnaring consumers, laborers, politicians, utility executives, public utility commissions,
and the federal government. Recent scholarship on energy systems has emphasized the
hidden or invisible nature of electricity, and the disjuncture between where energy is
produced and what places receive that power.34 To a great extent, Grand Gulf exemplifies
the generally hidden nature of our energy systems, where rural communities or “the
hinterlands” supply large and medium sized cities with power.35 And yet, even though
non-activists consumers rarely expressed concern for the places that contained coal or
nuclear plants, debates about energy choices were highly visible in the 1970s and 1980s.
In part, the 1970s energy crisis and fears about nuclear accidents heightened
concerns. As the debacle over Grand Gulf illustrates though, consumers in the late 1970s
and 1980s confronted the threat of wildly escalating utility bills to pay for nuclear power
plants. Unlike today, local and national media outlets covered these issues relentlessly,
often portraying nuclear reactors as boondoggles and utility executives as exceedingly
powerful, greedy, and irresponsible. If the environmental complexities, and metropolitan
and rural inequities, were less perceptible to those outside of places like Claiborne
County, consumers in Mississippi and elsewhere faced enormous rate increases,
prompting widespread outrage about government and corporate accountability. Stories of
faulty construction, neglect from regulators, and drug use at nuclear sites only
34
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exacerbated the sense that utility companies had bungled their grand plans for nuclear
power but hesitated little in asking for rate increases to pay for their mistakes. From the
1970s to early 1980s, economic, environmental, and energy crises converged,
invigorating concerns about what America’s energy future would look like, how it would
affect the environment, and who would pay for it. These concerns reverberated in
Mississippi, Arkansas, and Louisiana, as all three states found themselves with Grand
Gulf’s hefty price tag. Before the rate debacle occurred though, a series of other issues
emerged during Grand Gulf’s construction. While the problems do not warrant an
extensive discussion, they illustrate why many people felt skeptical about nuclear power,
the difficulty MP&L had adapting to an increasingly complicated regulatory landscape,
and the reactions from Claiborne County residents.
Construction at Grand Gulf occurred for several years with little fanfare or media
attention. Interest in the plant resurged in April 1978, when a tornado ripped through the
Grand Gulf site. The tornado’s path was 1,500 to 1,800 feet wide, with winds upward of
125 to 150 miles per hour.36 Construction cranes toppled from the storm’s force and
collided into one cooling tower. The collision between the crane broke a large section
from the upper section of the tower—an image that widely circulated and made the
structure appear vulnerable.37 The utility responded to the incident by asserting that
damage only resulted from an unusual collision, one that would not occur during normal
operation, but hired outside firms to inspect the damage. The event made a facility
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allegedly invulnerable to all natural disasters—barring truly exceptional events—seem
vulnerable even to mid-range storm. Of more consequence than the repair costs or
construction delays, the tornado reinserted Grand Gulf into the public mind and largely
remained there for the next decade. Adding to the renewed interest, in the fall of 1978, a
labor strike at Grand Gulf prompted a walk-out of over two hundred carpenters.38 It was a
small disruption but portended greater obstacles in the future for Mississippi Power &
Light.
The March 1979 accident at Three Mile Island galvanized anti-nuclear activism
across the United States. Grand Gulf, which had been immune to the large protests
elsewhere, faced scrutiny from a small cluster of anti-nuclear organizations in
Mississippi. While the accident at TMI loomed large in the public’s mind (evidenced by
archival sources and polling data), other recent events also drew skepticism from
residents in western Mississippi.39 A year earlier, a federal report named a number of
possible sites for nuclear waste storage, among them were three sites in Mississippi.
Residents in Richton, Mississippi reacted coolly, with one man asking “How would you
like to live on top of an atomic bomb?...That is the ground my grandchildren are living
on.”40 While Governor Cliff Finch described the state’s position as “unalterably
opposed,” the possibility for federal imposition—by the way of radioactive waste
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storage—loomed into the 1980s and has been periodically suggested as a possibility in
the past decade. The threat encouraged a small anti-nuclear movement in Mississippi,
which intensified after the accident at Three Mile Island.
In the same month as TMI, Dr. Edmund Keiser, a University of Mississippi
biologist discovered high levels of radiation in “deformed” toads near the Tatum salt
dome, where underground nuclear testing had been conducted in the 1960s.41 The
biologist believed the toads were possibly exposed to tritium, the radionuclide often
found in water sources near nuclear sites. Keiser disclosed his suspicions with a local
Sierra Club member but cautioned against informing media outlets before further
testing.42 Testing showed high levels of radiation, specifically sodium-22, a radioactive
isotope of sodium, but later investigations revealed that contaminated laboratory
equipment produced abnormally high levels of radiation.43 The radioactive toad scare
may have passed, but even unproven nuclear controversies produced suspicion, hurting
the industry’s credibility.
As fears swirled, three hundred protestors descended upon Port Gibson in June
1979.44 Like many anti-nuclear protests, activists passed out anti-nuclear literature and
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gave speeches about the dangers of nuclear power, advertising the slogan frequently used
by southern anti-nuclear activists: “No Nuke’s Y’all.” Recycling a common anti-nuclear
spectacle, protestors released five hundred balloons with a warning card affixed: “The
winds would be carrying radioactive contamination to this point. YOU would be
contaminated.”45 Watching the protest, an electrician employed at Grand Gulf, levied a
familiar critique at the anti-nuclear activists. Drawing a distinction between those who
labored and those who protested, and underscoring the types of knowledge obtained from
laboring onsite, the electrician urged the reporter to “take a look at these people around
here,” and concluded that if protestors “worked for a living at this like I do, they wouldn’t
be protesting.”46 The activists, primarily from Jackson and Hattiesburg, viewed the event
as a way to educate locals and to raise alarm about the dangers of nuclear power, but
expressed a “little disappointment” that few Port Gibson residents joined the protest.
Locals, in fact, were no strangers to protest. During the 1960s, the NAACP helped
orchestrate a boycott of white merchants in Port Gibson.47 Even after Three Mile Island,
the local stance towards Grand Gulf ranged from supportive to ambivalent. Sarah Pearson
Crisler, publisher of the Port Gibson Reveille, described the plant as a “boon to the entire
town,” and then underscored the difficulty outsiders might have of its upside: “You just
have no idea what this plant means to us, economically.”48 The town librarian, Nancy
Batton, disclosed her growing skepticism of the plant’s safety after the tornado incident,
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but also informed reporters that no patron had requested information on nuclear energy in
three years, adding “that kind of tells you something about how worried people are in
Port Gibson.”49
Others expressed an ambivalent view towards the plant. Reporters found resident
Hicks McNair fishing at a pond near Grand Gulf, who aptly surmised, “Maybe it’s
dangerous and maybe’s not.”50 While the comment captured the kind of common sense
interpretation that reporters gravitated towards, particularly when interviewing rural
people fishing (an exhaustingly common trope), McNair’s observation also highlighted
how attitudes towards technology shifted based on circumstance. The people of Claiborne
County had few options for economic opportunity, and even as allegations and proven
violations surfaced, the thread of ambivalence continued. While views for and against
nuclear power are generally emphasized, McNair’s comment demonstrates the real
albatross for the industry—an inability to remove the possibility of a severe accident,
which led to neither strong support nor outright opposition in certain cases.
As the fervor around the tornado, TMI, and radioactive toads subsided, larger
problems loomed for Mississippi Power & Light and its Grand Gulf plant. First, as a
result of a general downturn in the nuclear industry, the company suspended construction
on Grand Gulf’s second reactor unit in 1979.51 Beyond this industry-wide trend, where
demand for energy dropped and new reactors appeared unnecessary, a rate-controversy
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jeopardized Grand Gulf’s future in the early 1980s, when it became unclear who would
pay for the plant and who would buy the power it produced. Adding to this, reports of
excessive violations, falsified documents, and shoddy construction seriously encumbered
the final licensing process. In part, the nuclear industry spent much of the 1980s adjusting
to a post-TMI regulatory landscape, where tightening regulations forced substandard or
lax management to overhaul their practices.
More broadly, the problems occurred during transitional period for the entire
utility industry. The 1970s energy crisis, inflation, the environmental and anti-nuclear
movements, “technological stasis” in utility hardware, and new policies challenged the
“utility consensus” of decades past.52 During the early twentieth century, utility
companies built “regional electric power empires,” which were poorly regulated and
shakily financed.53 In an attempt to ameliorate the abuses of utilities, Congress passed the
Public Utility Holding Company Act in 1935, which “abolished most utility holding
companies except those providing economies and efficiencies to geographically
contiguous utilities.”54 The act limited how utility companies were organized, and the
New Deal programs like TVA and the Rural Electrification Agency also challenged the
authority utility companies held. Despite these measures though, utility companies
continued to operate through smaller holding companies, where the cost of building new
power facilities often entailed “pooling” agreements between several smaller companies,
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sometimes in contiguous states. Moreover, utilities still operated as “natural monopolies,”
whose arrangements were allowed because the product served the public good. Until the
1970s, utility companies pursued a “grow and build” strategy, which promoted electricity
consumption “in order to justify building new, more productive power plants,” and
consumers enjoyed low energy prices.55
In the late 1970s, the landscape also changed for utility companies due to Jimmy
Carter’s National Energy Plan. The “cornerstone” of Jimmy Carter’s plan was a piece of
legislation known as PURPA, the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978.56
According to James Williams, PURPA “eliminated rate structures,” which favored large
users of electricity, and it forced utilities to potentially buy electricity from industrial
generators or small scale energy producers—such as a solar farm.57 In practical terms,
PURPA challenged the “grow and build” strategy utilities had long advocated, which
encouraged unrestrained usage of electricity.58 The legislation encouraged the presence of
“soft energy” generators, which made it easier for generators of wind, solar, and other
nontraditional forms of power generation to compete with traditional utility companies.
PURPA also encouraged deregulation in the utility industry, one that has had some
positive consequences with diversifying power sources, but also opened the door for
disastrous deregulation that resulted in California’s electricity crisis in 2000 and 2001.59
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While many utility companies failed to anticipate the larger changes PURPA spurred, an
executive from Mississippi Power & Light sent letters to mayors in their service area
warning them of the dire consequences if PURPA passed: the “very survival of the
United States as a free nation is [was] threatened by the bill.” 60 An uncertain political,
economic, and regulatory climate placed utilities in a precarious position, and perhaps
nowhere were these shifting sands more evident than with Grand Gulf’s rate debacle.
Grand Gulf Becomes “Grand Goof”: Populist Outrage, Bill Clinton, and the Rate Crisis
Like most nuclear plants undergoing construction in the late 1970s, MP&L
repeatedly pushed back Grand Gulf’s completion date, and as delays occurred,
construction costs soared. Suddenly, in the early 1980s, the “largest construction project
in Mississippi” had far exceeded anticipated costs and forecasts for power consumption
had declined, leaving MP&L desperately searching for a means to uphold a financial
agreement from a decade prior—when the outlook about energy consumption and
construction costs appeared very different. In the case of Grand Gulf, several smaller
utilities within its parent company, Middle-South Utilities, were part of a system
agreement to pay for Grand Gulf and to buy some of its power. System agreements
offered companies a feasible way of financing large-scale projects, especially nuclear
reactors, which even by early estimates cost upwards of five-hundred million dollars—
per reactor. For Grand Gulf, Arkansas Power & Light, New Orleans Public Service, Inc.,
Louisiana Power & Light, and MP&L had committed, perhaps unknowingly, to pay for a
certain percentage of Grand Gulf and to buy power from it in the future. Moreover,
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MP&L officials allegedly informed Mississippi’s Public Service Commission in 1974
that the utility’s financial obligations for the plant only amounted to nineteen percent.61
The battle over who would pay for Grand Gulf ensnared utility companies, public
service commissions, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), state and
local governments, and consumers. Described by the Wall Street Journal as “one of the
largest and most complicated” cases ever presented to FERC, the legal and political fight
over funding Grand Gulf exposed the vulnerability of even well-established utilities. The
fight revealed the extent to which electric rates were a hot-button political issue.62 In
tandem, the rate controversy underlined and acknowledged the ongoing problem of
poverty, the former bread and butter of southern liberals that had been replaced by
identity-politics and obscured by the so-called Americanization of Dixie. Even if the
politicians and state officials who issued ominous warnings about the effects of thirty
percent rate increases for poor constituents cared little about addressing ongoing, deepseeded poverty in Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana, they rightly inferred that
dramatic rate increases were politically disastrous. While our energy systems appear
“invisible” to many people today, the controversies surrounding nuclear power and the
crisis within the utility business turned into a hyper-visible issue in the late 1970s and
1980s.
In 1974, Middle-South Utilities (MSU) developed the agreement for financing
Grand Gulf, which divided the cost between its various subsidiaries located in
61
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Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas. Later testimony by then Arkansas Governor Bill
Clinton noted the surreptitious nature of the agreement; it was filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission but not published in the Federal Register—potentially leaving
state public service commissions unaware of the implications.63 Then in 1977, according
to Clinton’s testimony, Middle South Utilities president Floyd Lewis testified before
Arkansas’s Public Service Commission that the state’s ratepayers would not be
financially responsible for Grand Gulf if the power proved unneeded.64 Recalling the
moment in 1986, Clinton stated that he would “never forget, if…[he lived] to be 100, the
clear memory of …[Lewis] raising his right hand and taking oath…that we would not
have to pay for Grand Gulf if we built all the power plants he wanted us to build.”65
At some point during 1979 or 1980, documents surfaced that showed AP&L had
committed to paying for part of Grand Gulf, even if the power provided by the new plant
was unnecessary.66 In 1980, Arkansas Power & Light left the agreement after the
Arkansas Public Service Commission and then Attorney General Bill Clinton pressured
Middle-South.67 The other subsidiaries reportedly signed a memorandum agreeing to
AP&L’s exit, which pleased Arkansans but alarmed ratepayers in Mississippi and
Louisiana. However, a formal agreement forced AP&L to guarantee loans to finance the
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plant, but otherwise the arrangement still appeared amenable to Arkansas’s PSC, who
feared massive rate increases as a result of Grand Gulf.68
As the news about the arrangement surfaced, MP&L spokesmen presented the
possibility for buying a greater share of Grand Gulf’s power as a necessary measure to
diversify a largely oil and natural-gas dependent regional energy system.69 But reports
placed the potential for rate increases in stark terms. If MP&L’s allocation increased to
over thirty-percent, a monthly electric bill that previously cost $52 dollars might soar to
$113 dollars.70 With the national economy still sputtering in 1980, and the uneven pattern
of economic development in the South post-World War II, many of MP&L’s customers
could hardly afford a rate increase. In 1982, MSU’s plan for power allocation, once
Grand Gulf went online, went before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), while in that same year, Mississippi’s Public Service Commission demanded a
hearing over the new cost allocations and possible rate increases.71
The call for a hearing by Mississippi’s Public Service Commission (MPSC)
reflected the contentious and embittered relationship between MP&L and the MPSC, and
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a more fundamental conflict between state officials and the federal government. MP&L
attempted to evade a hearing, prompting condemnation from the state’s Attorney General
Bill Allain:
MP&L came down here to the…[MPSC]…and got the certificate to build the
nuclear plant with the assurance to the commission that no more than 19 percent
would be used by MP&L. Now they’re running to Washington where they
think they will get better treatment and are thumbing their nose at the
commission.72

As Allain suggested, MP&L’s lawyers claimed that only FERC “has exclusive
jurisdiction” in this case and filed a motion to dismiss PSC’s order for a hearing.73 The
stakes were much higher than increased rates; the fight over Grand Gulf threatened to
permanently weaken the authority of states to regulate utilities. It also offered a chance
for renewed consideration of corporate accountability and the stubborn issue of poverty.
Attention to the latter had largely been superseded by interest in identity politics and
social causes, but for a brief moment, the threat of increased rates prompted politicians to
chip away at the Sunbelt façade of prosperity and progress.
Beyond official statements and testimony, other sources provide a good indication
of MP&L’s views about the battle over Grand Gulf. In 1988, a former MP&L employee,
Donald Colmer, published a book-length defense of the company and the project itself.
Colmer blamed MP&L’s problems upon a shift in political winds, where certain
gubernatorial administrations developed policies that reflected “regressive populism,”
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breaking several decades of aggressive efforts to attract industry.74 With the gubernatorial
election of Cliff Finch, a Mississippi Democrat who “sacked groceries…on his way to the
Governor’s Mansion,” the presidential election of Jimmy Carter, and Bill Clinton’s
gubernatorial victory in Arkansas, “populism was reborn with a vengeance.”75 Following
Cliff Finch’s term, the election of the anti-nuclear Democrat, William F. Winter, like the
election of Richard Riley in South Carolina, assured closer scrutiny of the nuclear
industry and utility companies generally. Following Clinton’s lead, Bill Allain’s battle
against MP&L also won him political points, and he succeeded Winter in 1984. From
Colmer’s perspective, and likely many others, the populist-infused critique of utility
companies, specifically Middle-South Utilities, brought about larger economic changes.
Colmer characterized Jimmy Carter’s election as the “greatest tragedy” for electric
customers in the “southern tier of states,” and lamented the anti-growth policies of socalled populists who initiated the “heavy exodus of industry” from the United States.76
The populist fervor continued into 1983, when the Mississippi Public Service
Commission, led by Lynn Havens, D.W. Snyder, and Norman Johnson, pressed MP&L
for a public hearing on the issue, and after a series of legal skirmishes, a federal judge
ruled backed MPSC’s request for a hearing.77 While the PSC hearing would not occur
until June 1983, hearings before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission began in
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March 1983. During those proceedings, public service commissions from Louisiana and
Mississippi cited concerns about rate increases, in addition to MP&L and MSU’s
concerted efforts to side-step state authority.78
Like the public service commissions in Arkansas and Mississippi, Louisiana’s
state commission, along with the New Orleans City Council, expressed alarm at their
financial obligation but also called for the return of Arkansas Power & Light to the
agreement.79 By November 1983 though, the citizen group, Save Our Wetlands, decried
the willingness of the New Orleans City Council to consider a referendum giving
Louisiana Power & Light and New Orleans Public Service (MSU companies) exclusive
access to their market for sixty years, described by the group as a “conspiracy between
the City Council and the utilities.80 Despite the onslaught of criticism by public service
commissions, citizen groups expressed doubt about their immunity from corruption. The
suit alleged that an earlier referendum which ceded complete control of New Orleans
Public Service to the Louisiana Public Service Commission was “the only referendum in
American history to be underwritten by a private corporation.”81
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The legal odyssey over cost-allocation and rate approvals required hearings before
state public service commissions, primarily Mississippi’s, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, and eventually the United States Supreme Court. In 1984, FERC’s
administrative law judge ruled that all four generating companies should bear the cost of
Grand Gulf and recommended AP&L’s allocation as thirty-six percent.82 Responding to
this ruling, infuriated Arkansans allegedly mailed “hundreds of thousands of post cards”
to President Ronald Reagan, insisting that Secretary of Energy Donald Hodel “advocate
the ‘states’ rights’ position on this issue.”83 If Grand Gulf has faded from public memory
today, in 1984, Arkansans named it the most important news story of the year.84
Relishing in the furor, Governor Bill Clinton described the fight as “war,” and any
payments from Arkansans for Grand Gulf would occur “over his dead body.”85
The frustration extended to Mississippi’s Public Service Commission, who
relentlessly pursued a clear justification for any possible rate increases in the future and
doggedly fought for the PSC’s right to intervene in such matters. After a series of bizarre
hearings, where commissioners purposely mispronounced names, ridiculed one witness’s
hair, and were photographed asleep during the hearings, the PSC ordered an extensive
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audit of Grand Gulf in September 1984.86 Ignoring the recommendations by the Public
Utilities Staff, the PSC selected Burkhalter and Company, an accounting firm based in
Jackson, Mississippi, for the audit.87 Receiving over two million dollars for the audit,
Burkhalter & Company found MP&L largely blame-free for Grand Gulf’s escalating
costs, concluding that “factors causing major cost escalation and schedule slippage were
industry-wide in nature and beyond the direct control of MP&L.”88
While the audit gave the PSC more substantial justification for a rate increase,
corruption ran rampant throughout, as later federal investigations determined. On August
11, 1987, the forty-year old lead auditor of Grand Gulf, David Charles, was found dead
from carbon monoxide poisoning in the garage of his Jackson home.89 However, the
coroner officially ruled the cause of death “undetermined,” and the FBI found his death
suspicious enough to launch an investigation.90 Charles had been a friend and campaign
aide for the hard-charging PSC Commissioners, D.W. Snyder and Lynn Havens, and
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those ties presumably led the PSC to ignore other viable bids for the audit.91 Less than a
year earlier, Snyder and Havens were indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of
plotting to stall MP&L rate approval. According to the federal charges, Snyder and
Havens attempted to force MP&L to settle a suit with United Gas Pipe Line Company,
threatening that without an amendable settlement, MP&L would not receive a rate
increase to pay for Grand Gulf. Havens and Snyder were allegedly bribed by Travis
Ward, a Texas oilman, who provided free trips to Havens and Snyder, and possibly paid
for David Charles’s trip to the Super Bowl in 1984. The core issue for federal
investigators was whether the audit fraudulently ignored evidence of MP&L’s role in
forcing “imprudent costs” onto consumers. Although family members cited Charles
suffered from narcolepsy and may have fallen asleep in his vehicle, others expressed
doubts. One friend, Barclay Rader, shared with reporters that Charles allegedly once said,
“If they say I committed suicide, find the one who pulled the trigger.”92 The indictment
of Haven and Snyder, along with the suspicious death of David Charles, call not only the
audit’s conclusions into question but also taints the entire fight between the PSC and
MP&L over rate increases.
In 1985 though, no corruption had yet surfaced in the Grand Gulf debacle, and
there were more immediate concerns. Among them, the plant itself inched closer to
officially going online and finally producing power. While MP&L and MSU officials
sought rate relief approval, engineers readied Grand Gulf for its commercial debut, which
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had been long-delayed after a series of obstacles and missteps. In 1982, the NRC granted
MP&L a low-power license, and Unit One achieved criticality or “went online,” albeit on
a much smaller scale than during commercial operation. However, due to a series of
unresolved problems, the agency ordered the reactor to remain shut down until MP&L
addressed the issues.93 For example, the NRC belatedly realized that technical
specifications for Grand Gulf were borrowed from a model drawn from another plant,
and thus, surveillance and safety procedures were not based upon Grand Gulf’s actual
specifications.94 Grand Gulf employs a “Mark III” containment structure, which no
operating commercial plant had at the time, so the discrepancy mattered.95 Only in
September 1983 did the NRC grant permission for low-power operation, although a fire
in the backup diesel generator delayed achieving criticality for another two weeks.96 A
month later, the NRC revealed its investigation into allegations that MP&L falsified
training data for workers at Grand Gulf. To MP&L’s credit, they self-reported the issue
and then recertified workers, but they nonetheless ignored necessary worker
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qualifications.97 Adding to problems, that same year, the NRC levied a $20,000 fine on
MP&L after NRC inspector found a security guard asleep—while on duty.98
Compounding the growing list of mistakes, the NRC levied another $12,000 fine on
MP&L after the company allegedly failed to follow the proper administrative procedure
after the diesel generator fire. The procedure ensured adequate communication about
what had been done in the aftermath, a vital aspect to managing a complex, high-risk
technology.99
The violations or mishaps were not entirely unique to Grand Gulf, as media
coverage from the period indicates. To be fair, some of the incidents covered by
journalists were often minor in nature and were largely more illustrative of a complicated
and evolving regulatory system created to govern complex technology than an imminent
threat. Regulatory standards were a moving target, and turnover within the NRC also
made expectations unpredictable. After the accident at Three Mile Island, the nuclear
industry and the NRC underwent a period of increased scrutiny, and plants still under
construction in the early 1980s were perhaps more likely to have aberrations or mishaps
detected or reported. Nonetheless, some believed that Grand Gulf’s problems were
exceptional, particularly from the anti-nuclear camp. In 1984, Congressional staffer
Richard Udell, working for Rep. Edmund Markey (D-MA), claimed that “these people
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are out in Mississippi trying to operate a nuclear plant –they’re not qualified to operate a
car.”100
The denunciation prompted a swift response. Led by Rep. Jerry Huckaby (D-LA),
twenty-four members of the Congressional Interior Committee complained to Chairman
Morris Udall (D-AZ) that Udell’s remark was a “blatant slur aimed at Southerners.”101
For MP&L, the accusations of incompetence from Udell and others implied more a slur
on southerners; it disparaged a great accomplishment. MP&L’s Donald Lutken described
Grand Gulf as the “eighth wonder of the modern world,” while former employee Donald
Comer likened the plant to “Jack’s beanstalk,” which “sprang up in Claiborne County
when grinding poverty hovered over the land like a perverse giant.”102 Whether Grand
Gulf constituted the world’s “eighth wonder” or a “Grand Goof,” as labeled by critics,
the NRC eventually granted MP&L a full-power license, and the plant began commercial
operation in July 1985.103 And yet, Grand Gulf’s entry into producing power, despite the
previous hiccups, was overshadowed by the ongoing controversy surrounding rate
increases.
By 1985, MP&L’s financial crisis spiraled further out of control. On June 13,
1985, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) sustained the ruling that all
four generating companies (AP&L, NOPSI, MP&L, LP&L) should share the cost of
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Grand Gulf.104 In practical terms, the ruling meant rate increases for consumers. While
FERC alleviated some of the pressure on MP&L, purportedly on the verge of bankruptcy,
MSU’s subsidiaries called for rate increases.105 Despite their previously staunch
resistance, in September 1985, Mississippi’s Public Service Commission granted MP&L
a three-year rate increase.106 Meanwhile, the 8th Circuit Court dealt a blow to Arkansans
by ruling that AP&L could seek a rate increase, one that allowed the subsidiary to pay for
Grand Gulf and recover profit for its shareholders.107 Like MPSC, Arkansas’s Public
Service Commission also settled with AP&L, and granted rate relief, in part motivated by
a desire to avoid federal intervention and larger rate-increase.108 Senator Dale Bumpers
(D-AR) expressed dire warnings that rate increases would make “a Sahara out of my
state,” and contemporary observers pointed to Reynolds Metals closing two aluminum
plants days after the rate hike as evidence of its effects.109
To be sure, the rate increases disrupted a long-standing benefit touted by southern
politicians: cheap electricity. And yet, like professional sports teams who hold
metropolitan areas hostage with their demands for expensive facilities, Reynolds Metals
escaped the villainous portrayals that MP&L experienced. The very product that utilities
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provided, one that had allowed the companies to exist as “natural monopolies” since they
served the public good, heightened scrutiny directed at their practices—which other
corporations ducked. Amidst a deregulatory, free trade climate, corporations somehow
remained unscathed, and southern politicians—both Republican and Democrat—had
become so accustomed to offering corporate incentives that when companies like
Reynolds laid off 1,000 workers in Arkansas, only Middle-South Utilities appeared as the
boogeyman.
Nonetheless, Arkansas politicians drove efforts to enhance the powers of state
public service commissions. Even before FERC’s official ruling in July 1985, Senator
Dale Bumpers (D-AR) and Senator David Pryor (D-AR) cosponsored legislation to
address the limited means state commissions possessed in setting rates. The Ratepayer
Protection Act of 1985 lingered before Congressional committees and never passed.
More notable was the testimony of an aspiring politician, Bill Clinton, who supported the
bill and whose personal history with the Grand Gulf controversy began in 1977.
In his testimony, given in July 1986, Clinton articulated the fundamental issues at
stake, while also detailing how the fight over Grand Gulf shaped his own outlook on
power, corporate accountability, and poverty. Stating the controversy had “consumed a
fair amount” of his public life, Clinton blamed his trust in the assurances of MSU
President Floyd Lewis on naivety and youthfulness, concluding that he “believed [then]
that you could believe anybody’s word if they gave it under oath and realized that they
could perjure themselves if they did not tell the truth.”110 While some satirized Clinton’s
fight against MSU as a “thinly veiled political aid,” his testimony and other public
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statements highlighted issues of long-standing importance to the American South but also
about the nature of corporate regulation in the United States.111 For Clinton, removing the
states’ authority to regulate utilities and to intervene when companies betrayed their
promises or acted imprudently, disproportionately skewed the balance of power towards
the federal government, or worse, private interests. According to Clinton, the effect of
this imbalance and corporate favoritism was disorienting:
I think I know how people feel in countries such as those that are memorialized
in novels like Animal Farm and 1984. You never know where you are. Power is
total, arbitrary, and absolutely unconcerned with the interest of the ordinary
citizens.112
Whatever his motivations, Clinton articulated a populist message aimed at the
contradictions within the federal government and Ronald Reagan’s administration.
Calling the Grand Gulf debacle a “profoundly disturbing harbinger,” Clinton goaded
Reagan’s administration, citing the dispute as “real chance” to “get the federal
government off our backs.”113 The new sources of power, as Clinton stated, now
appeared abstract and total in their authority.
During his testimony, Clinton chiseled away at the acceptance of greed as a best
practice and the indifference of the federal government. More striking, the testimony, in
its revelation of the region’s endemic poverty, challenged a vision of the modern South,
one characterized by metropolitan growth, southern lifestyle magazines, and embrace of
the hallmarks of the 1980s economy—technology, real estate, finance, and defense
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spending. Clinton’s testimony alleged that underneath the glossy surface, one that rate
increases of twenty or thirty percent threatened to expose, existed a very different reality,
where some people could barely afford to pay their bills at their current rate:
So what we have here is a case where, in the case of Middle South, the poorest
people in the United States of America, in States with higher than average
unemployment rates, higher than average poverty rates, and how higher than
average utility bills, are being told you are a second-class citizen. You cannot
come to Washington and have your concerns heard. Nobody knows what you are
living like out there…maybe living on $200 a month…We do not care what
happens to you. We are going to give the utility its money no matter how stupid
the decision was, how arrogant it was, or what your State was promised.114

As historian Judith Stein has detailed, both major political parties failed to address
major shifts in American economy during the 1970s—changes they were partly
responsible for. While Reagan-era cuts towards social-welfare programs hurt
impoverished communities, more damaging was the decline in manufacturing and labor
unions, acquiescence to corporate greed, and federal policies that encouraged
deindustrialization and limited investment into sectors of production—all patterns that
politicians in the 1970s addressed inadequately.115 To be poor in the eighties, as Clinton’s
testimony underscored, implied a kind of statelessness, where the government colluded
with corporations, the chasm between the powerful and the seemingly powerless grew,
and those with power appeared blithely unaware of the repercussions.
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Confirming Clinton’s suspicions, the US Supreme Court ruled on the Grand Gulf
case in 1988. Prior to the ruling, in 1985, Mississippi’s Public Service Commission
granted MP&L a rate increase, supported by the audit led by David Charles, who died of
carbon monoxide poisoning two months after the Supreme Court’s ruling. The state’s
attorney general and several consumer groups challenged MPSC’s authority to increase
rates, charging that the grounds of prudence were not sufficiently shown. The case went
before the Mississippi Supreme Court, who agreed that “prudence” in avoiding excessive
cost had not been demonstrated, challenging FERC’s ability to “pre-emptively” rule on
questions of rates or determine prudence. Resisting this view, the US Supreme Court
ruled that “Mississippi’s effort to invade the province of federal authority must be
rejected” and reversed the ruling. Historically, Mississippians had crafted a variety of
ways to “invade” or curtail federal authority but for less noble purposes. Nonetheless,
after the ruling, further negotiations over what form rate increases would take, and how
much power each subsidiary would buy occurred over the next several years.
Race, Taxes, and the Distribution of Power
As the rate controversy continued, another issue surfaced regarding the
distribution of tax payments from Grand Gulf. While not as closely followed as the rate
controversy, which affected consumers in three states, the massive tax payments from
Grand Gulf produced very similar questions about poverty, inequality, corruption, and
greed. In the early 1970s, when MP&L sought to build Grand Gulf, among the benefits
cited for Claiborne County were increased tax revenues. Generally, nuclear plants offer
revenue-poor rural areas a significant, long-term means of improving local infrastructure,
public services, and schools. Living near a nuclear plant poses a risk to local populations,
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and one important means of off-setting that risk entails boosting the county’s coffers with
large tax payments. In 1983, some Mississippi state legislators, believing that Claiborne
County, despite its poverty and limited opportunities, was “getting too much a ‘good
thing,’ ” introduced a measure to redistribute property tax payments from Grand Gulf.116
Similar measures had been introduced in previous years, but legislators continued
their pursuit. Instead of Claiborne County receiving most of the property tax payments
from Grand Gulf, legislators proposed “redistributing” the wealth to all of MP&L’s
service counties, conveniently ignoring the fact that those communities did not live by the
nuclear reactor. The initial measure proposed redistributing seventy-five percent of
property tax paid by MP&L to all service counties.117 Rep. Fred Banks, Jr. of Jackson
questioned “why should one small county have all that property to tax far beyond the
needs of that county.” Legislators proposed redistribution occur based upon how much
electricity counties consumed, and in the case of Rep. Banks’s constituents, Hinds
County, where the city of Jackson is located, stood to gain the most from the
redistribution. Echoing Banks, Rep. Dick Hall of Jackson mused, “We’re talking about
totally different numbers than we have before. We’re talking about 21st century
legislation. We never dreamed of values like this.”118
While some legislators salivated over millions of dollars in added tax revenue,
others expressed their frustration and near bewilderment at the situation. Rep. Charles
Sheppard of Lorman, a small town near Grand Gulf, declared that a county’s ability to
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tax property within its borders was “a Constitutional right,” and that the measure exposed
divisions between rural communities and urban areas. Evan Doss, Claiborne County’s tax
assessor, and the state’s first African-American elected to the position in 1973, concluded
that the legislators’ maneuvering was “a racist thing simply because black people are
controlling the money.”119 Doss, not immune to corruptive influences either, underscored
the pressing needs of Claiborne County residents: “We’re on the bottom right now.
We’ve got poverty running rampant…Oh God, there are so many things we need to
do.”120
The numbers bore out a slightly different picture, although not one of prosperity.
In 1982 alone, Claiborne County received ten million dollars in tax payments from Grand
Gulf. Moreover, due to the plant’s construction, the local economy had grown and
unemployment reduced, dropping from over 12.4 percent in 1971 to 7.6 percent in 1981,
and the median family income improved from $4,583 in 1969 to $13,904 in 1979.121 The
country’s wealth in terms of tax collection grew considerably, but the employment and
income statistics were illusory. With the boost, Claiborne County climbed county
rankings in income. However, what those rankings actually suggested was not that
Claiborne County’s problems had disappeared, but that many Mississippians still lived in
abject poverty. Once temporary construction worked ended, the local economy faced a
downturn, and the long-standing problems of poverty in a predominantly rural
community remained.
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The legislation failed in 1983, but legislators doggedly reintroduced the measure
until it passed. In part, the threat of increased rates for all MP&L consumers supported
their logic that Claiborne County needed to share its newfound wealth.122 In 1986, the
House Ways and Means Committee approved a bill that exempted Grand Gulf from local
property taxes, approximately $14 million annually, and instead imposed “a state charge
of 2 percent of the value,” or approximately $16 million. From this measure, Claiborne
County would receive fifty percent of the payments in 1987, with a five percent reduction
annually until 1991 and receive thirty percent after that date. The new bill required ten
percent to go into state’s general fund, and the remaining money redistributed to the other
forty-four counties—on the basis of their electricity consumption.123 Ironically, Governor
Bill Allain, who crusaded against MP&L as attorney general and governor, signed the bill
into law in April 1986—and the spirit of “populist vengeance” withered in political
compromise. Then in June 1986, Mississippians voted on a referendum, one that would
further diminish Claiborne County’s power to tax. In a narrow approval, 50.6 percent of
voters approved a constitutional amendment, Section 112, that essentially stripped the
ability of local governments to tax nuclear power plants and gave the state legislature
those powers instead.124 Referendum opponents in Claiborne County charged the
amendment violated the Civil Rights Act of 1965 and levied accusations of racial
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motivations.125 Like the rate controversy, the issue lingered in Mississippi courts, and
attorneys for Claiborne County fought for a more equitable settlement until 1990, while
tax revenue accumulated undispersed.
Finally, on June 26, 1990, Governor Ray Mabus (Dem.) signed into law an
official settlement. The bill raised the revenue Grand Gulf’s owners would pay from $16
million to $20 million and required reimbursement to Claiborne County, the city of Port
Gibson, the school system, and the state for loss of property taxes (in lieu of). From the
$20 million, the bills dictated that Claiborne County receive $8 million annually, Port
Gibson receive $640,000 annually, the state of Mississippi receive $1.2 million, and the
rest of the funds would be distributed to MP&L’s remaining service counties. Of $17
million in an escrow fund that accumulated during the protracted litigation, Claiborne
County received $2 million and an additional $500,000 went to an emergency
management agency in case of a nuclear accident.126 The settlement guaranteed a still
sizable amount of revenue for Claiborne County, but the ability to tax nuclear plants
within their borders ultimately became the purview of the state. The battle over
distributing tax revenue, while less glamorous than other topics, captured the struggle
over power in a changing political landscape, one with new political actors and perhaps
older lingering suspicions about African-American political power, fading paternalist
tendencies, and a pot of money too large for an anti-tax state to ignore.

125

“Grand Gulf Issue Based on Money, Legislators Say,” Clarion Ledger, November 26,
1986.

126

“Mabus signs Grand Gulf Settlement,” Laurel Leader-Call, June 27, 1990.

95

Despite denials from legislators, Mississippi’s history made the cries of poverty,
inequality, and race in the tax dispute difficult to deny. A poor, rural, predominantly
black county had its power to tax certain property within its own borders removed and
legally enshrined in the state’s constitution. Echoing a past where white southerners used
arcane legal loopholes to deny African-Americans the rights of citizenship, legislators
had pursued—since 1972—control of Grand Gulf’s tax revenue. In the Grand Gulf tax
controversy, vestiges of the South’s past confronted a new era, where the “search for
equality” gave way to the “search for usable political power,” which sometimes entailed
betraying your own community.127
During his long term as Claiborne County’s tax assessor from 1972 to 1995, Evan
Doss, Jr., gained political power and financial resources from his position. In 1996,
Mississippi’s Office of the State Auditor (OSA) demanded repayment of $260,600 from
Doss, stating that as tax assessor, he misappropriated funds. Attorney General Mike
Moore then filed charges stating that Doss, in fact, embezzled $652,368 from Claiborne
County tax collections from 1993 to1996 (even after his period as assessor). Doss
repeatedly denied the allegations, describing the charges as a “slap in [his] face.”128 The
evidence, however, suggested that Doss had engaged in a “lapping scheme,” where tax
records appear in order, but bank deposits show missing sums of money. These schemes
can go undetected for long periods of time until the source of income covering the
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shortages disappears, or in Doss’s case, he stepped down from the position to run for
office, disrupting the scheme.
Doss’s problems continued with a federal indictment. He decried the accusations
as politically-motivated—not an unreasonable position. Whatever the motivations, the
evidence against Doss’s actions was staggering; he robbed the people of Claiborne
County for years, despite his protestations to the contrary. Phil Bryant, the state auditor in
1997, concluded that “the citizens of Claiborne County were not well served by Evan
Doss. His violation of the trust placed in him is legendary in Mississippi.”129 In May
1997, a jury convicted Doss on all nine counts, and a judge sentenced him to four years in
prison and fined him $186,000 dollars.130
Even with the evidence clearly stacked against his innocence, Doss claimed the
prosecutors were racially-motivated, a charge they denied. Judge David Bramlette
(appointed by George H. Bush) cited character, not race, as the reason for Doss’s
convictions, concluding that “this defendant served himself” instead of Claiborne
County.131 Doss’s white collar crimes haunted him even in prison, after he and his sister,
Leola Dickey, attempted to illegally conceal assets after declaring bankruptcy.132
Although Doss’s innocence seems unlikely, dislodging race entirely from the
investigation and his prosecution is difficult, but those forms of prejudice and hostility
operate in subtle ways that are more challenging to prove. In recent years, Doss has
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resurrected himself, at least to some extent, serving as the president of the NAACP’s
local chapter and participating in local Nuclear Regulatory Commission hearings,
advocating perhaps for the people of Claiborne County.
As for the Grand Gulf nuclear plant, it continues to operate today, perched above
a place defined by tragedy and decay. Newspaper reports in the 1960s, before MP&L
announced its plans, described Grand Gulf as a “ghost town” but celebrated the recent
arrival of the newly christened Grand Gulf Military Park, whose creation commemorated
the “glory of Grand Gulf.”133 In 1962, glorifying American Civil War history reeked of
subtext, one infused by the growing threats to white supremacy by the civil rights
movement. Decades later, when former MP&L employee Donald Colmer waxed
nostalgic about Grand Gulf’s nuclear reactor, he characterized the plant’s prominent
cooling tower in surprisingly stark terms: “in one of the poorest counties of the poorest of
states stands a towering symbol of power.”134
Nearly thirty years later, the statement needs little revision. If not the poorest
county in Mississippi, Claiborne County suffers from high poverty, and anywhere from
thirty to forty percent of residents live below the poverty line. Signs of the impoverished
present, with its vacant businesses and dilapidated homes, sit uncomfortably alongside
vestiges of the past. Visitors might come to see Port Gibson’s First Presbyterian Church
(c. 1859), with its iconic hand perched atop the steeple, or explore the crumbling
headstones of Grand Gulf’s cemetery. After that, they might drive a few miles further,
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along winding back roads that stretch deep into the piney woods to find the “Ruins of
Windsor,” where the charred columns of a former plantation display another towering
symbol of power—opulence built upon a troubled history. More likely, visitors seek the
ruins of Windsor for what local guides describe as a window into the “glorious” southern
past.
Nuclear power plants produce discordant scenery, or perhaps make traces of the
past and the present more visible, and these symbols of power transform in different
contexts. In 1974, scholar Langdon Winner visited Diablo Canyon in central California,
where construction for the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant had begun years earlier. Against
the backdrop of the Pacific coast, with its spectacular jagged rocks and “blanket of surf,”
stood the future nuclear reactors housed in two giant domes that “looked slightly obscene
like breasts protruding from some oversized goddess.”135 Looking beyond the site,
Winner spotted a California grey whale, which “shot a tall stream of vapor from its blow
hole and into the air and then disappeared into the ocean.”136 What Winner described as a
“chance juxtaposition” set into stark relief two symbols: “the power of nature and of
human artifice.”137 For Winner, and likely the thousands of protestors arrested at Diablo
Canyon in the 1980s, nuclear reactors had no place along a beautiful stretch of Pacific
coastline, especially one where potential seismic activity posed a terrifying worst case
scenario. Grand Gulf, tucked between river gullies and kudzu vines, and on the banks of
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the “big muddy,” perhaps strikes some as less spectacular. There are no jagged ocean
coves or whales spouting vapor, but ghosts linger in the ravines of what General Ulysses
Grant called “the most broken country” he ever saw. These are the kinds of places that
outsiders might find unspectacular, and yet, the sight of a heron, alone and pensive, along
the banks of the Mississippi captures those two symbols of power—nature and
technology jostling for position—just as well.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE LOUISIANA WAY AND THE REACTOR: NUCLEAR POWER ON
THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER
Two hundred miles south, Waterford Unit 3, one of two nuclear reactors in
Louisiana, sits squarely between the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain, and
twenty-five miles north of New Orleans. St. Charles Parish, where Waterford is located,
contains a larger population (approximately 50,000) and greater industry than Claiborne
County. Nestled between chemical plants and pipelines, the area, and river parishes like
it, have been dubbed “cancer alley” due to the high rate of industrial emissions and
cancer among its residents. And like the stretch between Vicksburg and Natchez,
Mississippi, where visitors can follow the “Blues Trail” along Highway 51, or gawk at
historic plantation homes, St. Charles Parish and the adjacent areas also contain traces of
the past, with many of its former sugar plantations restored, while others remain buried
beneath the industrial present. Waterford, like Grand Gulf, occupy in-between spaces,
where vestiges of an older history confront New South schemes, and the short twenty five
miles between New Orleans and Waterford seems better measured in time and culture
than by distance on a map.
Grand Gulf and Waterford share a common river and a common owner, the utility
conglomerate Entergy, and both are situated in places deeply embedded in southern
history. Waterford’s single reactor helps power the vast industrial corridor between Baton
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Rouge and New Orleans and generates electricity for consumers throughout Entergy’s
service area. Like Grand Gulf, the Waterford site and surrounding area contains a rich
history, one forged in an older economy built upon insatiable appetites and human
bondage. And like Grand Gulf, the history of Waterford demonstrates the ways in which
energy systems, or rather the systems humans devise, build order in our world.1
As Langdon Winner contended, social and political orders can bear their imprint
upon technologies, and large-scale, high risk technologies invite these imprints. Nuclear
power plants, while federally regulated, still require coordination between local and state
governments, and the utilities themselves. Waterford, if roughly similar to other reactors,
bore the marks of the “Louisiana way,” where corporations received lavish incentives
from the state and expected little scrutiny of their methods. Waterford’s history, like
Grand Gulf, illustrates a vast regulatory system adjusting to a post-Three Mile Island
world and the difficulties of managing large-scale engineering projects.
Waterford Unit 3, a nuclear reactor placed in one of the most vulnerable areas in
the country—to both “natural” and unnatural disasters, offers a window into an evolving
and imperfect system of risk assessment. Long before Hurricane Katrina made landfall in
2005, the construction of Waterford highlighted a growing “technological disaster
subculture” in southern Louisiana.2 Even if residents in the river parishes and New
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Orleans had become accustomed to oil spills and hazardous chemical releases, the
introduction of a nuclear plant forced many to reckon with a variety of worst case
scenarios. As Ted Steinberg has observed, “natural” disasters or “acts of God,” in modern
America are rarely disasters solely of divine providence but rather a collision between
man-made and natural forces.3 As Waterford’s history shows, the systems for assessing
risk and locating nuclear reactors reflect value judgments about people, places, and
ultimately, what our society and government chooses to save from “acts of God,” or in
the case of nuclear power, from human error or “normal accidents.”4
The Waterford plant is located in Killona, a census-designated place in St. Charles
Parish, one of the many “river parishes” adjacent to the Mississippi River.5 Like the other
river parishes between Baton Rouge and New Orleans, industry, especially petrochemical
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industries, have become a well-established part of the landscape. Along the corridor, the
presence of both heavy industry and historic rural communities create what scholar
Barbara Allen calls a “strange juxtaposition.”6 Directly across from Waterford, the
Bonnet Carré spillway diverts floodwaters from the Mississippi River into Lake
Pontchartrain when necessary. Built after the Great Flood in 1927, the spillway and the
levees along the river offer another reminder of an uneasy alliance between man, nature,
and technology.7
The site surrounding Waterford was once known as the “German Coast,” coined
after Germans first settled the area in the early 18th century.8 Karl Friedrich
d’Arensbourg, led establishment of a German community in the area, which included
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building his own residence near the Waterford site.9 Descendants of the D’Arensbourgs
owned the land until 1849, when the land was purchased by William B. Whitehead and
Company. The documentary record and archaeology surveys suggest that sugar cane
cultivation began as early as 1828 on site, and several plantations were likely
consolidated in the mid-19th century. In 1879, Richard Milliken officially named the
property the Waterford Plantation. A year later, black workers from Waterford and the
nearby Dugan Plantation (Killona) joined together in a labor strike for higher wages.
Strikes spread to eighteen plantations, and federal troops eventually intervened.10 But
otherwise, the Waterford site quietly operated as a sugar mill until 1951.
Waterford’s three thousand acre site was typical of former sugar cane plantations,
with the northern section’s environment formerly used to cultivate sugar cane, while the
southern half remained “uncultivated,” wooded swamp and marshland.11 The site’s
environment resembled other marshland and swamps in the area, with oaks forests and
cypress gum trees, a diverse avian population, amphibians, and many reptiles, including
the American alligator, considered an endangered species until 1987.12 In 1963,
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Louisiana Power & Light (LPL) bought the Waterford site, built two steam generator
plants and then began construction on the Waterford nuclear plant in the 1970s. While
fragments of the site’s history remain, including sections of the overseer’s home and
tenant housing built after the Civil War, the most-intact marker of Waterford’s past is the
“plantation bell,” which was donated to LP&L and is now preserved on site. The
plantation bell and the nuclear reactor capture the river corridor landscape, with its
“bizarre backdrop,” to borrow Barbara Allen’s phrase, where the plantation past meets an
industrial present.13
Decades earlier, Louisiana’s growing oil industry attracted industry to the area,
but by the mid-twentieth, heavy industry also flocked towards the river corridor, with
companies buying former plantation land for petro-chemical plants and other industrial
purposes.14 This stretch of river also contains the Port of South Louisiana, which extends
fifty-four miles long and ranks among the top five ports in the country for tonnage.15
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Because of lucrative incentives, including ten year tax exemptions from property tax and
easy access for shipping, industries streamed into the river parishes.16 By the early 1970s,
numerous chemical companies were located near the site. Less than a mile from
Waterford, Hooker Chemical manufactured caustic sodas and chlorine, with a capacity to
produce nearly one billion pounds of chlorine annually. Other facilities included the
Union Carbide plant, which produced organic chemicals, and as late as 1981, could store
up to 482 million pounds of hazardous materials. In addition to chemical and
petrochemical facilities, according to a 1981 safety evaluation, forty-three major
pipelines, described as “potentially hazardous,” carrying industrial liquids and gases were
located within five miles of the Waterford site.”17
Living near the industrial matrix were several small communities. Killona, a
predominantly African-American community with approximately one thousand residents
circa 1977, sits a mile from Waterford.18 Across the river, the community of Norco
contained several thousand residents living near a major Shell refinery. Twenty-five
miles south was the city of New Orleans. But like other rural places, urban areas located
twenty or thirty miles away often seem much further, and that perception of distance has
undoubtedly only grown. The contrast between a small, rural community like Killona and
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New Orleans make the two places seem worlds apart. Connecting those worlds are power
lines, flowing from rural spaces into energy-hungry metropolitan areas.
Efforts to attract nuclear-related business, and industry generally, accelerated in
the 1950s and 1960s. Louisiana and other southern states engaged in a “race to the
bottom” promising lavish-tax incentives, less stringent pollution controls, and passing
right-to-work laws in order to attract industry to their states.19 Seizing the nuclear
momentum, the state of Louisiana ratified the Southern Interstate Nuclear Compact in
1960. Two years later, the state legislature passed the Nuclear Energy Act, which created
a Division of Radiation Control, an agency that regulated the use of radiation and
radioactive materials within the state, and transferred certain regulatory responsibilities
from the federal government to the state of Louisiana.20 To promote nuclear-oriented
development, the act also created a Board of Nuclear Energy in 1962.21 Led by Clarence
“Taddy” Aycock, who served three consecutive terms as lieutenant governor from 196072, the Board initially advertised Louisiana’s amenable climate for businesses using
radiation, promising “the advantages offered” were “unequaled by any other state.”22
Among those advantages, the state lured industry by offering an exemption for a total of
ten years from local property taxes, while another legislative measure ensured industries
would receive “fair tax treatment” afterwards. Still other measures further incentivized
19
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businesses by offering natural gas at lower rates, and allowed “political subdivisions” to
issue bonds to construct plants for new manufacturers.23
Utilities also benefited from these inducements. Joining the nuclear band-wagon,
Louisiana Power & Light announced their plans to build the Waterford nuclear plant in
1970.24 Two years later, the AEC granted LP&L a construction exemption that allowed
the company to begin excavation below the levee onsite, part of the massive series of
levees constructed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.25 By 1973, LP&L submitted
their “final” environmental impact statement, although another more detailed EIS would
be published in 1981.
The licensing process moved slowly though. Congressman David Treen, the first
Republican representative from Louisiana elected since the turn of the century (and a
future governor), represented the district where Waterford was located and wrote to AEC
Chairwoman Dixie Lee Ray, to “strongly request that the application process be
expedited” because Louisiana Power & Light was “entitled to prompt action.”26 The AEC
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responded coolly to Treen’s request, and four years after LP&L’s initial announcement,
on February 19, 1974, a public hearing finally occurred—the final step before receiving a
full construction permit. Unlike Grand Gulf’s hearing, which reportedly lasted for
seventeen minutes and generated little opposition initially, concerns about Waterford
were more prevalent, particularly from residents in New Orleans.
The opposition reflected growing concerns about water quality and industrial
pollution in Louisiana. The city of New Orleans drew its drinking water from the
Mississippi River, and industries frequently discharged their contaminants into the river,
essentially treating the river as a “sink” for industrial waste.27 In fact, Waterford’s safety
analysis report, describe the river as the “ultimate heat sink,” where heat is discharged
into the river to cool the plant.28 During the late 1960s, the problem had grown to such an
extent that treatment facilities were unable to rid the city’s drinking water of “chemical”
and “oily” tastes.29 Given this context, Waterford’s location and reliance upon the river
understandably made some residents nervous. LP&L’s Waterford design employs a
“once through” system, which draws and discharges water directly from and into the
Mississippi River, compared to a system that requires a cooling tower and reuses water
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for cooling purposes.30 Some feared that Waterford’s release of radiation might harm
aquatic species and further pollute an already severely polluted section of the Mississippi
River.31
Among those expressing their concerns, the hearing featured one formal
intervenor, Robert Head, publisher of a local alternative newspaper, Nola Express, and
his lawyer. Head’s interventions addressed a number of issues, including radiation
monitoring, technical design issues, and the effects upon aquatic biota.32 In addition to
Head, the NRC granted thirty-eight individuals “limited appearances,” which allowed for
brief statements.33 Local environmental organizations embraced the opportunity, despite
their doubts about the Atomic Energy Commission’s desire to incorporate the public’s
input into their decision making. Although some pointed to Waterford-specific issues,
others used the hearing for a broader platform. Ross Vincent, president of the Ecology
Center of Louisiana, argued that technical issues obscured the “real issues” at stake.
According to Vincent, the debates surrounding Waterford extended far beyond radiation
30
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monitoring or design schematics: “people here in Louisiana are beginning to raise
questions about high-ways and bridges, about development in the wetlands, about
excessive energy consumption and the need for facilities such as Waterford.”34 In this
sense, debates about nuclear power intersected with an array of other concerns about
energy and the environment, which refracted onto one another. Simplified further,
Vincent laid bare the fundamental question Waterford raised; it involved “the way in
which people in this area perceive their collective future.”35 For a growing number of
people, a better collective future required greater care for an interconnected environment
and more public input about local energy systems.
The public hearings were intended to counter accusations that the nuclear industry
and the federal government were overly secretive and ignored community input, and
reflected an effort to establish greater credibility with the public. While the hearings
rarely satisfied activists, they nonetheless allowed limited public participation and put
pressure on utility companies and regulatory agencies, particularly with environmental
issues, evacuation plans, and other safety concerns. With the hearings finished, the
Atomic Energy Commission finally issued LP&L a construction permit on November 14,
1974, and full-scale construction began.36
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Like many other nuclear plants built during the late 1970s, obtaining a
construction permit rarely portended an obstacle-free path and opposition to the plant
continued. The opposition took three forms: formal legal interventions, organized protest,
and small-scale, individual expressions through letters to Louisiana’s leaders. A number
of local organizations including Save Our Wetlands, the Oystershell Alliance, the Sierra
Club’s New Orleans branch and Delta Chapter, and the Louisiana Ecology Center,
actively protested or heartily scrutinized Waterford 3. Public protests occurred in 1978
and 1979, with later protests slightly more invigorated by the accident at Three Mile
Island. In May 1978, local media reported that a motorcade of seventy-five cars drove
from New Orleans to the Waterford site, and two-hundred protestors held a three hour
event, delivering speeches, chanting “No Nukes!,” and carrying anti-nuclear signs.37
Days after TMI, in April 1979, protestors, led by the Oystershell gathered outside city
hall in New Orleans, “trying to get Mayor Ernest Morial to oppose construction” of
Waterford.38 In their signature slogan, protestors in New Orleans nodded to the area’s
culinary heritage and a terrifying nuclear powered future: “How do you like your oysters?
Raw, Fried, or Radioactive?”39
On the legal front, Save Our Wetlands (SOWL), a local organization, filed several
lawsuits, which usually represented a collective effort with other local, anti-nuclear and
environmental groups.40 In December 1977, the group filed a lawsuit against LP&L and
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the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which contended that Waterford had lowered
property values for several developments near Lake Pontchartrain and that the PriceAnderson Act, which initially set liability for a nuclear accident at $560 million dollars,
inadequately protected residents from any financial losses incurred from nuclear
accidents.41 SOWL has gained notoriety in recent years for another lawsuit they filed in
1977. Uniting a broad base of opposition in St. Tammany parish, SOWL filed suit against
the US Army Corps of Engineers for their barrier plan, “which included levees and
structures to impede a storm surge from entering Lake Pontchartrain.”42
When Hurricane Betsy arrived onshore in September 1965, massive flooding
occurred in New Orleans. In response, Congress authorized funding for a barrier plan.43
With the passage of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) in 1969 and the
added requirement of filing an environmental impact statement, opponents to the barrier
plan gained the ability to more effectively halt developments that potentially endangered
the environment.44 The court issued an injunction against certain components of the
barrier plan, due to an “inadequate environmental impact statement,” and the Corps
shifted their focus from the barrier plan to a “high-level option,” which Craig Colten has
argued was more acceptable to the public and less damaging to the environment.
Residents in St. Tammany opposed having storm water diverted into their community,
41
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while environmentalists worried the barrier plan encouraged unimpeded development in
local wetlands.45 The new plan focused on preventing “overtopping of the outfall canals,”
which required higher levees, and “not keeping the storm surge” out of Lake
Pontchartrain.46 Over the next several decades, the plan had various levels of completion,
faced delays in environmental assessment, continued public opposition to local impacts,
and other complications. After the levees broke following Hurricane Katrina in 2005,
conservative media quickly latched onto the 1977 lawsuit, claiming that
environmentalists caused the devastating flooding that occurred in New Orleans. It was a
convenient scapegoat for a much more complicated problem, which obscured the broadbased opposition to the barrier plan in the 1970s, the flawed approach of the Corps of
Engineers, the vast environmental changes development had produced in southern
Louisiana, and an array of other factors that made the city vulnerable to catastrophic
flooding.47
While SOWL’s 1977 lawsuits might appear unrelated, they reflected a growing
awareness that southern Louisiana’s fragile ecosystems and large bodies of water made
not only its environment vulnerable but also underscored the vulnerability of people
living there too. Moreover, there were no easy answers to these problems. Beyond the
court room, anti-nuclear and environmental organizations, along with residents generally,
expressed other concerns about rate increases, thermal pollution, and evacuation
measures. Regarding the latter, residents living near Waterford 3, whether in the river
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parishes or twenty-five miles southeast in New Orleans, feared LP&L and the NRC had
not properly planned for a full-scale evacuation. In part, Hurricane Betsy in 1965
dramatically showed how natural disasters could undermine man-made protections
against flooding.
In Case of Emergency: Louisiana’s “Disaster Subculture”
More fundamentally though, driving across the vast expanse of water and bayous
into New Orleans visually reinforces the difficulty of evacuation and the city’s
vulnerability. The knowledge that the Mississippi River might swell her banks, break the
levees, and terrify “her silly children back into humility,” as William Alexander Percy
once wrote, loomed large despite efforts by the US Army Corps of Engineers to create a
better flood protection system.48 Natural disasters, whether through river floods or
hurricanes, only further demonstrated the precarious state in which the city existed, and
one that residents were well-acquainted with. Other nuclear plants prompted concerns
about evacuation, but perhaps nowhere else was it more pronounced than with the
Waterford plant. Adding to the fears about nuclear accidents or catastrophic flooding, the
burgeoning petro and chemical industry along the river lent another layer of gravity to the
situation, one that LP&L and the NRC acknowledged as a legitimate danger.49 The
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construction of Waterford and hazardous industries along the Mississippi combined with
older, natural threats—very much the embodiment of a risk society that straddled longstanding risks with new, manufactured risks.50
With the accident at Three Mile Island on March 28, 1979, fears of inadequate
evacuation plans heightened, especially for those living in New Orleans. Early plans only
included evacuating residents from a ten-mile radius, and the New Orleans metropolitan
area sat twenty-five miles downriver with no easy means of evacuating. In the days
following the accident, New Orleans Mayor Ernest Morial assuaged few fears, candidly
stating that “due to limited road capacity” it was “not possible to evacuate the entire
metropolitan area in short period of time.”51 According to Morial, the City Office of Civil
Defense prepared another solution: housing up to “900,000 persons in the city’s fallout
shelters for two weeks.”52 When writers for Baton Rouge’s alternative publication Gris
Gris called Orleans Parish’s Civil Defense Director Charles Erdmann about the fallout
plan, he “laughed into the phone,” and asked the staff, “Where would you put a million
people?”53 Fears of inadequate evacuation plans and entrapment lingered in the years
following TMI. Writing in 1982, a resident of Vacherie, north of Waterford, noted the
confluence of environment, industry, and dense populations that made evacuation
especially difficult: “…with bayou lands and wet lands to the rear. All surrounding areas,
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except the wet lands, are densely populated, industrialized and evacuation is greatly
limited.”54
To the NRC’s credit, their 1981 safety assessment of Waterford reflects a
concerted effort by the agency following TMI which required utilities, particularly for
units under construction, to revise their environmental impact statements and safety
evaluations. In the assessment, they concluded that the flood potential at Waterford could
occur from three different scenarios: storm surge from a “probable maximum hurricane,”
levee failures during Mississippi River floods, and local “intense” precipitation.55 Of the
possible hurricane paths, the NRC considered a hurricane approach from the Head of
Passes, or the mouth of the Mississippi River, to be the most critical. Even with a levee
failure and maximum probable hurricane, the NRC determined that that site’s flood
protection, which gave Waterford’s nuclear island an additional thirty-feet barrier from
flood waters, as adequate.56 While the NRC deemed Waterford’s system as largely
hurricane proof, the NRC was less convinced about the site’s adequacy for a probable
maximum flood-induced levee failure. The agency found that if a severe flooding
scenario occurred, a possibility existed that levees would be topped near the Waterford
site, and called for LP&L to provide a more thorough analysis and consideration of a
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“nearly instantaneous failure of the levee,” and characterized LP&L’s estimate for
flooding scenarios as conservative.57
Regarding evacuation plans, the safety assessment gives little insight into what an
evacuation would look like in practice, detailing instead the federal, state, and local
agencies involved and noting the necessity of emergency drills. The NRC had, in fact,
required LP&L to revise their emergency plans, but even in a post-TMI world, the plans
only obliquely hinted at what that process would entail. Due a law passed by the
Louisiana state legislature, Act 449, the primary responsibility for emergency plans and
coordinating actions between agencies resided with the Assistant Secretary of the Office
of Environmental Affairs. Commenting on the tangled regulatory matrix, one New
Orleans resident lamented that the state and local authorities “charged with protecting our
safety” were “simply accepting the questionable federal contention hook, line, and
sinker!”58 In other words, faith in Waterford’s safety required faith in the state’s ability to
not only prepare adequately but also to execute those plans accordingly.59 Calls for a
better evacuation plan, did however, encourage state agencies to provide a more detailed
strategy, and in 1982, officials announced that if a serious nuclear accident occurred,
school buses would transport populations from St. John Parish to East Baton Rouge
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Parish, temporarily housing evacuees in Baton Rouge’s Centroplex.60 While plans for
evacuating populations in the more immediate St. Charles Parish, where the plant was
located, were not mentioned, the image of school buses hastily carrying large numbers of
people away from the “plume exposure pathway,” appears absurd in a post-Katrina
world, but residents then felt skeptical too. Writing to Congresswoman Lindy Boggs (DLA), one New Orleans resident asked, “Please help stop licensing of Waterford 3—Help
us make our lives a little more secure.”61
A series of industrial mishaps in St. Charles Parish no doubt added to residents’
skepticism towards high-risk technology and hazardous industries. In one study
conducted for FEMA in 1983, sociologists from Ohio State described how St. Charles
Parish, grounded in a long history of natural disasters, had been more recently shaped by
the “acceleration” of technological accidents. The study’s authors concluded that recent
events strengthened a local “technological disaster subculture,” while surmising that
“whatever the balance between the natural and the technological, it does appear that some
there is some kind of disaster subculture in this part of Louisiana.”62 Prompting the study,
on December 11, 1982, a chemical storage tank exploded at the Union Carbide plant in
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Taft, located less than two miles away from Waterford.63 The tank contained
approximately 45,000 gallons of acrolein, a highly toxic, flammable, and colorless
liquid.64 The only major property damage occurred onsite, but a period of risk to public
health required the evacuation of an estimated 17,000 people.
Other recent disasters and accidents only reinforced the claim of one local
official, who described St. Charles as the “most high disaster risk location in the state.”65
Two years earlier, a tank truck carrying ammonia, a chemical of which the parish
reportedly had the highest concentration of in “the free world,” crashed into a train,
killing three people after they suffocated from inhaling the gas. Adding to the tally, in
1981, a train transporting hydrocarbon derailed near a major refinery, forcing the
evacuation of people nearby. The following year numerous accidents occurred, including
a Norwegian tanker spilling ammonia into the Mississippi River, a major fertilizer spill
on the “river road” (the main road that runs along the Mississippi River), a gas and water
spill from a 140,000 barrel storage tank at a petroleum company, chlorine escaped from a
pipeline, flammable propylene gas leaked from major refinery’s dock, and a nearby
refinery’s pipeline erupted into flames and spilled oil. Finally, in March 1982, a Liberian
tanker crashed into a tugboat, spilling four thousand gallons of crude oil into the river and
causing a massive fire, where flames soared 100 feet high.66 And even though the 1983
study found St. Charles parish authorities generally well-prepared and communicative
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about emergency plans, the fact remained that people living near the industrial corridor,
or downriver from it, had good reason to feel skepticism towards industry and high-risk
technology.
Building a Nuclear Reactor the Louisiana Way: Incompetence, Corruption, and the
Construction of Waterford
For LP&L, revising evacuation plans likely appeared secondary to more
immediate, pressing internal complications. Although Grand Gulf suffered from safety
issues, the rate controversy elicited far more attention. Waterford’s situation reversed the
two. Rate increases posed a small challenge, and technical problems occupied center
stage. As early as 1979, an external audit indicated that LP&L’s ability to monitor
construction and technical quality was severely limited by a lack of staff. Describing the
technical staff as “extremely lean,” LP&L had four engineers and one technician
monitoring the construction of Waterford 3.67 The report’s authors were aware of no
“other nuclear project in the country wherein construction” had such limited monitoring,
and warned that despite the presence of four “hardworking, dedicated, and loyal
individuals” assigned to the job, they could not “adequately cover those facets of
construction that should be covered.”68 In part, Waterford’s growing list of problems
occurred, according to the report, because the individuals hired to monitor construction
spent more time dealing with paperwork and attending meetings than actively observing
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and problem-solving onsite. Employees spent more time approving order contracts than
providing guidance with technical issues. Moreover, nuclear plants generally relied upon
contract companies, in this case, EBASCO, to supply labor, employees, or engineering
feedback, and this decentralized piece-meal method posed problems during construction,
both at Waterford and elsewhere. The report concluded that while employees from
contract firms generally tried to serve the interests of their company and LP&L,
“potential conflicts of corporate interests” existed and carried serious financial
ramifications, since LP&L ultimately paid the bill for construction costs.69 In tandem, the
review also strongly encouraged LP&L to better coordinate with EBASCO for NRC
inspections, or else their credibility would “start to erode” with the agency.70 The
obstacles Waterford faced broadly resembled other nuclear plants, but as the external
review indicated, understaffing and lack of expertise in vital areas of plant construction,
such as LP&L having a well-trained electrical engineer to better oversee cable pulling,
made the plant uniquely troubled.
The depth of Waterford’s issues emerged when LP&L pursued a power license in
the early 1980s. After reviewing LP&L’s application for an operating license, the NRC
announced in July 1981 that the company could only receive a power license after
resolving a “number of outstanding items.”71 The NRC then published an interim report
that detailed Waterford’s numerous, unresolved problems, among them, “the lack of
nuclear experience throughout the organization and the apparent lack of appreciation by
69
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high-level management of the magnitude of the project it is undertaking.”72 More
daunting, the NRC argued that preparing LP&L’s management and staff for Waterford’s
operation would require an “extraordinary effort.”73 The agency’s heightened sense of
urgency reflected the seriousness of LP&L’s situation, but it also showed the NRC’s
desire to regain lost credibility too. By the NRC’s own admission, its predecessor, the
Atomic Energy Commission, “performed little inspection,” at nuclear plants under
construction before 1968, and “only minimal guidance was available.”74 Regulatory
oversight tightened in the 1972 and 1973, but “major changes” occurred after Three Mile
Island.75 In this changing climate, the NRC revised its own procedures, and its
interactions with LP&L show the improvements made in safety inspections but also
persistent shortcomings.
Less than a year after the agency’s stern warning, the situation had seemingly
improved, and the NRC expressed their confidence in LP&L’s overhaul of managerial
and safety issues, stating there was “reasonable assurance” Waterford could be operated
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“without undue risk.”76 In December 1982, the NRC proposed issuing LP&L a $20,000
fine for alleged violations involving the “failure of LP&L to sufficiently control” their
quality assurance program that oversaw the plant’s four emergency core cooling systems.
To LP&L’s credit, their prime contractor, EBASCO had violated NRC regulations in
their development of the cooling systems, and LP&L reported the problem after an audit
and investigation. NRC only detected the severity of the problem after LP&L’s selfreporting and a subsequent on-site visit. The problems with the onsite cooling systems
extended beyond documentation, and an NRC inspector concluded that the system’s
“built condition” also contained “numerous” deficiencies and discrepancies.77 According
to the NRC, the problems resulted from LP&L’s minimal staffing to quality assurance
and inadequate oversight over its contractors, as the external review warned in 1979.78
This resulted in emergency core cooling system components that contained installation
errors and schematics that did not match “actual field installation.” Or in other words, not
only were critical safety features incorrectly installed, but there were also gross gaps in
records and installation work out of compliance with regulations.79 The revelations in
1982 hinted at larger, deep-seeded problems, which seemingly reached into every facet of
the plant’s operation.
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As LP&L sought to redress the NRC’s recommendations, more allegations
surfaced in 1983 and 1984. After a series of articles in The Gambit, a New Orleans
weekly newspaper, revealed the findings of the external audits in the 1970s, and former
employees publicly alleged poor quality assurance and compromises in plant safety,
LP&L found itself mired in controversy again. Central to Waterford’s new scandal was
the plant’s very foundation—down to the concrete poured. The nuclear reactor, the
containment shield, and other essential components for creating nuclear power are built
upon a so-called “nuclear island,” an industry term for the part of the plant located on a
substantial concrete base-mat with reinforcing shields where the most sensitive aspects of
a nuclear plant are held. Nuclear islands are constructed, in theory, to withstand aerial
bombardments, high winds, floods, and the thick concrete base mats underneath are
intended to withstand seismic activity and other “unusual events,” to use the NRC’s
terminology.
Reports about Waterford’s concrete problems first appeared in 1979. Workers
discovered “honeycombing” as they constructed the reactor containment structure.80
Honeycombing, the mottled appearance concrete gets when its improperly mixed or
poured (inefficient vibrations causes separation), can signal deeper structural weaknesses.
This problem appeared around the same time as the NRC dismissed claims of shoddy
construction by a former contract employee, Robert Liesen. While LP&L described
Liesen as a “disgruntled employee,” he claimed otherwise, alleging the company fired
him for insisting upon quality control. The NRC rejected his claims.81 Behind the scenes,
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of course, the external review conducted in the same year supported his complaints—at
least in terms of quality control. And in 1981, the NRC also admonished LP&L for those
same issues, but in 1979, the agency had yet to overhaul their approach.
Even before publicized reports appeared, cracks in the reactor building’s concrete
base mat in the reactor building were discovered in 1977, but the NRC determined those
cracks would close with the placement of the reactor building (on top of the basemat).82
One EBASCO engineer onsite dismissed the cracks as serious but conceded “that part
was unanticipated.”83 For some, ordinary construction hiccups like these possessed an
exaggerated quality in the context of nuclear power, and newspapers frequently reported
on minor issues during the late 1970s and 1980s.
More troubling, in May 1983, local journalist Ron Ridenhour, best known as the
Army soldier whose investigation broke open the story of the 1968 My Lai Massacre in
South Vietnam, reported that cracks in the foundation continued, along with water
seepage, describing the problem as a “serious design flaw” which “may threaten the
integrity of the nuclear reactor itself.”84 Ridenhour pointed to the area’s so-called “jelly
ground” near the Mississippi River, or “water-charged sand,” which now held a,
“enormous, concrete and steel boat,” as the culprit.85 In the months thereafter, the NRC
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sent a team to investigate the cracks further, determining the weight from structures on
the base mat caused the cracks, but that “the foundation provides adequate support.”86
Despite the NRC’s conclusions, the concrete controversy persisted into 1984, as
LP&L desperately sought an operating license. From a series of special inspections and
evaluations, a more thorough picture of why cracks appeared in Waterford’s base mat
emerged. According to NRC documents, during the initial concrete pouring, violations of
“specification requirements,” such as using substandard concrete, occurred. In May 1984,
an independent consultant, however, concluded that construction was “adequate” and the
violations were inconsequential to the base mat’s structural integrity, and in fact,
exceeded the standards required by the American Concrete Institute.87
Looking at the correspondence and records today, the public scrutiny of nearly
every aspect of Waterford’s construction is astounding; no mistake appeared too small for
intervenors or local journalists, who made much ado about concrete, pipes, and
everything in-between. Given the array of industrial mishaps, Three Mile Island, and the
ever-present environmental vulnerability in southern Louisiana though, this concern,
while not wholly unique to Waterford, makes sense. Living in a place where floods,
hurricanes, and chemical explosions were not uncommon only intensified the
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“consequences of modernity.”88 With trust in institutions and expertise eroding, and risk
seemingly proliferating, public scrutiny of mundane details, like concrete, became
newsworthy. The NRC had launched their own investigation as well, sending a team to
Waterford to inspect further.
This heightened scrutiny, from the public and the NRC, frustrated LP&L’s
executives to no end. In response to the NRC’s special investigation into Waterford, NRC
officials held a meeting with LP&L’s top brass in Bethesda in June 1984. LP&L
executive R.S. “Mike” Leddick complained about the “process…where so time and effort
is spent protecting the allegers, many of who which I would have pinned a medal on if I
could have identified them, for telling me in a timely fashion what problems I might have
had, that it’s been hard, hard to communicate.”89 The “process” Leddick referred to, in
this case, included the NRC’s team directly seeking out people at Waterford to discuss
issues, conducting field inspections, going through documents on site. This level of
involvement was new for the NRC. By their own admission, detecting problems late in
the construction stage usually involved “a situation where someone brings us a box of
allegations or a box of affidavits” and says, “those are my allegations.”90 While local
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activists accused the NRC of a “regulatory cover-up,” the reality was more complicated.91
From NRC documents and the meeting transcript, they were not as complicit as critics
charged.
The NRC’s team identified a number of problems with LP&L’s management of
Waterford. Among them, the agency found the credentials, backgrounds, and education
of quality control inspectors had not been properly verified, nor did it meet federal
standards. Adding to this, LP&L’s system of record keeping either suffered from
complete disorganization, neglect, or more troubling, deliberate concealment. The NRC
admonished LP&L executives for missing non-conformance reports, which document
any unusual or non-standard occurrences, claiming that at least twelve reports “had either
been destroyed, thrown away or couldn’t be located.” These reports, according to agency
officials, contained the plant’s “historical record” and made it “very difficult” to
determine the impact on “the integrity or the safety of the system.” Darryl Eisenhut, the
Director of NRC Licensing, chided LP&L’s representatives further, urging them to “be a
lot more sensitive to…what does this all tell you about what’s been going on in...quality
control at your plant for the last few years…you really need to look at the root cause of
these problems.”92 Adding to the chorus was NRC official Harold Denton, a native North
Carolinian, graduate in nuclear engineering from North Carolina State, and Jimmy
Carter’s go-to NRC official during the TMI crisis in 1979.93 Scolding LP&L’s executives
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at the June 1984 meeting, Denton reminded the company of their failure to meet the
NRC’s standards in a “number of areas,” and that those problems “had been kicking
around for sometime and have not been faced up to.”94
If LP&L could grease the palms of Louisiana politicians, or at the very least
create a favorable regulatory climate at the state level, the NRC after Three Mile Island
represented a new challenge. The company’s failure to adequately address long-standing
issues, and respect the gravity of the situation, seems more egregious in light of the fact
that they paid no property taxes for the first ten years of Waterford’s construction.
Less than a year after the meeting between the NRC and LP&L, on March 16,
1985, the agency gave LP&L an operating license, but commercial operation remained
delayed. Several months later, the agency issued a major civil penalty of $130,000 for
violations discovered during inspection and older problems associated with the
company’s Quality Assurance Program. Although NRC fines often seem comically small
compared to the billions of dollars spent on nuclear plants, the civil penalty underscored
the seriousness of the violations, and at the very least, made for poor publicity. NRC
extended LP&L’s response period from thirty to sixty days because of the “extensive”
nature of the violations.95 The penalties represented the end of a fifteen-year odyssey, a
settling of scores before Waterford began operation commercially, which finally occurred
on September 24, 1985. Louisiana’s other nuclear reactor, River Bend Unit 1, also owned
94
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by LP&L (and Middle-South or later Entergy), began operation a month later near the
town of St. Francisville about 100 miles northwest of Waterford.
Like so many other nuclear plants, Waterford 3 emerged from the controversyladen, highly fractious climate of the 1970s and early 1980s, and then quietly operated,
sending power to the grid and generally raising few eyebrows. While Waterford’s
operation has not been without problems, or temporary shut-downs, like many others, the
nuclear plants so feared and hotly contested in decades prior have largely receded into the
backdrop. Except for the communities living near nuclear plants, and the remnants of the
anti-nuclear movement, most Americans spend little, if any, time thinking about the
reactors in our midst. This “invisibility” perhaps reflects a broader cognitive dissonance
between energy production and energy consumption. It also reflects the massive overhaul
within the nuclear industry and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission after Three Mile
Island. In tandem, public pressure and dogged reporting by journalists, at both local and
national media outlets, no doubt contributed to a safer and more reliable system—at least
when compared to the gross failings in the late 1960s and 1970s. Early watchdogs, within
and outside the inner circle, have shaped the nuclear industry and helped transform
unprepared and arguably neglectful regulatory apparatus for the massive challenges
building nuclear reactors posed.
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in southern Louisiana, and
three nuclear reactors—all owned by Entergy—laid in its path: Waterford, River Bend,
and Grand Gulf. Waterford’s location made it the most vulnerable to the storm’s wind
and rain; the levees only promised thirty feet of protection from floodwaters if they held.
In a story characterized by failures to prepare, to engineer sound flood protection, and to
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provide for society’s least able to evacuate, Waterford rode out the storm without
catastrophe. The plan coordinated between the NRC and LP&L worked. As Katrina
churned, officials and employees prepared Waterford for the worst-case scenario, and one
day before landfall, LP&L shut the reactor down. Phone lines stopped working after local
flooding occurred, but staff onsite continued communication with officials through
satellite phones and maintained necessary power through diesel generators after losing
connection to the power grid. The nuclear industry and LP&L issued self-congratulatory
statements following the disaster, capitalizing on a moment of colossal failures from
every other end. Of course, they benefited from not experiencing catastrophic levee
ruptures or massive flooding; the worst case scenario happened twenty-file miles south in
New Orleans. There was no great plan for the poor, the elderly, or the poor and black in a
city 80 percent underwater.96 No steel and concrete nuclear island shielded them from the
wind, the rain, and the flood.
Writing in the 1990s, sociologists Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck explored the
relationship between risk and modernity in The Consequences of Modernity and Risk
Society: Towards A New Modernity, respectively. The interpretations diverge in certain
areas, but both scholars argued that certain risks, such as radiation, superseded class
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distinctions and otherness. Although Giddens and Beck conceded that the less privileged
experience risk differently, the consequences of modernity, whether “atomic fallout or
ecological disaster,” left humanity with a more egalitarian form of risk, one that Beck
argued would “boomerang” back to even the “rich and powerful.”97 As climate change
threatens, the “world risk society” Beck saw developing seems close to the mark. The
widespread fears of radiation and inadequate evacuation measures during Waterford’s
construction underscore the generalized sense of risk, that extended across lines of class,
race and ethnicity, and sex. But as Giddens and Beck noted, distribution of risk matters,
and there are “always losers” and “winners” in risk societies.98
When presidential hopeful Jesse Jackson delivered a speech at Tulane University
in 1984, he outlined those differences. Jackson lamented the recent controversies with
Waterford and feared the effects of nuclear accident upon the impoverished, stating: “The
poor already cannot afford to buy water, and the air is not for sale…yet!”99 Continuing
on, Jackson argued that the “real obscenity” was the “millions of dollars” supporting
racist regimes in South Africa, and criticized Middle South Utilities for using the uranium
mined “by tens of thousands of black men held in virtual slavery by the most abhorrent
government on the face of the earth—the white supremacist government in Pretoria.”

97

Beck, Risk Society: Towards A New Modernity (London: SAGE Publications, 1992),
23.

98

Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity; Beck, Risk Society, 23.

99

Jesse Jackson, speech, May 4th, 1984, Tulane University, Folder: WSES Safety Inves.,
Box 2, Department of Justice, Matter of Louisiana Power & Light, Co. 1971-1984.
Accession Number: P1991-137.

134

Jackson alleged the utilities companies justified their actions by its cheap price but never
managed to ask why South Africa’s uranium remained cheap. The answer, Jackson
argued, was “the same reason cotton was king in the Old South.”100 Nuclear power
systems “offer ways of building order” in our world, from the people who mine uranium
and live with its dangerous by-products to the rural places that house nuclear reactors.101
Today, Waterford churns out power atop a former sugar cane plantation, where modern
appetites for electricity meet a past driven by an insatiable appetite for sugar. Risk looms
over everyone in southern Louisiana, whether from natural or unnatural means, but the
ordering continues—same as it ever was.
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CHAPTER FOUR

THE NUCLEAR BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY: RADIOACTIVE
WASTE AND ENVIRONMENTAL IDENTITIES
Kreeg Antwoord: I think…the big story will be the disappearance of the Barnwell, South
Carolina nuclear dump…
Mitzi Molnar: But don't you think the Debbie Boone kidnapping will be a bigger story
than the nuclear dump disappearance? After all, the public is more interested in
people disappearing than dumps!” ---Saturday Night Live (April 22, 1978)1

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, rural Barnwell, South Carolina sat at the center
of the nuclear waste debate, and not only because it became, at one point, the dumping
ground for approximately 85 percent of the nation’s radioactive garbage.2 While the
Savannah River Site, which occupies parts of Aiken, Allendale, and Barnwell counties,
has garnered more scholarly attention, the Barnwell community nearly achieved the
nuclear trifecta of being the site of major investment in defense technology, nuclear
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reprocessing, and waste disposal.1 While the plans for all three never fully materialized
the initial vision for expanding upon what SRS started in 1951 resembles the “technology
corridors” aggressively pursued today; except for its rural location.2 Barnwell’s lowlevel radioactive waste site (LLW) exemplifies South Carolina’s investment in the
nuclear industry, where according to one observer, “ ‘King Cotton’ was deposed only
have been replaced by another king: Plutonium.”3 Owned by the corporation ChemNuclear, the LLW repository was part of a larger effort to transform a rural agricultural
economy into a high-tech industrial one—a Nuclear Valley in the US South.4
The history of Barnwell’s waste facility is, on one hand, very much a local
history. It is the story of one community’s support for a radioactive burial ground amidst
vociferous opposition. On the other hand, this micro-history is about a national problem
and a regional quest for nuclear industry. Barnwell’s LLW site underscores a
fundamental issue surrounding “nuclear things;” radioactive materials require a
permanent burial repository, and few communities or politicians willingly allow them in
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their backyards.5 Studying Barnwell’s LLW facility illuminates a hidden history of waste
in post-World War II America, one that shaped rural environs and spurred serious
consideration about balancing economic and environmental needs.6 This chapter analyzes
the political processes, economic visions, and policy failures that facilitated the
establishment of the low-level waste site in South Carolina and an inequitable system of
waste disposal where three (now four) states are responsible for burying the nation’s lowlevel nuclear waste and much of their high-level waste.7 By shifting the scholarly focus to
the eastern United States from the more well-documented western nuclear story, the
history of Barnwell’s repository demonstrates how America’s nuclear legacy has
embedded itself in communities and in landscapes across the country, transforming rural
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spaces into radioactive environments.8 Finally, Barnwell’s history is part of a regional
story—a radioactive Dixie, where twenty-seven million cubic feet of nuclear waste now
decays in South Carolina.9 If the older “burden of southern history,” as C. Vann
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Woodward put it, manifested itself through the past, a new burden requires monitoring
Barnwell’s nuclear waste for centuries ahead.
In the late 1970s, an uproar ignited over South Carolina’s nuclear trade. Antinuclear activists in the state characterized it in regional terms, deeming it the South’s
“disproportionate burden.”10 Many other South Carolinians expressed outrage about their
state serving as the nation’s trash can. In response, the rural community of Barnwell
supported Chem-Nuclear’s facility more strongly than before, and in doing so, they
transformed a marker of environmental inequality into a marker of pride.11 While others
feared radioactive waste, many in Barnwell proudly extolled its virtues and denied the
10
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risks the nuclear industry entailed. As activists and non-activists alike bemoaned the state
and the region’s new identity as radioactive places, Barnwell touted an environmental
identity others loathed.
The conflict between the struggling rural community of Barnwell and the rest of
South Carolina provides a compelling portrait of how the industrialization and
commercialization of the South, along with the rise of modern environmentalism,
presented poverty stricken areas with a conundrum: How could rural communities
survive without accepting federal or corporate development—particularly risky
industries?12 The voices of Barnwell residents illustrate the dilemmas faced in rural
communities as independent farming became financially unfeasible, families migrated to
booming metropolitan areas, and jobs hemorrhaged. For these residents, economic needs
as well as social and cultural values, dictated their position, superseding modern
environmental values. 13 To others, the Chem-Nuclear site appeared as a Faustian
bargain; it was, as one South Carolinian argued, better to have “poverty than
pestilence.”14 Barnwell’s story is a history of that bargain and its place in the economic,
social, and environmental transformation of the South from “Cotton Belt to Sunbelt.”15
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Before moving into the origins of Barnwell’s contested terrain, the complicated
matrix of waste by-products demands clarification. Two broad categories divide
radioactive waste: high and low-level waste (HLW or LLW). Low-level waste ranges
from innocuous medical scrubs to more highly-radioactive remnants of nuclear power
production, which underscores the imprecise nature of the system. The United States
currently has four low-level waste sites, and each of these sites has its own parameters for
what it accepts, where it accepts it from, and how much it accepts. Untangling even these
knots is complex—never mind the more vexing question of where high-level waste goes.
Depending on who is assessing the risks of radioactive waste, the spectrum between high
and low level can vary.
From the public’s perception, waste categories merge into an amorphous one, thus
making any and all nuclear waste appear equally dangerous. For those in the nuclear
industry or the NRC, the gradient is more distilled, with certain types of waste presenting
real hazards and others negligible. These discrepancies have historically created a chasm
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between policy-makers, industry experts, activists, and the public. In Barnwell’s case,
approximately 75 percent of the waste is defined as “fuel-cycle” (i.e. from nuclear power
production) and 25 percent came from non-fuel cycle purposes (i.e. research and
medicine).16
South Carolina’s entrée into the nuclear waste business began with the
development of the Savannah River Site (SRS). Built in 1951, SRS became one of many
Cold War military installation projects churning out the necessary components for
expanding the nation’s nuclear arsenal. SRS served as the state’s largest employer in the
mid-twentieth century, and functioned as a symbol of American technological
supremacy, Cold War demands, and regional modernization.17 Moreover, SRS’s
development launched the state’s friendly relationship with all things nuclear. Today,
SRS houses high-level nuclear waste, primarily due to a lack of suitable disposal sites
elsewhere. With the delay in opening the long-awaited high-level depository at Yucca
Mountain in Nevada, high-level waste remains in disposal purgatory: no use and no place
for burial either. South Carolina’s investment in a nuclear economy provided economic
benefits coupled with long-term environmental risks.
The development of the Savannah River Site transformed Aiken County, an area
bordering South Carolina and Georgia. Even today, a drive through Barnwell county
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suggests that the region’s transformation only extended so far, leaving large swaths of
land unscathed from the hallmarks of twentieth century development: suburbanization
and sprawl. Despite its proximity to SRS, Barnwell County remains rural, dotted with
bucolic pastures and a few chain stores present in many small towns. Thus, Barnwell’s
landscape is defined by competing claims – one to an agrarian past and the other to an
aspirational suburban landscape. Already home to part of the Savannah River Site, and
with ample land available, Barnwell County welcomed the nuclear industry as perhaps its
most important lever for economic development, and encouraged the siting of the lowlevel radioactive waste site and a controversial nuclear reprocessing plant built by AlliedGeneral but never operational.18
Chem-Nuclear’s pursuit of the Barnwell site began in the late 1960s, and was
soon followed by a two year long licensing process, a brief delay compared to later
licensing odysseys of countless nuclear power plants. The initial reaction to the disposal
site was one of muted concern, and some politicians questioned the wisdom of South
Carolina’s seemingly breezy acceptance of radioactive waste. Former chemical engineer
and State Senator Gilbert E. McMillan (R-Aiken) warned his colleagues of such dangers
in March 1970: “I know when you pollute with atomic waste you pollute forever, and I
submit that South Carolina should not becoming a dumping ground for atomic waste.”19
Still, the public hearing for the repository received little attention, and no one opposed to
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the site attended the one and only hearing.20 Originally, the proposed facility consisted of
a seventeen-acre area in Barnwell, which no doubt appeared miniscule contrasted with
SRS’s expansive reach (SRS occupies approximately 198,344 acres). Unlike SRS, with
its massive relocation program that dislocated an entire community, Chem-Nuclear
required far less land and promised additional revenue for the rural county.21
In 1971, Chem-Nuclear Inc., entered into a 99-year lease (at $50 a year) with the
state of South Carolina, after undergoing a two-year licensing process.22 A bargain by
any metric, it included various tax payments to both the state and to Barnwell County and
financial contributions to an “extended care fund.”23 These terms have been modified, to
some extent, over the following decades, but the fundamental agreement remains the
same.
For the first five years of operation, the site occupied the original seventeen acres
but vastly expanded in 1975 to 235 acres. In conjunction, the initial 99-year lease soon
extended to 2075. The expansion occurred for three reasons. First, the amount of lowlevel radioactive waste had sharply increased, thus requiring more land for disposal and
opportunities for greater profit. Second, tritium plumes, bodies of radioactive water and
vapor which can affect water aquifers, at the Barnwell site necessitated a greater amount
20
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of land as well. And finally, multiple commercial low-level waste sites closed: Maxey
Flats in Kentucky (1977), West Valley in New York (1975), and Sheffield in Illinois
(1978).24 What started as a small disposal site transformed into a sizeable estate of
radioactive garbage. The volume of nuclear waste skyrocketed, growing from 50,219
cubic feet in volume to over 600,000 cubic feet in 1975. By 1979, Barnwell’s nuclear site
contained over two million cubic feet of low-level nuclear waste, all buried in shallow
trenches.25 Today, the ground beneath those 235 acres contains approximately twentyeight million cubic feet of nuclear waste. By comparison, the Empire State Building has a
volume of thirty-seven million cubic feet. With the addition of SRS’s nuclear waste,
perhaps the entire building would be filled to capacity.
In a brief period of three years, with three commercial nuclear waste sites closing,
South Carolina, Washington, and Nevada remained the only states willing to bury the
nation’s low-level radioactive waste.26 This sharp inequity set off a political, and
arguably environmental, crisis on a national scale. A democratic nation had inadvertently
become inegalitarian in its waste disposal, raising the question of whether democratic
means offered any resolution to the crisis, and how much input the public should have, if
any, in the storage of radioactive waste. 27 Coinciding with the low-level waste dilemma

24

See “Site History and Environmental Monitoring Report for Sheffield Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Disposal Site,” State of Illinois, Illinois Emergency Management
Agency, 2009, http://www.illinois.gov/iema/NRS/Documents/SheffieldReport.pdf.

25

DHEC, “Commercial Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal in South Carolina.”

26

Walker, Yucca Mountain, 125, 128-131.

27

See Langdon Winner’s “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” Daedalus 109, no. 1, Modern
Technology: Problem or Opportunity? (Winter, 1980): 121-136.

146

in the 1970s-1980s, the Department of Energy faced the difficult task of finding
repositories for high-level radioactive waste from nuclear weapons production, further
highlighting the problem of siting and community input.28
The looming nuclear waste crisis illustrated the difficulties of managing the need
for burial, while negating the political fall-out. For the governors of South Carolina,
Washington, and Nevada, this posed a serious problem, for themselves and for their
constituents. The issues surrounding high and low-level waste demanded federal, state,
and local governments work together effectively; a challenging prospect for any problem
much less one as complicated and fraught with controversy as radioactive waste. A
haphazardly organized means of disposal, one that relegated waste to a few states, no
longer sufficed.
As others have observed, no coherent policy had been adopted to effectively
handle the increasing amounts of radioactive waste the United States produced.29 Without
a clear agenda for waste disposal, a potentially manageable problem evolved into a fullfledged national controversy, with South Carolina at the forefront. In a 1976
congressional hearing, George D. Debuchananne of the U.S. Geologic Survey,
concluded, “The question then may well be asked: Why don't we have, systematic site
selection criteria? The answer, if it is to be found, lies within the failure of any Federal
Government agency directly or, indirectly involved in disposal site criteria study and
determination to step forward and provide energetic leadership in a critical area of public
28
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policy.”30 Debuchananne’s comment underscored the general stance towards nuclear
waste policy: not now, later.
Further complicating matters, by the late seventies, the public’s heightened sense
of environmental awareness and general uneasiness about the nuclear industry created a
policy log-jam of sorts, with the intended goal of a more equitable system. If possible in
the abstract (a creation of policy wonks), the regional compact system would prove more
difficult to carry out. In 1978, the nuclear crisis remained unresolved, and the temporary
closings of the Beatty, Nevada and Richland, Washington low-level sites, resulted in an
enormous influx of nuclear waste importation to Chem-Nuclear’s Barnwell site. For
Chem-Nuclear, the political crisis elsewhere created a boon. By the late seventies, South
Carolina received approximately 77-85 percent of the nation’s low-level nuclear waste,
and in 1978, the numbers soared even further.31
Even as Chem-Nuclear’s site vastly expanded in the mid-seventies, and the waste
volume increased, Barnwell residents welcomed it. While the industry’s presence
generated jobs, Barnwell County received much need tax revenue from the site. As a
rural county with few resources and a small tax base, the Chem-Nuclear site promised
additional funding for local schools, parks, and other government services. By
entrenching themselves in the community, the company reinforced their advertising
slogan, “We’re the good guys,” an unconcealed public relations campaign to ward off
30
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accusations of corporate malevolence.32 When Barnwell stood poised to become home to
Allied-General’s nuclear reprocessing facility in the 1970s, residents strongly supported a
project that others deemed unsafe and unnecessary. Amidst pastures and Confederate
memorials, the nuclear industry seemingly promised the same kind of growth that
neighboring county, Aiken, experienced decades earlier with the Savannah River Site.
The political situation in South Carolina proved favorable for Chem-Nuclear and
Barnwell county for several years. During his tenure as governor from 1975 to 1979,
James B. Edwards, an oral surgeon who was the first Republican elected governor in the
Palmetto State since Reconstruction and who was later appointed as Secretary of Energy
under the Reagan administration, staunchly supported the state’s nuclear industry.
Testifying before the Senate in 1978, Edwards reminded the committee of the nuclear
industry’s economic significance for South Carolina:
I might just add to expand a little bit on the job situation, when $1.235 billion
worth of new industry moves into South Carolina this year, you know that is
a big figure. I can't even translate that, being an old country boy, how much
money that is…If we have not had nuclear energy to give us that opportunity, we
would not have jobs for people.33
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While Edwards acknowledged the need for a comprehensive plan for radioactive
waste disposal, he reinforced South Carolina’s commitment to the nuclear industry.34
Like many southern boosters before him, jobs and revenue superseded other concerns.
Even though his claims to “being an old country boy” were given in jest, Edwards
skillfully deferred any further knowledge about the nuclear related industries by aligning
himself not with industry experts, but rather with laymen—a form of pro-nuclear
populism perhaps.
Two years later, the political winds shifted due to a change in leadership, the
proliferating amount of waste shipped to South Carolina, the election of Richard Riley as
governor of the state (at the time, governors could not be re-elected), and most
importantly, Three Mile Island (TMI). Although the accident at Three Mile Island in
1979 wrought major changes in safety and regulation in the commercial nuclear industry,
the event also invigorated the nuclear waste debate in South Carolina. Calling for a
reappraisal of the state’s nuclear waste intake and its blind-eye to the consequences of the
nuclear industry, Richard Riley, a Democrat who later served as Bill Clinton’s Secretary
of Education, disrupted a long-standing pattern toward unencumbered regional
development, Panglossian in its ethos.
Until the catastrophe at Chernobyl in 1986, the reactor meltdown at the Three
Mile Island nuclear plant in Central Pennsylvania was the most prominent accident in
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commercial nuclear power.35 Three Mile Island (TMI) vividly demonstrated the dangers
of nuclear technology gone awry, shook the nation’s tenuous faith in the safety of nuclear
energy, and gave vigor to anti-nuclear activism.36 Plans to ship TMI’s high-level nuclear
waste to the Savannah River Site jeopardized South Carolina’s friendliness with the
industry, after the public became alarmed by the news. For Governor Richard Riley, the
event proved politically expedient.37 Instead of accepting TMI’s waste, Riley appeared as
a hero, successfully blocking other states’ radioactive waste. Riley justified his decision
by addressing the South Carolina’s larger nuclear waste problem. Citing the large volume
of high level and low-level waste buried in the state, Riley asserted, “South Carolina can
no longer be the path of least resistance in seeking the national answer to nuclear waste
disposal.”38
For nearly a decade, Chem-Nuclear quietly operated the facilities with little
complaint, although it drew the ire of anti-nuclear activists.39 Anti-nuclear activists had
been embroiled in a decade-long movement against the proliferation of nuclear power
and defense technology in the state, but these groups were still largely outside the
mainstream until the late seventies, when the anti-nuclear movement gained a wider
following. Despite the increased efforts by activists, including public protests in 1978,
35
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and a slow stream of news reports on the site, the issue essentially remained dormant
until Gov. Richard Riley’s well-publicized refusal to accept high-level nuclear waste
from the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear meltdown in April 1979. What to do with
TMI’s nuclear by-products set off a battle over nuclear waste in South Carolina.
Richard Riley’s stance brought greater awareness to the increased volume of lowlevel radioactive waste in the state, gripping South Carolinians’ attention. Adding to the
furor, a number of environmental catastrophes, including the Love Canal toxic saga in
New York, triggered anxiety about industrial pollution and hazardous waste.40 The
visible presence of commercial nuclear power plants, federal defense sites, and high and
low-level nuclear waste in the state, in addition to the increased coverage of
environmental disasters, made many South Carolinians anxious about the future and the
consequences of living in a nuclear state. Moreover, Riley’s public refusal exposed the
Chem-Nuclear site’s central problem. Due to the Interstate Commerce Clause, if South
Carolina accepted radioactive waste from one state, any other state could bury their
nuclear garbage within its borders.41 By presenting South Carolina as a victim of federal
incursion rather than as the product of its own design, Riley’s refusal aroused public
support, even as it undermined serious appraisals of the state’s shortsightedness in 1971.
Sparked by Gov. Riley’s well-publicized invocation of state pride, and its
continued use by the media, other state politicians, and national activist organizations,
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South Carolinians readily employed similar rhetoric.42 The wholesale acceptance of the
nation’s low-level nuclear waste became an affront to South Carolinians’ pride. The
debacle transformed their state into the “nation’s sacrificial lamb.”43 Upon congratulating
Gov. Riley’s efforts in April 1979, South Carolinian Stephanie Connor declared: “South
Carolina is not a garbage can for the rest of the United States!”44 Shocked by the ruinous
implications of their state’s burgeoning nuclear-waste industry, South Carolinians
demanded equitable distribution of low-level nuclear waste.
In one letter to Governor Riley, an infuriated Camellia Lane of Surfside, SC,
asserted: “Why does S.C. have to be the ‘dumping ground’? When I read articles such as
the enclosed I get furious! And I’m not alone – just 1 of thousands. I’m middle class, 42
yr old, a wife…I’m not a nut either.”45 If middle class, middle aged wives were angered,
the political implications for Richard Riley and others loomed that much larger. By the
late seventies, the Barnwell issue extended beyond local anti-nuclear groups and became
a key issue adopted by South Carolina’s chapter of the League of Women Voters,
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spearheaded by state politician Harriet Keyserling and LWV member Mary Kelly. Those
groups also effectively broadened interest in the issue—particularly with female voters
and mothers especially.46
While other environmental inequities remained largely hidden or ignored by the
public, the perception that South Carolina had been unduly assigned the role of nation’s
garbage can for radioactive waste stirred people from complacency.47 Richard Riley’s
popular appeal, efforts by a diverse coalition of citizen groups and anti-nuclear
organizations, and a national spotlight sparked interest among formerly disinterested
citizens. Adding to the uproar, a 20/20 news program on the state’s nuclear waste woes
vexed South Carolinians, and many immediately wrote to Gov. Riley about their
concerns after seeing the broadcast.48-49 The dramatization of low-level nuclear waste
likely compelled residents to enter the fracas. In her letter to Gov. Richard Riley, South
Carolinian Novella Garrison expressed her dismay: “I have just seen a television program
which has me outraged. The program revealed that South Carolina is the dumping ground
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for the nuclear waste of not only the United States, but also other countries.”50 Harriet B.
Vinson of Greenville, expressed a similar sense of urgency: “Last night I watched 20/20
on Channel 12, WLOS, Asheville, and I knew that today I MUST write to you to find out
what I can do to get this stopped.”51 The national broadcast served as another painful
reminder of the state’s role as the nation’s dumping ground, the cost of industrial
development, and the failure of policy-makers to create an equitable system for waste
disposal.
The crisis also sparked rumination about South Carolina’s natural beauty and
economic potential from residents, as they wrestled with the problems of poverty and
preserving the environment. Sheila McClaine, resident of rural North, South Carolina,
warned that with unfettered development the state could “become just as homely and
unsightly as some of the less fortunate states than our own.”52 By comparing South
Carolina to the rest of the nation, many citizens expressed a holistic view of the state’s
environment, linking the majestic coastal areas to Barnwell and the southeastern
lowlands. Stephanie Connor, the sophomore at Georgetown University, implored Gov.
Riley to protect the state’s natural beauty, linking the state’s aesthetic appeal to the
character of its people:
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South Carolina is a beautiful state and one of the few states left which is
developing and moving forward, instead of stagnating and decaying. I think you
agree that progress should be encouraged, but tempered so that we do not sacrifice
the beauty of the state and the unharried friendliness of the people.53

Fears of radiation, a strong attachment to place, and a sense of injustice compelled many
of the state’s residents to call for better waste disposal policies. Constituent
correspondence written during the crisis underscored a desire to preserve some
redeemable form of the past through preserving the environment.
As they considered their state’s trade in radioactive waste, South Carolinians
weighed the consequences of industrial development. Conflicted about the greater costs
of unchecked growth, Robert Clardy of Pelzer, South Carolina, professed that he, “Mr.
Average Citizen,” preferred “poverty to pestilence.”54 Clardy found it mysterious that the
state “could trade a status as one of the poorest states in the nation to one of the most
dangerous.”55 Deborah Johnson mused, “We must be incredibly desperate, uniformed, or
stupid.” Johnson continued, “I would hate to see South Carolina commit themselves to
becoming the nuclear dumping ground of the nation, simply because they had been sold
the line that this was an economic boondoggle.”56 Sheila McClaine, of North, South
Carolina, questioned industry’s unimpeded march through the state, while underscoring
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the need for economic growth: “There can be no denying the need for industry and
productivity in our growing state, but again, some of the construction seems totally
unneeded. For example, the new mall being built in Orangeburg seems to serve no lifesaving purpose.”57 While the nuclear waste issue intersected with specific concerns about
environmental and health risks, it also highlighted more general dilemmas about
economic development: how could one of the “poorest states” give its citizens better
opportunities without committing themselves to “pestilence”?58
Even as South Carolinians acknowledged the economic benefits of industrial
development, a strong current of anxiety remained. The passionate response following
Governor Riley’s refusal to accept Three Mile Island’s nuclear waste reflected concerns
about environmental contamination and the public health risks associated with radiation.
The fears expressed by South Carolinians mirrored an upswing in national concerns about
nuclear power and radioactive waste. As historian Samuel Hays has noted, “little thought
had been given by either industry or the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] to the
disposal of radioactive waste” until the last half of the 1970s.59 As public concern
increased, nuclear enthusiasts faced the difficult task of assuaging fears.60 In a letter to
Congressman Butler Derrick of South Carolina’s Third District, Frances Rodgers
envisioned an eerie future: “No humans, no animals, might as well blow us up…We will
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all die of cancer.”61 Another resident, Deborah Johnson, characterized the public as
“zombie-like,” and feared the capitol lawn would be littered with “malformed babies,
sterile men and women, and lethally irradiated bodies.” Johnson wondered what horrible
tragedy would have to occur “before the nuclear risk” was “taken seriously in this
state.”62 The threat of radioactivity, invisible and seemingly uncontrollable, powerfully
underscored the dilemma between economic growth and maintaining proper regulation
for the environment and public health.
In Barnwell, economic development and community preservation took
precedence over environmental and public health concerns, placing them at odds with
anti-nuclear activists and many others in South Carolina. Surrounded by critics, the
people of Barnwell clung tighter to the nuclear waste site, recasting a marker of
environmental inequity into a point of pride. Living near a radioactive waste repository
produced a stigma different from ordinary landfills or even hazardous waste sites.
Radiation conjured images of mutation, defective genes, and deformed children. A
community living with twenty-seven million cubic feet of nuclear waste invited new
categories of difference. To live in Barnwell carried the weight of uncertainty—never
knowing what made you sick, why relatives died of cancer, or children had birth
defects.63 A nuclear economy requires a commitment to uncertainty and accepting an
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inability to find solid explanations for mortal or ordinary occurrences like cancer. Even as
SRS officials, Chem-Nuclear employees, and state officials monitored the area’s nuclear
sites and promised a safe operation, the scale of Barnwell’s radioactive waste repository
made it nearly impossible to separate the community’s identity from its atomic trade. In
response, locals transformed their albatross.
At the forefront of the Barnwell debate, aging state representative Solomon Blatt
tenaciously fought the nuclear waste opposition even as his health failed. Blatt’s political
power, forged over five decades, gave Barnwell County and its municipality a stiff
rebuttal to the anti-Chem Nuclear opposition. In 1985, a year before his death, a ninety
year-old Blatt offered a fiery proclamation:
We live on top of the dump, as they call it. We call it a fine industry serving not only
South Carolina but the nation…Why would you want to interfere with what we’re doing
down there if we like it? Why do you want to run the little county of Barnwell and tell us
what industry we have and we won’t?64

Blatt, the ever-savvy politician, reversed the David and Goliath in the nuclear waste
debate. Barnwell appeared as “the little county,” bullied by certain political factions and
their environmentalist allies. For Blatt and the people of Barnwell, local autonomy
reigned over other matters.
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In a curious brand of localism, Blatt and other pro-Chem Nuclear supporters to
the area, welcomed “newcomers” so long as they supported the dump, and resisted
outsiders, those who posed a danger to Barnwell’s identity and economic viability. In a
letter to Barnwell city council chairman, T.E. Richardson, Blatt expressed his desire to
protect local residents “from a large group of obnoxious and unworthy citizens spilling
themselves over us in our section of the state.”65 Blatt welcomed “newcomers,” with ties
to industry, reflecting upon the benefits of these additions to the community, “Our town
and county is a better town and county for the newcomers who have moved in and lived
among us. Barnwell is making progress as the result of these industries being in our
midst.”66 Blatt even insisted he knew “no one” in the community that opposed the
industry.67 Pro-Chem Nuclear supporters delineated boundaries between “us” and “them”
and carved those lines more aggressively as protests and national attention threatened
greater scrutiny of Chem-Nuclear’s operation. As the public pushed for greater oversight
and stricter regulations, pro-nuclear forces in Barnwell called for greater autonomy in
their county’s industrial development.
Many Barnwell citizens, and residents from adjacent Aiken County, firmly
supported Chem-Nuclear and the nuclear industry. Drew Wilder, of the Barnwell
Chamber of Commerce, seemed encouraged by the pro-nuclear sentiment in the area,
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despite the “anti-nuclear mood of the country.”68 Wilder asserted the citizenry, “which
has lived with the industry for nearly thirty years,” still “overwhelmingly” supported it.69
According to the Chamber of Commerce’s survey, nearly eighty-three percent of
Barnwell residents favored continued nuclear development and presumably the ChemNuclear site, while forty-one percent considered themselves “NOT well informed on the
subject.”70 The letter gives no indication of how many residents the council surveyed, but
others expressed similar sentiments. One hundred Barnwell and Aiken County residents
petitioned for the continued development of the nuclear industry, citing its importance to
the area.71 Barnwell resident Dennis Hutto doubted the legitimacy of environmentalists,
describing them as a “very small minority of people” who “want to save a bird or tree
from some type of harm that they don’t even know would be harmed in the first place.”72
Hutto felt activists overlooked cases “where people actually froze to death from lack of
heat.”73 For many locals, Barnwell’s economic life or death hinged upon the nuclear
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industry.74 Without Chem-Nuclear, some Barnwell residents feared the community’s
disappearance altogether. B.D. Plexico Jr., the last remaining new car dealer in town,
bemoaned its disintegration: “there are many businesses that have been closed up. The
town which I love and grew up in is rapidly becoming a ghost town.”75 An area farmer,
skeptical of Barnwell’s safety, nonetheless confirmed that many Barnwellians, “felt it
[Chem-Nuclear] was a salvation then for people to be able to remain in the area and have
a decent job.”76 Chem-Nuclear appeared as vital life support for a hemorrhaging rural
community.
For those living in Barnwell, Chem-Nuclear’s presence translated into
employment opportunities and greater revenue for the county. The site, at its peak,
employed somewhere between 200-300 people approximately.77 In recent years,
employment figures have dwindled to less than one hundred.78 Moreover, in 1985 alone,
Barnwell County, “received $575,000 in fees and property taxes from Chem-Nuclear; the
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town of Snelling (population 150) gained $50,000; and the state of South Carolina put
more than 9 million into its treasury.”79 The benefits were tangible. Barnwell’s school
system received approximately $500,000 over a period of five years in the late seventies,
funding a variety of projects for new facilities.80 Because of the community’s small size,
Chem-Nuclear’s impact in Barnwell was highly visible, benefiting the company as well.
When outsiders attacked Chem-Nuclear, many perceived it as an attack upon their
community too. According to Dennis Shepard of South Carolina’s Department of Health
and Environmental Control (DHEC), “a lot of the community sort of laughs [and
laughed] at the outsiders who want to say how bad it is…This community has no more
excess deaths from cancer, leukemia, any of the normal causes of death, than any other
community would have.”81 Paradoxically, Barnwell’s radioactive garbage appeared as
one way to extend the life of a rural town rather than a source of death and disease.
Unlike many other rural communities, Barnwell experienced a population growth
during the seventies, with an approximately 25 percent increase.82 Before Chem-Nuclear
opened the site, a housing survey in 1970 estimated that nearly 30 percent of housing in
Barnwell was sub-standard, and at least an equal number lacked one or more plumbing

79

“Residents want Barnwell to Remain Open,” Fayetteville Times, 1-25-1987, Tim Bass,
CASH papers, Southern Historical Collection, UNC-Chapel Hill.

80

“Environmental Assessment for the Barnwell Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility,”
NUREG-0879, completed November 1981, published January 1982: 103, 3-27.

81

“Residents want Barnwell to Remain Open,” Fayetteville Times, 1-25-1987, Tim Bass,
CASH papers, Southern Historical Collection, UNC-Chapel Hill.

82

Environmental Assessment for the Barnwell Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility,”
NUREG-0879: 92, 3-11.

163

facilities and were overcrowded.83 Spurred by the construction of Allied-General’s
nuclear reprocessing site and Chem-Nuclear’s presence, the county experienced a
housing boom over the decade, growing from 5,384 dwellings to 7,282, a 35 percent
increase.84 Unemployment, however, remained stubbornly high. In 1989, Barnwell
county’s unemployment rate ranked eighth in the state.85 And thus, the benefits were
more akin to a “boom-town” than a sustained economic engine, one that would
substantially boost employment and raise the standard of living in the way that SRS had
done for Aiken county. Despite this, the Barnwell community arguably viewed even
slight improvements as better than other alternatives and certainly good enough for
hosting a LLW site.
Although few Barnwell residents voiced trepidation about Chem-Nuclear’s
repository, the accident at Three Mile Island provoked some anxiety among locals about
environmental contamination. Mary Moore wrote to Gov. Riley that the accident “upset
many of us in South Carolina, especially in Barnwell County.”86 Written in April 1979,
the same month as the Three Mile Island accident, DeWitt Norwood Jr. echoed Moore’s
sentiment. Norwood requested Riley prevent the importation of the site’s waste, and
professed his belief that “most of the people in Barnwell County think as I do about the
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matter.”87 To be sure, both writers were concerned with waste from Three Mile Island,
not the more benign low-level waste shipped into the Chem-Nuclear facilities. The
increasingly publicized nature of environmental disasters and risks gave incidents like
Three Mile Island greater visibility and intensity and rattled the nerves of even some
Barnwell residents.
In 1985, as the nuclear waste debate returned to the headlines, Susan Owen of
Barnwell conceded the need for “economy,” but not an “economy that may one day make
Barnwell a ghost town.”88 Owen, like B.D. Plexico Jr., envisioned Barnwell’s ghost town
fate; however, environmental degradation would be the cause. Similarly, Owen urged
Rep. Butler Derrick to preserve her community, by ending nuclear waste importation, not
through its continuation. Owen’s conception of history and the future influenced her
opinion, “My husband’s grandfather, spent his life helping Barnwell become a better
place to live, for his family and friends. Now I fear for the future of my family living in
this town.”89 Another Barnwellian, R.J. Baxley surmised, “If the thing starts leaking, it’ll
contaminate everything to the ocean…The thing about it is, no matter where you’re going
with it, the money man wants it. But, buddy, what good is a payroll when you’ve done
and killed everybody around?”90 Darkly humorous and candid, Baxley’s comment
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underscores the central predicament for a community and a state which staked its future
upon the nuclear industry.
While the Barnwell controversy reached a crescendo in 1979, the debate
continued well into the next decade, as state and federal officials negotiated a
complicated nexus of environmental policy regulations. The Low-Level Nuclear
Radioactive Policy Act (1980) and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (1982) allowed states to
circumvent the Interstate Commerce Clause if they entered into a compact agreement
with other states. As legal scholars Richard Stewart and Jane Stewart have noted, the
compact system yielded a “regional approach” to nuclear-waste disposal rather than a
centralized, federal one.91
In 1986, South Carolina then joined the Southeastern Waste Compact with eight
other states, buoyed by North Carolina’s assurance that a nuclear waste site would be
completed by 1992. The growing backlash against nuclear waste in North Carolina, along
the curiously slow progress securing a site, led to South Carolina’s withdrawal from the
compact in 1996, and North Carolina’s ban from using Chem-Nuclear’s Barnwell
facility. The resistance to fulfilling the state’s obligation, despite its nuclear reactors and
Triangle-research facilities, could best summarized by Wilber Register, a Bladen County,
NC County Board Commissioner, “It’s kind of like everybody wants to go to heaven, but
nobody wants to die.”92 Widespread public apprehension, along with earlier examples of
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poor management, thwarted any attempts to make nuclear waste disposal more
equitable.93
Today, Washington, South Carolina, and Utah harbor most of the nation’s nuclear
waste. More recently, a LLW facility has opened in Andrews, Texas, located in the arid
western part of the state, but the “compact” to which Texas belongs only includes
Vermont; and thus, one could reasonably conclude that the facility exists primarily for
Texas generators.94 Over thirty years after the passage of a series of nuclear-waste related
acts, little has changed, and the high-level waste repository Yucca Mountain (NV) has
been officially stalled, most recently by President Obama’s administration—no doubt
fueled by Senator Harry Reid’s political power.95
For South Carolina, the policy developments of the eighties alleviated a grossly
disproportionate burden, but nonetheless left many questions unanswered, among them
when the Barnwell facility might close. Other measures included the increase in a
perpetual maintenance fee, forcing generators to pay a fair price for not simply waste
disposal but also for the cost of decommissioning the site, going from the original fee of
eight cents (per cubic foot) to over two dollars more recently.96 While this did not quiet
the most vociferous critics, it assuaged a more widespread feeling of outrage among the
public. Renewed support from the South Carolina Republican leaders in the 1990s, and
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powerful nuclear waste lobby, ensured continued operation of the Barnwell site. In 1998,
South Carolina joined a new compact, the Atlantic compact, thus limiting the number of
states that can dispose of waste in Barnwell. Although the current influx of waste is
significantly less than in previous decades, the importation of so-called low-level waste
continues.
In 2002, the South Carolina General Assembly transferred nearly $50 million
dollars from Barnwell’s Extended Care Fund, one of two funds created for monitoring
and maintaining the site in the future, to the state’s general fund to meet a budget
shortfall.97 Despite the legality of such a transfer, the ethics of it are less clear. Although
the state of South Carolina has paid back the funds, it nonetheless used money
demarcated for decommissioning and maintaining the Barnwell site over the long-term—
a vital aspect in protecting the public and the environment from approximately twentyeight million cubic feet of nuclear waste— to address budgetary missteps, raising
questions about government accountability, especially as the Extended Care Fund
balance has increased to over $145 million dollars.98 A skeptical observer might
reasonably conclude that the funds remain vulnerable to future machinations.
As the environmentally disastrous situation at the former LLW site Maxey Flats
demonstrated, low-level radioactive waste site can pose a significant threat to the
surrounding ecosystem and to public health. Of greatest concern is the migration of
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radioactive elements into the water supply. While Barnwell County proved more suitable
than other areas, the disposal method, a technique called shallow land burial, left the area
vulnerable to groundwater leaching into the shallow pits and then into other sources of
water. Despite the waste’s high-tech origins, shallow-land burial techniques are rather
simple, although not quite as crude as some might imagine. Disposal trenches,
approximately five meters deep and two hundred meters in length, are, in fact, engineered
pits, reinforced by sand, cement, and other materials to stabilize each trench and designed
to minimize the effects of groundwater. Casks of nuclear waste, both from the fuel-cycle
and non-fuel cycle materials (typically segregated), are laid atop one another in the
trenches, stacked hierarchically depending on the level of radiation, so that more
radioactive materials are buried deeper. Our own renderings of waste sites, either in the
imagination or popular culture, evoke a different kind of disposal practice, one closer to a
landfill than what lies beneath the grassy surface of Chem-Nuclear’s grounds. While
Chem-Nuclear employee Michael Benjamin has conceded that burial practices have
improved over the years, regulators have characterized the Barnwell site as wellmanaged, especially when compared to notoriously ill-managed sites like Maxey Flats
and Sheffield. 99 As a 1981 Environmental Assessment noted, “operating experience at
many of the commercial low-level waste (LLW) disposal has been less than desirable.
However…the Barnwell facility has been operated at the forefront of technology.”100
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Despite commendable management practices and forecast modeling, the nuclear industry
produces risks, and the very nature of radioactive materials creates the possibility for
unintended consequences, some not immediately visible.
In any disposal site, groundwater is one of the primary, if not the primary, cause
for concern. As groundwater seeps into trenches, it creates the potential for radionuclides,
specifically tritium and strontium-90, to spread into neighboring water sources,
vegetation, and possibly expose humans to radiation. The presence of tritium and
strontium-90 at disposal sites, while expected and arguably unavoidable by those within
the nuclear industry, has been a source of criticism for anti-nuclear groups and concerned
citizens, although claims of increased cancer rates, thyroid disorders, or leukemia are
often speculative, generally contentious, and with occasionally suspect, independently
generated data. And yet, the NRC and DHEC concluded in 1981 that “long term
migration” was the “most important identified” problem with the Barnwell site.101
Tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, is the radionuclide most likely to
migrate from groundwater into the water table, an area of saturated soil that exists at
different depths beneath the surface depending on the location. If tritium leaches into the
water table, it can create a “tritium plume,” a body of tritiated water and vapor moving
through water aquifers that must be monitored regularly.102 Because tritium is considered
the “heaviest isotope of hydrogen” it moves much like water through the ground, and
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thus, its rate of migration is easier to predict but also difficult to contain.103 At the
Barnwell LLW site, tritium plumes have been located, which have been monitored and
documented over the past several decades. In recent years, DHEC and Chem-Nuclear
have created a more open dialogue with the public, making maps of plume-locations and
radiation activity available for access.
While the public’s concern is one of a more immediate nature—the invisibility of
radiation and the risks to public health, the larger question confronting South Carolina
and Chem-Nuclear is the matter of not only controlling tritium plumes but also
remediation. The ground beneath Barnwell, if not a highly dangerous environmental
threat, must be monitored, controlled, and remediated for years to come. Tritium plumes
present an expensive project at the very least. The costs of a LLW site continue for
hundreds of years after waste disposal ends, and based upon a 2008 report, tritium
remediation will cost anywhere from $23 to $140 million dollars and conceivably costs
could increase.104 For now, the Barnwell “extended care fund” which Chem-Nuclear has
contributed to since its inception will cover the costs of remediation, along with
decommissioning and monitoring at least for several hundred years.105 Central to the
dilemma about Barnwell’s low-level waste site, and nuclear controversies generally, is
the unique time-scale of radioactive waste. In our own lives, the length of our contractual
commitments is often much shorter, but nuclear power and waste, along with utilizing
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radiation for research and medicine, require long-term commitments that extend beyond
our lifetimes and into future generations. South Carolina’s commitment to low-level
waste began in the seventies and will extend far beyond the lives of the politicians,
developers, and citizens that made it initially possible.
The outcry against South Carolina’s perceived role as the nation’s dumping
ground typically prompted the solution: each state should bury their own waste.
Proponents of this solution arguably failed to consider the political, economic, and
cultural values of states less inclined to harbor nuclear waste dumps; and perhaps more
importantly, failed to address the politics of waste. Barnwell resident Susan Owen
questioned the decision to bury nuclear waste “where people’s lives and futures are not in
jeopardy.”106 Owen then proposed this solution: “There’s plenty of unpopulated
[underline Owen’s] wasteland that will not even grow weeds.” For Owen, Barnwell,
South Carolina, was a populated place, despite its rural location and small number of
residents. America’s wasteland, presumably in the deserts of the Southwest and Western
regions, historically had been the dumping ground for nuclear waste, and Owen’s
response proposed more of the same. South Carolinians opposed to the Barnwell dump
perceived their state as decidedly non-wasteland but possibly underestimated outside
perceptions. For the states refusing to bury their own nuclear waste, much less any other
state’s, reflects a larger problem at stake. To outsiders, Barnwell, South Carolina may
have seemed like a wasteland too.
The furor surrounding low-level nuclear waste demonstrates the problem with
contemporary views surrounding the environment: the waste can always go somewhere
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else. Those on either side of the debate continually missed a central issue behind the
geography of waste disposal: the cost of consumption in the modern United States.
Activists and non-activists alike, ignored what now seems readily apparent. Even if the
location changed, football-field sized trenches of radioactive waste would still multiple.
Because consumptive habits faced little criticism, simply shunting other states’ nuclear
waste elsewhere appeared justifiable. Susan Owen’s solution, ship the nuclear waste to a
so-called ecological “dead zone,” is less striking for its scientific inaccuracy than for its
implications for the area that must contain radioactive waste. In her consideration of the
environmental havoc wreaked by nuclear weapons in the West, writer Marilynne
Robinson has defined wilderness as the place “where things can be done that would
intolerable in populous landscape… If is no longer to be found in one place, we assume it
exists in other places. So the loss of wilderness always seems only relative, and this
somewhat mitigates any specific instance of abuse.”107 If not “wild” in the popular
conception of wilderness, a place unaltered by human means, then Barnwell’s landscape
fits Robinson’s definition rather well.
Located in the Atlantic Coastal Plains, the rolling hills of Barnwell and Aiken
have long since been used, whether for farming, the ever-expansive SRS, or other
industries such as pulp wood logging. Because of the SRS, according to a 1981 report,
the federal government owns the majority of the land, while forests and agriculture also
dominate the landscape.108 Multiple rivers and water sources are in close proximity to the
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site, namely the Savannah River, the Salkehatchie River, and the Lower Three Runs
Creek.109 Ranging from sandy soils to swamps, abundant pine forests cover the land
surrounding the site and mostly deer, foxes, and small lizards, snakes, and birds populate
the local ecosystem. At one time, other species such as eastern cougars possibly roamed
the area, but by the time the Barnwell site opened in 1971, a great number of species,
both animal and plant, were either eradicated, rare, or endangered in Barnwell county.110
The site itself was used for pulpwood production and farming before Chem-Nuclear
leased the land, so it had long been utilized for some form of industry.111 And now, it
contains a vast and inconceivable amount of radioactive waste beneath layers of soil,
clay, and sand—“intolerable in populous landscape.”112
Rural America, not simply the western United States, carries the burden of our
radioactive past, present, and future. In a 1980 hearing before a Senate committee,
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) underscored this stark inequity, stating that “vast
quantities of nuclear waste” are “scattered across rural America….Rural America will
most likely become the repository for all of the country's nuclear wastes… 113
Geographies of waste are complex, ranging from hazardous chemicals to landfills, where
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trash of all varieties is forgotten, ignored, or as in developing countries, scoured for
valuable (and dangerous) metals. For the people of Barnwell, and those dissecting the
remnants of our discarded devices, waste takes on new meaning, a meaning quite
different from those not well-attuned to the economic and social reasons for these
bargains. Across the rural US South, the fears of Barnwell’s people have materialized:
populations dwindled, houses and farms sold, and rural residents grasped for economic
opportunities that would salvage the vestiges of the towns they loved. Sprawling
metropolitan areas thrived, while ghost towns dotted the rural South. Barnwell’s last new
car salesman, B.D. Plexico Jr., does not appear as someone who has been “sold a line,”
but rather as someone who weighed the costs of the nuclear industry and decided
preservation of his community overruled the risks.
Historian C. Vann Woodward described the vast changes afoot as the “Bulldozer
Revolution.”114 The sprawling reordering of the South, combined with the toppling of
“old monuments of regional distinctiveness” bound to white supremacy and human
bondage, left people wondering if an American South existed at all. For Woodward, the
“burden of southern history,” namely defeat and poverty, gave the region ongoing
markers of difference. As much as the South appeared Americanized, a history of failure,
guilt, and poverty defined the region and its people.115 Southerners, in Woodward’s
estimation, did not share the same can-do attitude so engrained in American culture.
While the region has neither a monopoly on poverty or radioactive waste, the South has
new burdens—not necessarily defined by exceptionalism—but by a nuclear future. When
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all the old monuments have crumbled, radionuclides beneath South Carolina’s soil will
decay far more slowly, requiring centuries of environmental stewardship and new
monuments of warning.

Barnwell's Nuclear Waste (Volume, Cubic Feet)
3,000,000
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000

Barnwell's	
  Nuclear	
  Waste	
  	
  

1,000,000
500,000
0
1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
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CHAPTER FIVE

JIMMY CARTER AND THE TROUBLE WITH EXPERTISE

Jimmy’s got more sides than the Pentagon and may prove nearly as dangerous.
He’s as hard to get a handle on as a greased pig, which is as elusive as a
lightning bug.”1 ---Larry L. King (1976)
…the President apparently felt he had to fish or cut bait between energy and
environment. He chose to cut environment.
---Unnamed Carter Administration Official (1979)

On April 1, 1979, after attending Sunday school, President Jimmy Carter and First
Lady Rosalyn Carter ventured into the control room of the Three Mile Island (TMI)
nuclear power plant, where days earlier a “chain of events” caused the worst commercial
nuclear accident in American history.2 Photographs from the Carters’ TMI tour showed
the couple wearing rumpled, unfashionable yellow disposal shoe-covers and lacking
presidential airs. While Carter’s willingness to investigate the accident himself and
“learn firsthand from the scientists” demonstrated his deep-seeded commitment to the
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nation’s energy issues, the popular television series Saturday Night Live found an
abundance of comic material in Jimmy and Rosalyn Carter’s trip.1 A week after the
partial meltdown at TMI, SNL lampooned the accident, and the Carters, in a skit entitled
“The Pepsi Syndrome.”2
Offering an antidote to the widespread fears surrounding the accident, the
gloomy anti-nuclear message of the recently released film The China Syndrome, and the
media uproar over TMI, “The Pepsi Syndrome” depicts nuclear engineers as comically
incompetent, overlooking the large “no soft drinks in the control room sign,” only to set
off a nuclear meltdown after an engineer, played by Bill Murray, spills the soft-drink
Pepsi on the reactor controls. A smarmy spin-doctor represents the nuclear industry,
describing the core meltdown as a “surprise” and no worse than having a “chest x-ray
over, and over, and over.” The Carters, played by Dan Akroyd and Laraine Newman,
sheepishly enter the control room, wearing yellow hard-hats with their names
emblazoned. While Rosalyn begs the president to tour the Hershey Factory instead, a
hapless Jimmy Carter, reminds the plant employees of his nuclear expertise and his
protective “yellow boots,” inspecting the “surprise” himself and unwittingly transforming
into the 90 foot tall “amazing colossal president.” Even after his growth spurt, Carter
remains the same – bumbling and ineffective in the face of calamity. A pointed parody of
his southern roots, the ninety-foot tall Jimmy Carter then announces his newfound love
for the similarly-tall janitor, an African-American woman (played by Garrett Morris),
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who mutates after the engineers asked her to clean a “spill” in the nuclear reactor
chamber.3 “The Pepsi Syndrome” accurately captured the public’s perception of Carter
and of nuclear power, even as it exaggerated elements of the TMI accident.
Despite efforts to portray Carter as a “nuclear expert,” and his reputation for
“technocratic precision,” the President’s claims to expertise worked as a double-edge
sword, influencing how Americans responded to Carter’s presidency and his energy
policy.4 Jimmy Carter found himself trapped between his desire for mastering policy
issues, devising the best solutions in a rancorous political climate, and his public image as
an energy expert and environmental steward. Embodying these dilemmas, Carter’s stance
on two nuclear projects in the American South, the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing
Plant (BNFP) and the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project (CRBR), tested the
president’s claims to nuclear expertise and his abilities to translate his knowledge into
effective solutions.
To a great extent, BNFP and Clinch River represented the nuclear industry’s
precarious future and a philosophy that had driven nuclear developments over several
decades. Both projects represented technological solutions for the problems presented by
the nuclear fuel cycle, reducing waste and creating a more efficient reactor. In terms of
political consequences, the fate of BNFP and CRBR proved far more meaningful for
shaping Carter’s presidency than the accident at Three Mile Island.
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Nuclear controversies of this sort provoked Jimmy Carter’s ire for their
wastefulness and for their inherent risks, which he continually emphasized. Although
Carter rightly interceded in the matter of nuclear reprocessing, on nuclear issues
generally, he waffled from characterizing nuclear power as a “last resort” to actually
supporting shorter licensing periods for nuclear plants. Even though he possessed more
familiarity in terms of technical and scientific knowledge than his predecessors, Carter
never fully crafted a coherent nuclear policy. Historian Bruce Schulman has argued that
Carter “represented the nation’s attachment to a high-technology future,” and that as a
southerner, he embodied that “faith” because “the hunger for research and development
funds had emerged early in the South.”5 Lukewarm in his support for nuclear power, the
southern president with nuclear engineering experience, ironically, cast doubt upon the
South’s nuclear visions and contributed to a declining enthusiasm for such projects as
Clinch River and BNFP. Carter, in fact, used his presidential authority to challenge that
faith rather than sustain it.
Contrary to popular depictions, Jimmy Carter’s background in nuclear
engineering was not as extensive many believe, but his experiences in the field
profoundly shaped him and his presidency. One of the turning points in Carter’s life
occurred during an interview for a position in Naval Captain Hyman Rickover’s nuclear
submarine program. At the time, Rickover was one of the world’s “leading experts” on
atomic energy.6 In the interview, Rickover asked Carter if he had done “his best” while at
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the Naval Academy, where he graduated fifty-ninth in a class of 820. Carter, at first
confirmed that yes, he had done his best but then quickly realized otherwise. Despairing,
Carter then conceded that he had not done his best, to which Rickover replied, “Why
not?” Although Carter left the interview convinced of his poor performance, Rickover
accepted him into the nuclear program, a decision that Carter attributed to his honest selfreflection.7 The story, recycled frequently, figures prominently in Carter’s memoirs, and
the experience informed his approach to his presidency, and especially to energy and
nuclear policy. For Carter, “doing your best,” required a commitment to mastering
complex issues—and sometimes outsmarting the experts themselves.
Jimmy Carter’s time in the nuclear submarine program under the command of
Captain Hyman Rickover bolstered these tendencies. Serving under Rickover, whose
opinion he valued deeply, gave Carter a sense of insider status in the nuclear industry.8
From 1952 to 1953, Carter was assigned to the AEC’s Division of Nuclear Reactor
Development and worked with General Electric to develop the USS Sea Wolf, a nuclear
submarine. During this time, Carter took two graduate level courses in physics. He also
served as part of the team that disassembled an experimental reactor core in Canada,
which suffered a partial meltdown in 1952.9 Reminiscing about his service, Carter opined
that “few people at that time were as knowledgeable as we were about this new
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technology.”10 In October 1953, Carter received an honorable discharge for the navy and
returned home to Plains, Georgia, choosing to fill the void left by his father’s recent
death.11 Because of this, Carter’s nuclear engineering amounted to a brief, but
informative, period. However, as J. Samuel Walker has noted, Carter’s experience “did
not steer him to clear position on nuclear power as president.”12 It did, however, give
Carter confidence in his ability to tackle complex policy issues, one that would define his
presidency.
Returning home to Georgia, Jimmy Carter confronted new challenges managing
his recently deceased father’s farm, which according to Carter, made his “previous navy
life—even helping to design and build an original nuclear power plant—seem simple.”13
The “peanut farmer” from Plains, Georgia then entered politics, winning his first election
in 1962 for a seat in the Georgia Senate, where he served two terms from 1963 to 1966.14
His early political experiences in Georgia, according to Frye Gaillard, “stamped and
circumscribed” Carter’s presidency and contributed to his self-professed “outsider”
status.15 After a defeat in his 1965 gubernatorial campaign, which caused Carter to fall
into a period of depression, he became a “born-again” Christian, a transformation that
10

Jimmy Carter, A Full Life: Reflections at Ninety (Simon and Schuster, 2015), 64.

11

Bourne, 78-82.

12

Walker, 132.

13

Carter, A Full Life, 70.

14

Burton Ira Kaufman and Scott Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr.
(Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 8.

15

Gaillard, Prophet from the Plains: Jimmy Carter and His Legacy (University of
Georgia Press, 2007), 26.

182

influenced his view of public service as “wedding to a gospel of service based on his
strong religious convictions.”16 Despite his newly devout identity, one that paralleled the
growth of evangelical Christianity in both the Sunbelt South and US, Carter embarked
upon a gubernatorial campaign in 1970, where he “acted with ruthlessness and disregard
of principle,” kowtowing to white supremacists in Georgia to win votes.17 Once in office,
however, Carter adopted a moderate stance towards race, increased the number of
African-American state employees, and helped pass a number of progressive measures
that included environmental protection, tax and welfare reform, and improving the state’s
mental health services.18
Only a year after his election, Carter appeared on the cover of Time, as part of a
story on a new wave of southern political leaders who embraced racial moderation and a
“progressive response to economic and social change” in the region.19 The shift in
political leadership, lead by a number of moderate New South governors, including Dale
Bumpers (D-AR), Reubin Askew (D-FL), and Winfield Dunn (D-TN), represented a
broader transformation in the South, from “Cotton Belt to Sunbelt,” where “skyscrapers”
replaced “run-down shacks.”20 With Carter’s victory in the 1976 presidential election,
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southerners “savored a moment of vindication,” one signified by a growing national
fascination with a commodified-version of southern culture .21
And yet, Carter and the victorious South rang hollow for some. In November
1976, writer Larry King lampooned the triumphant South and “good ol’ boys” declaring
“We ain’t trash no more” after Carter’s election, noting that the new president “never
was” trash, and “he waren’t [sic] even tacky.”22 Rather, Jimmy Carter’s southern shtick
obscured his position of privilege, hailing from a family with vast real estate holdings and
an education that included the elite U.S Naval Academy, “in keeping with genteel
Southern tradition.”23 More presciently, King expressed his suspicions that underneath
the “soft spiritual goop” Carter publicly espoused was a “vengeful Old Testament God,”
which colored his perspective of the world as a “hard and serious place.”24 Underlying
King’s brash, dark humor and salty language was cutting political commentary, capturing
Jimmy Carter’s contradictions, his personality, and a world-view that influenced his
approach to the nation’s many problems.
Those contradictions run throughout the commentary on Jimmy Carter’s
presidency. After his exit from the White House, many commentators characterized
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Carter’s presidency as a failure.25 One scholar accused Carter of a “passionless
Presidency,” one lacking any “basic philosophy.”26 Others questioned Carter’s decision
to include members of his “Peanut Brigade” and “Georgia Mafia,” a home-grown
network of supporters and campaign staff, in his presidential administration, citing their
inexperience in national politics as yet another reason for Carter’s alleged failure.27 In
recent years, a wave of Carter revisionism has contested the predominantly negative
interpretations of his presidency. The illustrious record of Carter’s post-presidency,
particularly his humanitarian record, has contributed to the revival.28 Scholars have also
closely analyzed his success in the White House, challenging the widely held perception
that Carter’s administration achieved fewer victories than Johnson or Kennedy.29 Political
scientist Erwin Hargrove concluded that Carter was a “highly conscientious leader” who
faced “disjointed and recalcitrant political structures.”30 Put another way, Carter advisor
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Stu Eiznstat’s encapsulated the administration’s difficult circumstances in biblical terms:
“Moses would have had problems getting the Ten Commandments through Congress
unscathed.”31 Historian Michael Camp has argued that while Congress added to Carter’s
difficulties, his “inability to understand and account for the divergent interest groups” in
the nation’s energy economy created further problems.32 By analyzing Carter’s battles
over BNFP and CRBR, and his evolution in energy policy, the tendency to place his
presidency in either the “failure” camp, or within the more forgiving revisionist school of
thought, appears overly narrow. Carter’s record of achievements and defeats on these
issues remains sprawling and contradictory enough to render either characterization as
inadequate, and helps explain why Carter became saddled with his own claims to
expertise and his high-moralist approach to the presidency.
Jimmy Carter and his National Energy Policy
Carter’s approach to nuclear policy, and specific projects like BNFP and CRBR,
are difficult to fully assess without a broader consideration of his National Energy
Policy—a sprawling, complicated, and often contradictory agenda for addressing the
nation’s energy issues.33 As scholar Burton Kaufman has noted, even Carter’s toughest
critics acknowledge that the president in 1977 “faced a herculean task,” which would
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have challenged even the ablest politician.34 Crafting and enacting a successful NEP
posed a difficult task, and arguably, no other president has devoted more time to
analyzing the nation’s energy issues than Jimmy Carter. Scholar John Barrow has argued
that Carter’s “somewhat quixotic quest” for a NEP “defined his presidency,” illuminating
both his strengths and weaknesses. 35 Carter’s principled aversion to lobbyist influence,
propensity to micromanage, and a “willingness to tackle inherently difficult” issues
undergirded his commitment to NEP.36 However, as Barrow and others have noted,
Carter failed to gain political support within the Democratic Party, struggled to create
cross-party alliances, and “inspire confidence.”37 Moreover, Carter cast himself as an
expert, and in doing so, inadvertently hurt his own credibility by not offering more
satisfactory or transformative solutions.
As writer Larry L. King depicted, Carter had “more sides than the Pentagon,”
seen vividly in his efforts to craft a coherent national energy policy. While Carter proved
forward-thinking on alternative sources of energy, he undercut his own commitment to
energy conservation and environmental preservation by proposing a series of measures
which dangerously vowed to eliminate bureaucratic hurdles for nuclear licensing, oil
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pipelines, coal mining, and other energy-related projects. Although Carter and Ronald
Reagan’s policies towards energy and the environment are often presented as a study in
opposites, a closer look at Carter’s proposals and rhetoric demonstrates how his
administration, in many ways, laid the groundwork for Reagan’s anti-regulatory agenda,
albeit inadvertently. Carter’s bid to convince the American people and Congress in the
realm of energy further contributed to the dethroning of experts in matters of energy and
the environment during the 1970s and 1980s, even as he achieved numerous successes in
environmental and energy-related legislation.
After an intensive and secretive 90-day period, Carter and a select group of
advisors crafted the National Energy Plan (NEP). Recounting the experience, Stuart
“Stu” Eizenstat, Carter’s chief domestic policy advisor, described the 90 days as an
“inordinate time demand.”38 The new president failed, according to Eizenstat, to
appreciate the “degree of difficulty” his expectations imposed on his staff, made all the
more difficult because Carter’s presidential campaign emphasized the economy and not
energy.39 Suddenly, Carter’s administration confronted the sizable task of shaping a
national energy policy on a “crash basis.”40 Moreover, Carter’s insisted upon “utter and
complete secrecy” during the formation of NEP, keeping the policy proposals “very
close to his vest.”41 Nearly sixty days into the process, Carter finally shared more details
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about NEP with Stu Eizenstat, only to direct him to “not share with anyone including
your own staff.”42 Defying the orders, Eizenstat found it “totally out of the question for
my own energy person [Kitty Schirmer] to not see it.”43 In Carter’s first hundred days, his
desire for mastering policy issues, which gave him more control, weakened his ability to
build essential, long-term support his proposals—even from his own administration.
A month before unveiling NEP though, expectations ran high among Carter’s
administration. Frank Press emphasized its historic potential, advising Carter that his
energy message could become “one of the most important statements of your
Presidency.”44 On April 18, 1977, Carter gave his televised address to the nation, which
detailed his National Energy Plan.45 The speech begins with a dour Carter characterizing
the address as an “unpleasant talk” with the American people. The speech pointed to the
ways in which the nation’s energy problems threatened future generations and warned
that certain proposals would be unpopular and require sacrifice—the “moral equivalent of
war.” Noting the rapid depletion of natural gas and oil, Carter called for greater
conservation, coal mining, and alternative sources of energy, particularly solar power. If
calls for conservation went unheeded, the temptation to “plunder the environment” and to
build more nuclear plants, to drill offshore, and to strip-mine would only grow.46
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Compared to his “crisis of confidence” speech in July 1979, Carter’s first address
on energy appears far more environmentally minded, although his calls for increased coal
usage might jar readers today in light of global warming. Nuclear energy plays a minimal
role in the first speech, with Carter mentioning it only twice (oil is mentioned 28 times,
coal is mentioned 8 times). Conservation occupied a central role in 1977 and 1979, and
yet, other aspects and emphases of Carter’s energy policy evolved in troubling ways.
Some commentators have hailed Carter’s energy policies as prescient, and this
observation is true in two respects. It foretold an aggressive anti-regulatory attitude and a
more high-minded vision of the future powered by solar energy and conservation.
From 1977 to 1979, Carter’s administration increasingly found itself navigating
the interests of the nuclear industry, oil, coal and the Congressional representatives that
represented fuel-producing states. These entanglements, along with Carter’s own hostility
towards bureaucracy, contributed to the evolution in his energy policy. While Carter’s
administration begrudgingly fostered dialogue with leaders of utilities and industry, the
proposed policies from Carter in 1979 are alarming in their contradictions—with calls for
conservation but also giving potentially unlimited power to overrun environmental
regulations for oil, gas, and coal production.
Likewise, Carter remained lukewarm to nuclear power even as he recommended
reducing the licensing process for new plants. Greater public participation, in addition to
the requirement that utilities produce an environmental impact statement, resulted in a
lengthier licensing process. In this sense, Carter’s proposal to cut licensing time appears
contradictory to his expressed concern about environmental protections and building safe
nuclear plants. However contradictory, these proposals are less surprising in light of
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Carter’s highly technocratic and often single-minded approach. As a believer in expertise
and a self-appointed nuclear expert, a stream-lined licensing process may have limited
public participation, although Carter’s administration never clearly delineated how their
proposals would reduce licensing time.
In the months preceding Carter’s two major addresses in April and July 1979, his
administration grappled with how to revive Carter’s presidency. As the hostage crisis in
Iran contributed to yet another “energy crisis,” one that many Americans doubted
actually existed. Rather, skeptics surmised that rising energy prices reflected a scheme by
oil companies and a result of Carter’s inefficacy. In March 1979, Senator David Boren
sent Carter a “blunt” memo signed by twenty-one senators, although Boren suggested
more signatures were attainable. The memo, according to Boren, was offered in
“friendship.”47 What Boren and his fellow senators proposed soon became part of
Carter’s second series of energy related proposals and reflected the interests of oil and
coal producing states. Boren warned Carter that “deep discontent and bitter frustration”
existed in the country.48 According to the memo, the American people wanted
“government off [their] backs” and many felt the current administration had done nothing
to address the nation’s energy problems.49 Moreover, the memo delivered an ominous
warning that, without bold action, “disillusionment with the entire political process”
might occur. To better address the problems before Carter, the memo recommended a
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“bold, Truman, meat-axe approach,” arguing that the American people wanted a
president with “a firm hand on the tiller.”50
The memo’s authors argued that two problems existed: the energy crisis and the
bureaucratic crisis. In addressing these two alleged crises, the memorandum laid the
groundwork for reducing regulations and concentrating power into an “energy production
council” comprised of private sector figures and vaguely similar to the War Production
Board from World War II. Alarmingly, with presidential approval, the council could
“take emergency action” to authorize the construction of any facility “to produce, use, or
transport any form of energy immediately and without delay notwithstanding any rule or
regulation or the jurisdiction of any other federal or state agency.”51 While this proposal
primarily targeted oil, coal, and natural gas, the memo’s implications are worth exploring,
particularly because Carter soon incorporated their ideas and retreated from many of his
earlier commitments to an environmentally conscious energy future.
Less than ten days after the Boren memo, Carter gave his the first of two major
energy-related addresses in 1979, a speech that illustrates a notable shift in tone.52 Carter
continued his advocacy for conservation and called for less wasteful consumption, even
as he railed against the “federal bureaucracy and red tape.”53 Noting the recent accident at
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Three Mile Island, Carter informed Americans of his presidential commission to
investigate and produce a “full accounting,” called for greater use of coal and solar
energy, and pointed to “American genius” as one of the many ways the country’s energy
problems could be solved.54 Although Carter devoted attention predominately to oil and
ending federal price controls, he also noted his recent executive order, Order 12129,
which “will set strict deadlines for cutting through Federal red tape on important new
energy projects, such as pipelines…”55 Carter then discussed his “windfall profits tax”
proposal, which would have diverted a percentage of oil profits into an “energy security
fund” and encouraged research and development for solar power, mass transportation,
and developing cleaner alternative energy sources.56
Carter’s evolving energy policy reflected the escalating situation in Iran, rising oil
prices, and fears of depleted resources. It also illustrated the president’s advocacy of
alternative energy development, his commitment to build and to operate safer nuclear
plants, and ongoing commitment to conservation. And yet, the April address also
indicated the growing influence of energy-producing states and Carter’s own distaste for
bureaucracy and regulations—even those intended for much-needed environmental
protection. According to White House documents, Carter’s hostility towards bureaucracy
54
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manifested itself early in his presidency. Commenting on a document submitted by Stu
Eizenstat on the number of reserve oil barrels, Carter left a handwritten note, “Stu, this is
bureaucratic b.s. All I asked for were a) estimates of reserves b) How many barrels in
cubic mil.”57 As Carter’s note demonstrates, he sought efficiency and disliked the
information deluge produced by certain government agencies, but failed to appreciate
how streamlining approval for energy related facilities created dangerous openings for
utilities, oil, gas, and coal companies to exploit the environment and to defang the
Environmental Protection Agency.
The note also pointed to Carter’s tendency to chastise his staff, correcting minor
issues and even offering editorial feedback on non-speech materials. The traces of
Carter’s intense involvement at many levels of policy formation and staff activities can
be seen throughout his correspondence and his administration’s papers. In June 1979, as
fuel shortages loomed, Carter issued a memo to his administration executives that
whenever he “designated a situation as a crisis or special problem…everyone must
submit to a greater degree of discipline.”58 During his presidential campaign, Carter
admonished Stu Eizenstat, who was frequently on the receiving end of such feedback,
about a daily publication produced by his campaign: “Stu, this is of poor quality – serves
no purpose & is potential embarrassment. Early ‘warning’ (?) —misspelled names, etc.

57

Carter to Stu Eizenstat, April 16, 1977, 5613, Folder: Energy, 3/77-8/77, Box 101,
Collection: David Rubenstein’s Files, Domestic Policy Staff, JCL.

58

Carter to staff, June 23, 1979, F: Kemeny Commission, 6/79-11/19/79, Box 103, JCL.

194

Stop it.”59 Carter’s staff largely tip-toed around the issues, reluctantly tolerating these
tendencies even as it became politically disadvantageous. Before Carter’s first debate, he
returned briefing books—not known for their slim size—to his staff, “having read every
single page and corrected typographical errors and grammatical mistakes,” as Eizenstat
recounted. When Eizenstat and several Carter advisors tried to prevent him from being
“over-briefed,” Carter refused to go through a debate rehearsal and instead relied upon
his ability absorb the briefing materials.60
Carter’s propensity to micromanage and desire for mastery over issues went hand
in hand. In his 1982 memoir, Keeping the Faith, which detailed his experiences as
president, Carter appropriately titled the first chapter, “A Graduate Course in America.”61
Even after his exit from the White House, Carter viewed the presidency as not simply a
learning process, but as an opportunity to become more knowledgeable than the average
president. Stu Eizenstat attributed it to Carter’s “utter self-confidence,” but one might
also go back to his formative moment with Hyman Rickover.62 For Carter, doing his
“best,” meant continually accepting new challenges to analyze complex issues. James
Schlesinger, who served as Carter’s advisor and as Secretary of Energy from 1977 to
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1979, described Carter as having a “very high degree of expertise” in domestic matters.63
Carter, perhaps naively, believed that expertise granted him political power and
strengthened his persuasive abilities, which sometimes backfired. For a meeting with four
American auto executives about pollution, Carter had prepared to such an extent that he
“knew ten times as much” as nearly anyone else at the meeting. Remembering the
incident, Schlesinger bluntly characterized Carter’s performance as a “tour de force,” but
one that made him wonder, “What in God’s name is the President of the United States
sitting up hour after hour, day after day, reading these briefing papers on various methods
to control automobile pollution?”64
In the wake of Carter’s first of two energy addresses in 1979, his administration
grappled with falling approval ratings, ongoing conflicts with Congress, internal
frustration, and diminishing credibility in energy-related matters. According to one
memo, an NBC survey reported that only 25 percent of Americans believed an oil
shortage existed, which Carter’s staff characterized as a “plausibility gap.”65 Contending
with a growing belief that no energy crisis existed, the administration underlined the
importance of establishing greater authority, noting that maintaining the president’s
“energy credibility” remained vital if calls for sacrifice occurred.66 Carter’s
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administration desperately sought new strategies, noting that “old jawboning was
ineffective” and failed to convince the American people.67
Writing in June 1979, Si Lazarus, the associate director of Carter’s Domestic
Policy Staff, urged Stu Eizenstat to cut the president’s planned stop-over in Hawaii.
Emphasizing the general “nastiness” of attitudes towards Carter, Lazarus stated “I don’t
care how tired he is – the time for taking off for visible, nationally televised relaxation is
plainly not at hand.” Regarding the energy crisis, Lazarus reminded Eizenstat and David
Rubenstein that Carter need to “illuminate a credible path” to solving the nation’s
problems rather than serving merely as the bearer of bad news.68 Only a few months
earlier, the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, John C. White, professed
hope that energy might be Carter’s “domestic bag,” but by July 1979, his approval ratings
sank even lower with a dismal 28% approval rating.69 In response, Secretary of Energy
James Schlesinger, only a few days before resigning from Carter’s cabinet, urged the
president to devise an energy program—both “bold and credible.”70
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Seeking to revive his presidency, Carter “retreated” to Camp David in July 1979
instead of giving another speech on energy.71 After ten days of consultation and
mediation, Carter delivered his “malaise speech” where he called upon the American
people to collectively sacrifice in order to rebuild the nation’s strength and argued that a
“crisis of confidence” threatened America’s future.72 The speech also pointed to the
“battleground of energy” as the primary test for uniting the country and emphasized that
the energy crisis was indeed real. Moreover, Carter described his time at Camp David as
a period of reconnecting with people from “almost every segment of society,” an act he
described as listening to the “voices of America.”73 On matters of energy, however, the
Camp David summit appears less democratic than Carter claimed.
Domestic policy staff documents give a more complete picture of the figures
Carter consulted during his retreat, and why his energy policy drifted further away from
its original iteration in 1977. On July 9, 1979, Carter convened a meeting with
Congressional leaders to discuss energy. While the representatives from the House came
from a wide range of states, the Senators invited to the summit, not surprisingly, largely
71
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represented energy-producing states: Henry Jackson (D-WA), J. Bennett Johnston (DLA), Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX), Dale Bumpers (D-AR), Wendell Ford (D-KY), Russell B.
Long (D-LA), Robert Byrd (D-WV), Daniel Moynihan (D-NY). Of those senators,
Bumpers may have been the most environmentally-minded, but Bumpers, Long, Byrd,
Ford, Johnston, and Bentsen clearly sought policies beneficial to oil, coal, and natural gas
companies and their states. Although Carter pressed for alternatives fuels such as solar
power, and even proposed a “solar bank” in his malaise speech, he also announced a plan
for creating the “Energy Mobilization Board,” a strikingly similar idea to the one
proposed in David Boren’s memo in March 1979, and if enacted, a policy with the
potential to encourage a major crash program of energy-related drilling and mining in
states like Kentucky, Louisiana, and Texas—and exactly the type of “crash program”
Carter warned about in 1977. Among the Camp David attendees, Senator Lloyd Bentsen
signed the Boren memo and possibly others.74 As one unnamed official from Carter’s
administration commented after his address, “the President apparently felt he had to fish
or cut bait between energy and environment. He chose to cut environment.”75
In June 1980, the House of Representatives defeated Carter’s proposal for the
Energy Mobilization Board by a 232-131 vote (roll-call vote). Democrats split their votes
(107 against, 122 for), and Republicans (125 against, 9 for) largely opposed the EMB’s
potential for disproportionally shifting power from states to the federal government in
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matters of energy.76 Ultimately, the EMB constituted only one proposal among a sea of
proposals created by Carter’s administration. Evaluating Carter’s success in crafting a
coherent, effective National Energy Policy, and persuading Congress to pass such
legislation, is a difficult task. Scholars have been quite generous to Carter in their
interpretations of his energy policy, arguably because his successor Ronald Reagan’s
policies appear far less progressive comparatively.77 In particular, some have noted that
Carter’s achievements in price decontrol with oil and natural gas buoyed some of the
economic recovery in the 1980s and eventually helped usher in cheaper oil prices.78
Despite Carter’s environmentally unsound proposals for the EMB, his calls for
conservation, synthetic fuels, and solar power resonant as especially forward-thinking in
an era of global warming.
Jimmy Carter as Chief Nuclear Expert
One essential part of Carter’s energy policy, an area he expended vital political
capital on, was the nuclear industry. When Jimmy Carter launched his 1976 presidential
campaign, nuclear power had come under increasing scrutiny. In the wake of Vietnam
and Watergate, a diminishing American faith in government contributed to this sense of
unease. Moreover, the emergence of the environmental movement drew the public’s
attention to corporate malfeasance and government neglect towards issues like hazardous
wastes and pollution. During the 1960s and 1970s, a licensing spree occurred in the
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nuclear industry, with utilities jumping on the “bandwagon market” to build nuclear
power plants.79 The licensing spree coincided with the public’s growing concern about
radiation, catastrophic accidents, along with a lack of consensus among the experts, huge
cost-overruns which then affected ratepayers, nuclear waste, and the Atomic Energy
Commission’s troubled attempts to regulate an industry it also actively promoted. The
industry’s credibility gap threatened to turn the public against nuclear technology
altogether.80
In response to this, Congress passed a number of measures that sought to enhance
the nuclear industry’s credibility and by extension the federal government—allowing for
greater public participation, transparency, and more stringent regulations, all while
maintaining a commitment to nuclear power. The nuclear industry and its regulatory
apparatus begrudgingly attempted to win public approval back – knowing that the
industry needed an improved public image but also fearing the delays and potential
controversy these measures would bring. Since the passage of the Atomic Energy Act in
1954 any “person whose interest may be affected” could intervene in the licensing
process, but the opportunities for public involvement grew considerably during the late
1960s and 1970s.
Some policy measures were intentionally created to deal with the nuclear
industry’s credibility issue – such as the Energy Reorganization Act (passed in 1974),
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which finally ended the Atomic Energy Commission’s reign, and split the agency’s twin
purposes of promotion and regulation into two new agencies: the Energy Research and
Development Administration (ERDA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
The act also required the industry to report “abnormal occurrences” to the public within a
specific timeframe. Other measures, such as National Environmental Protection Act
(NEPA) and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), inadvertently or indirectly opened
space for public involvement and greater access to the inner-workings of nuclear plants,
and expanded jurisdiction over nuclear power to other government agencies and
Congressional subcommittees. In 1971, the Supreme Court ruling in the Calvert Cliffs
case dictated that utility companies were required to submit Environmental Impact
Statements for nuclear power plants, a landmark victory for both environmentalists and
anti-nuclear activists.81 After twenty-years of insulation from the outside, the nuclear
industry and its regulatory apparatus confronted a different landscape, which required
public hearings, environmental impact statements, and FOIA requests for documents.
Despite the crisis within the nuclear industry though, public opinion, as J. Samuel
Walker has noted, remained ambivalent about nuclear power. A survey in 1976 cited 61
percent of those surveyed favored nuclear power, while 22% opposed, and 17% were
unsure.82 Even in April 1979, after the accident at TMI, 44% of Americans surveyed
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approved of nuclear power, while 43% disapproved. Although the percentage of
favorable responses slightly decreased, the more significant number is the percentage of
those who moved from the “unsure” to opposed category. American support for nuclear
power continued after Three Mile Island for two major reasons: the desire for energy
independence and the fear of energy shortages. Others viewed the continuation of nuclear
power as a vital part of American superiority, to stall development would mean an
abdication of progress through technology.
For President Carter, claims to nuclear expertise cut both ways, either reinforcing
his views or further damaging his credibility. In 1976, as Jimmy Carter campaigned for
the presidency, California and Oregon both had similar initiatives on the ballot
concerning nuclear power. Advisor Carlton Neville outlined Carter’s inconsistency on
nuclear issues, commenting that he had adopted “both sides of an issue” by opposing
California’s referendum but supporting Oregon’s, and that “Jimmy Carter Nuclear Expert
cannot afford to appear “wrong” on a nuclear issue.”83 Carter’s image as nuclear expert,
high-moralist, and environmental steward constrained his ability to modify his positions
and hamstrung him on the campaign trail and in the White House. Carter’s “outsider”
status also prevented him from taking credit for the kinds of “horse-trading” other
politicians proudly advertised. Considering these limitations, advisor James Schlesinger
compared Carter to the ultimate political dealer: “Lyndon Johnson could buy in votes left
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and right…and everyone would talk about Super Lyndon…Jimmy Carter indulges in the
same thing and they are all over him.”84
While his predecessors Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford supported the expansion
of nuclear power, Carter positioned himself all over the spectrum. He viewed nuclear
power as a “last resort,” opposed reprocessing, and alienated pork-loving southerners
with his war on the Clinch River Breeder Reactor. At the same time, he wanted to
accelerate the licensing process for reactors, striving to cut “unnecessary bureaucratic
red tape and uncertainty and shave off four to six years” for nuclear power plant
construction.”85 Carter’s nuclear policy vacillated throughout his time in the White
House, leaving industry, Congress, and anti-nuclear activists unsatisfied. According to
political scientist Robert Duffy, the nuclear industry “never forgot, or forgave, him for
these transgressions.”86 Carter’s legacy on nuclear issues, and energy generally, is
exceedingly difficult to characterize as wholly successful or unsuccessful, primarily
because those metrics fail to account for vastly complicated policy issues. However,
advisor and Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger described Carter as “unduly
interested” in the nuclear industry, and that his actions prompted the nuclear industry to
hate him from 1977 onwards.87 Carter’s interventions in commercial nuclear reprocessing
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and the Clinch River Breeder reactor largely appear justifiable and reasonable, but the
fight over the Barnwell plant (BNFP) and CRBR incurred tremendous political costs and
may have harmed Carter’s broader agenda.
Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant
One of Carter’s first maneuvers as president was the indefinite deferral of
commercial nuclear reprocessing, which he announced in April 1977. The announcement
primarily affected the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant, then under construction in Barnwell,
South Carolina. Plans for the facility began in 1968, when Allied-General Nuclear
Services (AGNS) applied for a construction permit from the AEC for a commercial
nuclear reprocessing facility.88 On abandoned farmland—some tracts purchased decades
earlier for the Savannah River Plant—Allied-General envisioned a large-scale, state of
the art facility in rural Barnwell. Local politicians viewed Allied-General’s arrival as an
essential part of the area’s economic designs, where an agricultural region further
transformed into a technology-oriented one. Once completed, the “South Carolina
Advanced Technology Park” would host AGNS’s Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP),
Chem-Nuclear’s radioactive waste disposal site, and potentially other companies. 89
According to the original plans, AGNS sought to process “irradiated nuclear
power reactor fuel consisting of uranium oxide, or a mixture of plutonium oxide and

88

Suzanne Hughes Rhodes, “Unresolved Environmental Issues Associated with the
Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant in South Carolina” (Master’s Thesis, University of South
Carolina, 1979), 18.

89

Jim McNeil, Technical Evaluation Report for the Termination of South Carolina
Radioactive License Number 144, NRC Library,
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0037/ML003723186.pdf.

205

uranium oxide, clad in stainless steel or zirconium alloys,” commonly known as the
PUREX process where uranium is derived from spent-nuclear fuel. Adding to these
plans, the company also envisioned recovering plutonium for “new light water reactors or
breeder reactors”—two technological possibilities that seemingly promised more efficient
and more economical nuclear power.90
Reprocessing spent fuel, particularly uranium and plutonium, through various chemical
processes, had been used for defense purposes at Hanford, Savannah River, and other
defense sites as early as the late 1940s. Despite breezy assurances from the AEC and
nuclear experts, reprocessing spent fuel produced highly toxic, liquid waste products and
occasionally caused criticality accidents—usually during the transfer of solutions with
uranium or plutonium into another vessel. Despite the dangers involved, reprocessing
remained one of many “solutions” for solving gaps in the nuclear fuel cycle—both in
terms of supply of nuclear materials and reducing nuclear waste.
The fuel cycle concept, in theory, envisioned a clear beginning and end. Starting
the process, uranium or thorium are extracted, then processed and used to power nuclear
reactors, and depending on the nation, those wastes are either reprocessed—extracting
materials for future generation, or the materials are spent fuel in need of disposal.91 In the
abstract, the fuel cycle appears like a simple diagram, but in practice, other complications
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such as barriers to disposal or reprocessing bans have always challenged this neat
conceptualization. Nonetheless, visions of breeder reactors and new reactors fueled with
mixed-oxide fuel, made from plutonium and uranium, encouraged investment in
reprocessing facilities. Beyond defense facilities, in the United States, three commercial
reprocessing facilities were built, and only one commercial site ever reprocessed spent
fuel. Located in Ashford, New York, and operated by Nuclear Fuel Services until 1976,
the facility closed after encountering numerous problems – ranging from issues of worker
safety to tighter regulations. In 1980, the Department of Energy embarked upon a
massive effort to remove nuclear waste, decontaminate, and decommission the site, a
process that has taken three decades.92
When the AEC evaluated the safety of BNFP in 1970, they concluded the facility
could be operated without “undue risk to the health and safety of the public.”93 In the
AEC’s assessment, the environmental and technological risks associated with
reprocessing facilities were “well defined,” and the agency emphasized that processes
such as releasing low-level radioactivity– such as vapors containing tritium into the
environment would occur under “controlled conditions.”94 Other risks, such as natural
disasters or theft of nuclear materials, appeared as manageable problems with simple
solutions. To prevent theft or unauthorized entry into BNFP, the AEC approved of
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AGNS’s security measures: “a chain-link fence topped with barbed wire,” an additional
fence surrounding the perimeter of the 1730 acre site, and concluded “access to the plant
will be controlled.”95 From the AEC’s 1970 safety evaluation, nuclear non-proliferation
barely registers as a threat, and chain-link fences offered sufficient protection against the
theft of nuclear materials.96
In 1974, the nuclear nonchalance stopped, as India ratcheted up its regional
struggle with Pakistan and entered the nuclear club by exploding their own nuclear
device. Only a year earlier, a report by the AEC downplayed the dangers of using mixedoxide fuel in nuclear reactors.97 Despite the government and the nuclear industry’s efforts
to sever any connection between atomic bombs and nuclear power in the public’s mind,
heightened proliferation concerns muddled those connections again. While requiring
environmental impact statements and safety evaluations provided greater accountability
and encouraged public input in nuclear licensing, early reports reeked of pro-nuclear bias.
The threat of intrusion or theft could be rendered a non-threat with a guard post and
barbed wire, and similarly, the ground beneath the site, “potentially susceptible to
liquefaction” posed few worries for the report’s authors. 98
In 1971, three years after the initial application for a construction permit, AlliedGeneral broke ground on the BNFP site, although the Atomic Energy Commission
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warned the corporation that all financial risks were the company’s own, “pending the
outcome” of a future NEPA hearing.99 Thus, Allied-General embarked upon a risky
venture with fair warning that political winds could shift against the company’s plans,
and by the late 1970s, they did, as nuclear proliferation fears, problems at the commercial
reprocessing facility, commonly known as West Valley, in Ashford, New York, and
rising costs affected the entire nuclear industry.
The connections between nuclear weapons and nuclear power solidified further
during the 1976 presidential election, as Jimmy Carter “stressed the linkage between
nuclear technology exports and nuclear non-proliferation.”100 As scholar J. Michael
Martinez has detailed, Carter altered the conversation surrounding nuclear proliferation
by emphasizing the risks of reprocessing spent fuel.101 In doing so, Carter’s stance also
enhanced his “credibility with representatives of the blossoming environmental
movement.”102 Responding to the shift, on October 28, 1976, President Gerald Ford
further dampened the nuclear enthusiasm of previous decades, stating that “no single
nation, not even the United States, can realistically hope--by itself--to control effectively
the spread of reprocessing technology and the resulting availability of plutonium.”103
After Carter defeated Gerald Ford in the 1976 election, he acted quickly on the
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nuclear reprocessing, which simultaneously addressed energy and nuclear proliferation,
two central issues for his administration. On April 7, 1977, Carter issued a statement
declaring the “indefinite” deferral of commercial reprocessing, noting specifically that
the Barnwell facility would receive “neither federal encouragement” or funding.104
Indefinitely deferring reprocessing did not end the debate over BNFP, even if it
temporarily stymied AGNS’s plans for recovering uranium and plutonium for
commercial purposes.
In South Carolina, anti-nuclear activists opposed to BNFP achieved a small
victory but also realized the fight over the facility’s purpose nonetheless loomed ahead.
Others, in the pro-nuclear camp questioned the decision and sought more definitive
answers from Carter’s administration about alternative uses, particularly because the
plant’s alleged value had soared to 250 million dollars.105 For a president who abhorred
wastefulness, ironically, his deferral potentially implied the abandonment of BNFP,
leaving an enormously expensive facility to corrode in a rural pasture.
In response, one Barnwell resident, Mrs. James W. Dixon, commented that “if I
had known he [Carter] was going to do this I wouldn’t have voted for him.”106 Asked if
they would scrap BNFP if future nuclear wars were prevented, many in Barnwell offered
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a tentative, “yes,” but also doubted Carter’s ability to “sell his ideas to the rest of the
world.”107 And like Chem-Nuclear’s radioactive waste site, BNFP produced clear
economic benefits: employing 300 people “with an annual payroll in excess of $5
million.”108 Likewise, in 1976, AGNS’s tax payments—$407, 775 in total—funded
county schools.109 For a revenue poor county, the benefits were tangible, while Carter’s
plans for nuclear proliferation offered a more abstract, principled vision of the future, one
largely disconnected from everyday realties.
More significant for Carter’s political fortunes, his approach towards high-risk,
“uneconomical” technologies, especially commercial nuclear reprocessing and breeder
reactors, put him at odds with many southern politicians, who wanted the nuclear gravy
train to continue – by way of Allied-General, the Clinch River Breeder Reactor, and
similar projects. A month after Carter’s deferral announcement, his staff navigated the
political repercussions, arranging at least one meeting with Rep. Butler Derrick, Jr. (DSC). Described by Carter’s congressional liaison Frank Moore as the “point man in the
House on water projects,” Derrick wanted greater consideration for alternative uses for
BNFP; and in return, the president might gain much needed support for his controversial
water-project agenda, which threatened to pull federal funding for 117 water projects and
disgruntled western and southern members of Congress.110 Senators Ernest Hollings and
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Strom Thurmond both denounced Carter’s decision, although Hollings conceded that a
temporary delay was “logical and even desirable.”111 But Senator Hollings ultimately
supported Barnwell for “safety, for control, for needed energy,” characterizing Carter’s
non-proliferation policy as an “ostrich” policy.112 Going further, Hollings questioned
Carter’s “utopian rhetoric” in light of the fact that “we are sitting over here fat and happy
with nuclear as our principal defense,” and concluded that “the nuclear genie is out of the
bottle and the President can’t put it back in.”113
Responding to these concerns, Carter’s chief energy advisor and later Secretary of
Energy, James Schlesinger, drafted a letter to Strom Thurmond, emphasizing the
importance of halting nuclear proliferation. Carter, however, added a handwritten postscript: “P.S. Reprocessing at this time is just not necessary. Other functions may perhaps
be performed at Barnwell.”114 In the fiercely hierarchical world of Washington, Carter’s
post-script appears strikingly patronizing to a politician over twenty-years his senior.
Undoubtedly, Carter’s lack of political acumen has been noted before, but the letter
further illustrates two aspects of his presidency. On the one hand, Carter’s commitment to
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analyzing energy-related issues seemingly had no bounds, and as the AEC’s lax safety
evaluation of BNFP demonstrated, Carter’s deferral of commercial nuclear reprocessing
was prescient and justifiable. Despite the pleas of nuclear-friendly politicians and
industry-figures, Carter’s stern and occasionally unforgiving personality paid great
dividends in terms of stopping a risky-endeavor by ANGS. More importantly, Carter’s
principled stance to nuclear proliferation, an agenda couched in moral terms, arguably
enabled him to not vacillate in the face of corporate pressure—at least on the issue of
reprocessing.
The evolution of the Barnwell debate illustrates how Jimmy Carter and his
administration’s approach to nuclear issues, and energy more broadly, never satisfied any
camp, leaving environmentalists to cheer one day, only to scratch their heads at Carter’s
decision shortly thereafter. In 1978, a year after the deferral announcement, Carter’s
advisors circulated a series of memos which examined transforming BNFP into an AFR
facility, known as Away-From-Reactor storage, where spent nuclear fuel would be stored
temporarily. Anti-nuclear activists feared that an AFR site would only encourage the
federal government and the nuclear industry to delay finding permanent storage for
radioactive waste. If that occurred, South Carolina would find itself housing an even
greater amount of nuclear waste. While a number of South Carolina politicians desired an
alternative use for BNFP, few supported adapting the site for AFR storage. Stu Eizenstat
and Katherine “Kitty” Schirmer, both members of Carter’s staff, advised the president to
proceed with caution, and warned that James Schlesinger may have underestimated the
controversial nature of Barnwell’s fate and its potential to become an “explosive issue” in
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South Carolina’s gubernatorial elections.115 Furthermore, using Barnwell as an AFR,
potentially required the newly created Department of Energy to purchase the facility from
Allied-General, which Schirmer and Eizenstat argued might appear as a “federal
bailout.”116 In fact, BNFP already received federal funding for its non-reprocessing
operations, and Carter strongly opposed extending financial support to the facility in the
1979 budget. Even though James Schlesinger recommended exploring the AFR
possibility, at least for political reasons, Carter opposed a “federal takeover.”117
Despite President Carter’s ban on commercial nuclear reprocessing in 1977,
public fears heightened as many grew concerned that the BNFP facility would be used as
a federally-managed reprocessing site or an AFR storage site, even though Carter
opposed such actions publicly. Opposition to the plant emerged early in the project’s
planning and construction stage and would continue to grow throughout the 1970s, as
South Carolinians increasingly questioned the wisdom of their state’s commitment to a
nuclear-fueled economy. The worst fears of the 1,500 activists who gathered at Barnwell
in 1978 never materialized, and while Ronald Reagan’s administration flirted with the
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idea of federally-managed reprocessing or AFR storage at BNFP, ultimately they
continued Carter’s ban on commercial reprocessing.118
However, from 1976 to 1983, the site was used for testing natural uranium as a
“surrogate,” and for research using plutonium and other transuranic wastes, for
commercial and for contract work by the Department of Energy.119 Although the plant
was “decontaminated” in 1983, significant radioactive contamination remained – in
glove-boxes, fume-hoods, and in three underground, high-level waste tanks containing
300,000 gallons of rainwater and contaminated liquid.120 One tank contained 300
kilograms of uranium mixed with 5000 gallons of mixed waste. All said—
decontaminating or “decommissioning” of BNFP has been one of the largest
undertakings in South Carolina’s nuclear projects yet.121
Clinch River Breeder Reactor
For Carter, the decision to defer commercial reprocessing, which hampered
AGNS’s plans and Barnwell’s larger economic designs, drew the ire of some South
Carolina politicians, but largely remains one of the more positive achievements of his
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presidency, even if he gained little political capital from it. What leverage Carter
managed to obtain rapidly depleted as he entered a series of lengthy battles with
Congress, one of which centered around the controversial Clinch River Breeder Reactor
Project (referred to as CRBR henceforth). In 1972, AEC Chairman James R. Schlesinger,
who later served as Carter’s advisor and Secretary of Energy, and Tennessee Valley
Authority Chairman, Aubrey Wagner, officially announced that a demonstration model of
a fast breeder reactor would be built along the Clinch River in East Tennessee, near
Knoxville and Oak Ridge.122 In subsequent years, as with many nuclear facilities,
forecasts for the length and the cost to complete CRBR increased, but many in Congress
doggedly supported funding appropriations for the project nonetheless. Like the porkbarrel water projects, Carter devoted a tremendous amount of time and resources to end
federal funding for CRBR. Even after years of fighting Clinch River, in 1979, the
president informed his advisor that he would “rather go down swinging” on the issue, a
tactic which proved divisive and alienating, and jeopardized the three-decades long
pursuit for all things nuclear by southern politicians. Moreover, while federal funding for
CRBR only ceased in 1983, Carter’s attack on the project marked the death-knell of
breeder technology for commercial purposes in the US.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the fast breeder reactor represented what scholar
Maja Fjaestad has described as a “technological vision,” and industry figures advocated
breeder-reactors as a more efficient form of nuclear power because of “its ability to
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produce more nuclear fuel than it consumes.”123 When the nucleus of uranium or
plutonium undergoes the fissioning process, two neutrons are released, one sustains the
nuclear reaction, while the other neutron could be captured by the nucleus of enriched
uranium or thorium. If successfully “captured,” more fissionable material is created, and
thus, breeder reactors quite literally “breed” fissionable material.124 Because many
anticipated uranium shortages and rising costs, in addition to broader anxieties about
resource depletion that culminated in the 1970s, the breeder appeared as a viable option
for the technological future.125 But as Fjaestad has noted, the breeder “is an example of a
technological future that did not meet its industrial expectations,” and her study traces the
failure to transform the breeder into a commercially viable power-source in Sweden.126
Like the Swedes, a number of other nations invested substantial resources into
developing their own breeder reactors, including Japan, Germany, France, and the Soviet
Union, with each hoping to curtail energy shortages in the future, bolster economic
growth through cheap energy, and possibly attain national prestige through technological
innovation.127
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In the US, the first “fast” reactor, “Clementine,” operated at Los Alamos
Scientific Laboratory from 1946 to 1953, and was the first reactor to be fueled by
plutonium and to use a liquid metal coolant: mercury. Clementine had two purposes, one
of which was to further development of fast reactors, and the other purpose was to
advance nuclear weapons research. The reactor’s high energy neutrons provided a
missing link for nuclear weapons design. Before Clementine, researchers at Los Alamos
had no capabilities of producing such high-intensity neutrons.128
Similar to Clementine, other early developments in fast reactors occurred at
federally-funded, defense oriented national laboratories, such as Argonne in Illinois and
Hanford in Washington.129 The “first prototype breeder reactor,” informally known as
Fermi and located in Monroe, Michigan, achieved “criticality” or sustained its first
nuclear reaction in August 1963.130 The breeder’s fortunes, at least in the US, soured as
early as 1966, when the Fermi 1 experienced a serious accident—a partial meltdown—
inspiring John Fuller’s We Almost Lost Detroit (1975), a popular, investigative account of
the accident.131 Although Fermi 1 restarted again three years after the meltdown, by 1972,
the reactor’s “outmoded” technology and financial drawbacks contributed to its
decommissioning.
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Adding to the negative publicity surrounding breeders from anti-nuclear activists
and fiscal conservatives, Fuller’s account also served an essential text for the anti-nuclear
movement and encouraged fears that breeder reactors could “explode like an atomic
bomb.”132 The risks associated with breeder reactors encouraged development of an
experimental reactor, the Southwest Experimental Fast Oxide Reactor (SEFOR), located
in the mountains of rural Northwest Arkansas. The chief objective for SEFOR was “to
demonstrate how fast reactors would respond to accidental rapid increases in power,” and
the reactor operated for this purpose from 1969-1972.133 SEFOR and other experimental
reactors made considerable advances in developing breeder technology, even though
certain issues remained, particularly how to translate experimental breeders into reactors
for the private sector.
Despite the initial difficulties, the energy crisis of 1973, along with predictions of
resource depletion and bloated forecasts for energy needs, spurred further research and
development funding for breeder prototypes with the objective to create a commercially
viable breeder reactor. From 1967 to 1983, the federal government “spent over 6.5 billion
dollars” on Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) development. Breeder
technology, according to Richard Nixon in 1971, represented the nation’s “best hope” for
“economical cheap energy;”134 and according to scholar Michael J. Graetz, the AEC,
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Nixon, and Gerald Ford viewed the breeder as the “holy-grail of energy policy.”135 The
breeder offered a technological solution to America’s growing energy insecurity, and for
a time, Congress backed appropriations for fast reactor research even as the costs
escalated considerably. Carter’s election in 1976 threatened the endless stream of
appropriations for breeder development and the future of nuclear energy more broadly.
In February 1977, shortly after taking office, Carter announced a $200 million cut
to the breeder reactor program, which commentators interpreted as a concerted move
away from nuclear energy towards energy-conservation, coal, and building strategic oil
reserves. More importantly, Carter’s energy policy seemed to privilege short-term
solutions rather than long-term energy development.136 And like Barnwell’s reprocessing
facility, the administration’s proposal to kill the Clinch River project fit within his nonproliferation agenda. Defending his decision, in April 1977, Carter stated there was “no
need to enter the plutonium age by licensing or building a fast breeder reactor such as the
proposed demonstration plant at Clinch River.”137 James Schlesinger surmised that Carter
saw the breeder “as the single most important source” of nuclear proliferation, which
distracted him from more pressing issues.138 Ultimately, the maneuver pitted the new
chief executive against the majority of Congress, launching a fight over CRBR that
extended throughout Carter’s term.
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Although Carter stubbornly fought to end CRBR, in his correspondence and in his
budget proposals, he supported further research and development in breeder reactors. In a
September 1977 letter drafted to Congressman John Brademas (D-IN), Carter detailed his
stance towards breeder reactors, arguing that contrary to what many believed, his vote
against CRBR did not reflect an anti-breeder stance.139 Continuing on, Carter argued that
the CRBR was “an expensive, uneconomical and technically out of date facility…and not
a necessary component of an effective R&D program.”140 While Carter professed
supported for breeder research, in November 1977, he vetoed an appropriations bill for
ERDA, which included funds for Clinch River. In order to justify the veto, Carter
addressed Senate, reiterating his objective to end CRBR and his intention to “analyze still
available options…to ensure that no further necessary expenditures” were made.141
When defending his position on CRBR, Carter consistently pointed to the
project’s unnecessary nature, describing it as “technologically obsolete,” or as his staff
put it, a “technological dinosaur.”142 And while nuclear experts may have influenced his
views, Carter often emphasized his own analysis and his review of the information
available —the chief technocrat in the executive office. Tellingly, after an assembling an
expert panel on nuclear issues, members of Carter’s staff pressed for the meeting’s
139
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extension, arguing that the president could benefit from a longer discussion.143 But as his
personal diary attests, Carter fiercely guarded his time, and not surprisingly, seemed more
comfortable assessing policy issues in less collaborative settings.144 In this regard, Carter
is arguably unique among American presidents because of his deep involvement with
research and development policy, where his slight expertise in nuclear matters morphed
into an ability to dissect the particularities of breeder reactor projects. Writing to Iowa
Congressman Berkley Bedell (D-IA) in August 1977, Carter reaffirmed his commitment
to eliminating pork-barrel projects and reserving support for the breeder “only when it is
needed” and when “we are sure of the best design,” asking Bedell to “stick” with him in
the “continuing struggle.”145 As his November 1977 address illustrates, Carter’s knack
for alienating Congress surfaced early in his presidency, particularly as he reminded
Senate of his intentions to thoroughly analyze and to locate any unnecessary
expenditures—which resulted in Carter appearing more as a watchful parent or teacher
than as a much-needed leader on energy-related issues.
Despite Carter’s veto, appropriations for CRBR continued in subsequent years,
which contemporary commentators characterized as Congressional defiance, and
demonstrated the political efficacy of Tennessee Senator Howard Baker (R-TN) and
Congressional Representative Marilyn Lloyd (D-TN), both of whom lobbied for the
Clinch River during and after Carter’s presidency. As early as March 1978, Carter’s
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advisors fretted over gaining Congressional support, warning Carter that failure to
compromise might lead to a second veto over ERDA’s funding, and acknowledged that
CRBR represented a “highly visible symbol” of support for the nuclear industry. To gain
support from key Congressional figures, Rep. Olin Teague (D-TX) and Rep. Walter
Flowers (D-AL), Carter needed a “substitute symbol,” one that enabled the largely pronuclear Teague and Flowers to preserve “their credibility and position on nuclear
issues.”146 In doing so, however, the compromise threatened Carter’s own credibility,
who had seemingly back-pedaled from his earlier stance that nuclear power was a “last
resort.”147
Carter’s wavering on nuclear issues prompted Rep. Olin Teague’s “urgent,
personal request for a useful discussion” with the president. Teague warned Carter that
neither industry nor Congress believed his assurances that the present administration was
committed to a strong breeder reactor, and he pointed to an “intense uncertainty” about
Carter’s intentions.148 The uncertainty surrounding Carter’s stance reflected the
increasingly polarized landscape of energy and environmental policy, which gave a figure
like Carter, who offered complicated and occasionally contradictory solutions to
America’s energy problems, a very narrow platform of either “anti-nuclear” or “pronuclear” and left little room for complexity. As Carter had stated in 1977, he supported
146
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breeder reactor research but not the CRBR—admittedly a slight nuance, and yet, one
easily subsumed by the labyrinthine National Energy Policy. In this regard, Carter flailed
on the issue of public perception.
By November 1978, the fight over CRBR continued, and Carter’s advisors
weighed future options. Writing to James Talmadge McIntyre, Jr., then director of the
OMB, Frank Press acknowledged that “after eighteen months, we have still not
succeeded in implementing this policy,” which had become “a very contentious matter,”
and one that “jeopardized” the administration’s ability to ensure its non-proliferation
objectives at home and abroad.149 Essentially, the options before Carter followed several
trajectories. One option required the administration to “take administrative action” and
cancel CRBR, which Press warned would provoke a “long and bitter lawsuit,” and the
GAO concluded there was “no ground for such action.”150 Another possibility included a
series of negotiations and attempts to persuade Congress to accept the cancellation of
CRBR if funding for breeder research continued, also known as the McClure
compromise. The least attractive path required the administration to “acquiesce to the
will of Congress and complete construction of CRBR.”151 Admittedly, none of the
proposed options represented an ideal situation for Carter, particularly because his initial
opposition created a wedge between himself, and according to Press, what “has to date
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been the majority of Congress.”152 Cancelling CRBR constituted a fraction of NEP, paid
few dividends, and seriously threatened the president’s larger agenda, but Carter
remained stubbornly wedded to his opposition. In a letter to Speaker of the House Tip
O’Neill, written in April 1979, Carter stated he had reviewed the matter again and
remained “convinced that completion of the project would not be in the national
interest.”153
Convinced that CRBR was uneconomical, technologically obsolete, and would
weaken the nation’s non-proliferation agenda, Carter’s administration fought for the
project’s cancellation in 1979 and 1980.154 By most accounts, CRBR’s cost overruns
were tremendous, requiring approximately $15 million a month by 1979 from Carter’s
perspective and CRBR critics, the project’s proposed “loop” design appeared
increasingly outdated as the French nuclear program adopted a “pool” design for their
breeder reactors.155 Even if CRBR had transformed from once cutting edge to a
“technological turkey,” Carter underestimated the hunger for pork-barrel projects in
Congress and the disastrous effects of opposing certain projects. Moreover, Carter’s
attack upon Clinch River challenged a decades-long quest by southerners to develop not
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only lucrative defense-contracts but also nuclear-related projects, which provided a mix
of high-paying engineering positions and temporary construction work, and promised
additional revenue for state and local governments.
While Congressional support had been steady throughout Carter’s administration,
it waned after Ronald Reagan took office in 1981. Reagan, in fact, supported Clinch
River, as did his Secretary of Energy, James B. Edwards, the aggressively pro-nuclear
former governor of South Carolina.156 When Congress resisted Reagan’s desire to do
away with the Department of Energy, he responded by appointing Edwards, the former
dentist as his Secretary of Energy, which one scholar described as “the most significant
watershed in modern U.S. energy policy.”157
According to Edwards, Clinch River “fit into the administration’s energy policy
because it was a ‘long term high risk R&D venture,’ enhanced national security, and it
contributed to non-proliferation goals.”158 From this perspective, if the US dominated the
field of breeder technology, the American position to better dictate international control
of nuclear materials and technology would improve. After the administration encouraged
the NRC to license the facility, site excavation finally began in 1982. In a strange twist of
events, the long and divisive conflict over CRBR came to a sudden end in 1983, as a joint
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effort by fiscal conservatives and environmentalists successfully cut federal funding for
the project.159
At opposing ends of the CRBR debate in Congress were two southern senators:
Dale Bumpers (D-AR) and Howard Baker (R-TN). Senator Baker’s clever maneuvers
saved the project for over a decade and paralleled his efforts with TVA’s controversial
Tellico Dam. But as a lame-duck in 1984, Baker no longer wielded the same power in
Congress, and fiscal conservatives in his own party found CRBR unfeasible. Bumpers, an
advocate for the environment, gained support from environmental activists who had long
opposed Clinch River because of the risks it posed. After a long, protracted battle, the
“stake through the heart of the breeder” came from two southerners.160
Conclusion
Viewed holistically, Carter was an advocate for the environment and for a
forward-thinking energy future, but revisionists have also glossed over his more harebrained schemes—particularly the EMB and his calls for greater usage of coal. Curiously,
some revisionists have painted his anti-regulatory, anti-bureaucracy rhetoric as benign,
but unlike Ronald Reagan, Carter adopted the mantle of expert technocrat; and therefore,
his calls for overriding regulations for pipelines and energy facilities seem more
dangerous. The precise, president-engineer found “red tape” stifling the nation’s energy
future and inadvertently gave intellectual backing to the environmentally-hostile Reagan
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administration. In evaluating Carter’s presidency, over-simplifying Carter as a great
champion of the environment and alternative energy obscures his evolution in energy
policy. By 1979, Carter’s tone and proposals had shifted and acknowledging that change
complicates the perception of him as a high-moralist, impervious to influence. In a more
desperate political climate, Carter went to Camp David not as a biblical figure in search
of prophetic vision, but as an increasingly hardened politician searching for leverage and
a chance to salvage his political career.
Revisionist scholars have emphasized Carter’s accomplishments in proenvironment legislation, rightly noting the important legislative measures enacted during
his presidency.161 On environmental issues, the Carter administration’s greatest victories
occurred with the passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (the “Superfund” Act) in 1980, which gave the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) authority to remediate sites of hazardous
environmental contamination and “argue in court who should pay the cost,” and the
Alaska National Interest Conservation Act (1980) which “set aside 105 million acres of
Alaskan wilderness.”162 Under the Carter administration, legislative measures addressing
the environmental impact of surface and strip mining were passed, along with

161

Brinkley, “The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter; Jeffrey K. Stine, “Environmental Policy
during the Carter Presidency,” The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post-New
Deal Era, ed. Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis Graham (Lawrence: University of Kansas,
1998), 180.

162

Jimmy Carter, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter,
1980-1981, ( Best Books, 1981), 2381; Jeffrey K. Stine, “Environmental Policy during
the Carter Presidency,” The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post-New Deal
Era, ed. Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis Graham, 180.

228

amendments to the Clean Air and Water Acts.163 Carter’s fight over wasteful and
environmentally damaging water projects cost him politically, but offers another example
of his commitment to fiscal responsibility and environmental conservation.164 Adding
these accomplishments, Carter’s administration highlighted climate change and
humanity’s role in it. The National Climate Program Act of 1978 “doubled” the budget
for research about climate change, and Carter publicly noted that “the risk that man’s
own activities—might adversely affect the earth’s environment and ecosystem” and
warned that a greater understanding of these issues was necessary “before changes are
irreversible or the consequences inevitable.”165
Writing to advisor Stu Eizenstat in March 1980, Carter expressed his “deep”
concern about “the acid rain problem,” which Congress “must be warned about.”166
Carter’s advocacy for environmental issues and the seriousness upon which he viewed
them, is quite clear, but his stubbornness still abounded. Finding it difficult to shake old
habits, Carter told Eizenstat that “data must be presented to the public,” despite repeated
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warnings by the administration that the American public had abdicated, or least grown
weary, of data and expertise. Reflecting on his presidency in 1982, Carter described the
piece-meal nature of getting energy legislation passed as “despairing and tedious, like
chewing on a rock that lasted four whole years,” and then surmised that the public wasn’t
interested and were instead “aggravated every time I went on TV.”167 As Carter realized,
expertise went extinct in the 1970s, and Americans gravitated towards fewer details not
more. Reagan, in Carter’s words, capitalized on this moment and “deliberately [excluded]
other conflicting or confusing issues” for a “single minded purpose.”168 Despite Carter’s
environmental victories, the tide had turned against scientific authority and perhaps even
the necessity of proof itself.
In the ream of nuclear technology and non-proliferation, Carter scored bigger
victories, even though the battle over Clinch River cost him politically. By indefinitely
deferring commercial nuclear reprocessing, Carter intervened in a project with potentially
catastrophic risks, and neither Allied-General nor the federal government had fully
elucidated or considered questions of adequate security, or occupational and
environmental hazards. In the process, the community of Barnwell, South Carolina lost a
long-term source of revenue and employment, and although the facility operated for
several years, the South Carolina Advanced Technology Park never expanded into what
many envisioned. However, other activities at the site also produced a significant amount
of contamination with natural uranium and other materials, which has remained largely
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hidden from the public view and further demonstrates the importance of Carter’s
intervention.
Beyond the deferral of commercial nuclear reprocessing, Carter’s response to the
accident at Three Mile Island encouraged reform within the nuclear industry. By creating
the Kemeny Commission, which investigated the TMI meltdown and proposed steps for
moving forward, Carter’s administration spearheaded an effort that helped Americans
and the nuclear industry understand what occurred at TMI, provided transparency, and
also led to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission changing its own practices. The nuclear
industry and the NRC “adopted wide-ranging reforms” which have significantly
contributed to safer practices and more stringent regulations.169 The American nuclear
power industry reached a crisis point in the late 1970s and early 1980s, with mass
cancellations and TMI, but in subsequent years, output from existing nuclear plants has
increased and better performance has arguably narrowed the industry’s credibility gap
with the American public.
Like the Kemeny Commission, Carter’s administration used the independentstudy approach to address nuclear waste disposal, forming the “Interagency Review
Group on Nuclear Waste Management (IRG)” in 1978.170 A year later, the IRG released
their report, offering tempered support for the feasibility of permanent storage, while
acknowledging the political and environmental barriers persisted.171 Responding to the
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report, Carter’s new policy statement on nuclear waste created a “State Planning
Council” lead by South Carolina Governor Richard Riley, who diverged from longstanding patterns of pro-nuclear sentiment in the state.172 As J. Samuel Walker has noted,
Carter’s statement was “a milestone in efforts to manage radioactive waste because of
both its visibility and its thoughtful, substantive proposals to address the technical and
political aspects of the problem,” but it failed to transcend the “stalemate” of overcoming
public fears and finding adequate solutions for “inherently unresolvable waste issues.”173
Moreover, the IRG’s recommendation of creating regional compacts for greater inequity
in waste disposal never worked as planned.
More broadly, Carter’s tepid support of nuclear power and his fight against Clinch
River Breeder Reactor paralleled a general decline in enthusiasm over nuclear power.
With Clinch River’s cancellation, hopes for commercial breeder reactors to operate in the
US by the early twenty-first century largely dissipated.174 While Carter publicly
supported funding other breeder projects in an abstract sense, in practice, the federal
government’s invested in breeder technology subsided.175 In tandem, widespread
cancellations of planned or partially built commercial nuclear reactors coincided with
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Carter’s presidency and for several years afterward. From 1977 to 1984, twenty four
reactor projects (individual reactors) were cancelled in the US South.176 Although
numerous factors conspired against the nuclear industry, the wave of cancellations,
demise of CRBR, indefinite deferral of commercial reprocessing, and radioactive waste
stalemate challenged nearly three decades of regional nuclear optimism, which
paradoxically occurred under the watch of “Jimmy Carter nuclear expert” and native
southerner.177 Carter vacillated on many aspects of nuclear technology, but he never
wavered in highlighting the dangers of proliferation, a stance that disrupted a long
trajectory of downplaying the risks associated with harnessing nuclear technologies for
generation and destruction.
Despite Jimmy Carter’s accomplishments in energy, environment, and nonproliferation, the American public remained skeptical, even if periods of initial optimism
occurred (as in July 1979). Although Carter promised equity in energy sacrifices, for
some Americans, the burden of sacrifice and conservation rested upon the average
citizen, and elected officials seemingly paid lip-service to the idea but failed to conserve
energy in practice. One Florida couple, Mr. & Mrs. John Wyman, commented, “Carter,
with all his travels, fishing trips, etc does not seem to be doing much of the conserving he
wants the public to do.”178 Others echoed that sentiment, noting that “Amy & Rosalyn are
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traipsing around Switzerland…Carter’s flying all over looking for 1980 votes.”179 Like
his advisors warned, Carter appeared Janus-faced and tone-deaf to many, as one
constituent lamented, “I for one am getting a little tired of having Carter talk out of both
sides of his mouth at the same time.”180 Other Americans blamed Congress for its failure
to regulate nuclear plants and deal with the energy crisis because policy-makers were “so
busy increasing its own pay and benefits.”181 The decade’s economic and energy turmoil
undergirded a sense of inequality and perhaps an aversion towards conservation. And
faith in technological solutions continued, as another Floridian argued, “We have the
expertise in this country to solve any problems if we want to.”182
American faith in Jimmy Carter’s ability to solve, or at the very least improve, the
nation’s energy problems had once been robust. In December 1976, after Carter’s victory
over Gerald Ford, one survey reported that nearly 76 percent of Americans believed the
new president was “very likely” or “fairly likely” to create an effective national energy
policy, an issue which Carter, ironically, had devoted little attention to in his
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campaign.183 The “outsider” from Plains, Georgia committed to serving the “public
good” brought insider knowledge on nuclear issues and an engineer’s mind to
Washington, which generated an extraordinary commitment to analyzing policy issues
but also obscured contradictions, particularly in terms of environmental protection and a
better energy future.184 Like his ill-fated attempt to run a six mile race in 1979, where an
exhausted Carter required assistance off the course after four miles, the president
staggered into the 1980 election, unable to match Ronald Reagan’s assurances to make
“America great again.”185 By September 1980, one poll reported that 54% of Americans
surveyed disapproved of Carter’s energy policy, and another concluded that 75%
characterized Carter’s performance in handling the nation’s energy problems as “poor” or
“only fair.”186 During the 1980 election, Americans continued to express greater faith in
Carter’s approach versus Reagan’s, but expertise and “technocratic precision” gave way
to an administration that exuberantly rejected the need for detailed analysis by the chief
executive. Reagan’s Secretary of Energy, the pro-nuclear, former governor of South
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Carolina James B. Edwards, pointedly reminded an audience of his limited knowledge in
1977:
I am not a nuclear expert…for that matter, I am not a professional politician.
Before running for office, I was an oral surgeon. When the conversation reaches
strontium and thorium and some of the technical nuclear terms, such as: mixed
blend, co-processing, I only know what these mean to our people in terms of job
opportunities and a prosperous life.187
And this disavowal of expertise characterized the new administration—free enterprise
superseded close scrutiny of policy issues.188
Carter, defeated in 1980, no longer appeared as “Moses who will lead us out of
our post-Watergate desert, through the Red Sea of red tape, into the promised land of
personal salvation and good feeling,” nor did he resemble Saturday Night Live’s
“amazing colossal president.”189 For a politician considered an integral part of the “New
South,” where Sun-Belt optimism and moderate politics redefined regional identity; as
president, Carter offered an older tradition in southern culture—the grim sermons of the
past, which warned sinners to repent or else.190 Despite his many accomplishments,
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Carter never effectively communicated a coherent platform, resisting the trend towards an
increasingly polarized, partisan rhetoric concerning energy and the environment. Like a
“greased pig,” Carter provided complicated and contradictory solutions to complex
issues, failing to see that his forward-thinking vision on alternative energy, justified
stance against wasteful pork-barrel projects, and unwavering attitude towards nonproliferation could be tempered by his cries against red-tape, federal bureaucracy, and
regulations.191 Writing in 1988, Carter described the natural world as “fragile and
lovely,” noting that Henry David Thoreau’s observation that “wilderness is the salvation
of mankind” remained “more true than ever,” an indication of his deep affinity for the
preserving the environment against the unscrupulous activities of man.192 In light of this,
one wonders why Carter betrayed his faith in “wilderness as the salvation of mankind” in
1979, accepting political peanuts from the vested interests he disdained—appearing
“elusive as a lightning bug” yet again.193
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CHAPTER SIX

THE MIND OF THE NUCLEAR SOUTH: ANTI-NUCLEAR THINKING
AND THE DILEMMAS OF TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRESS
But if the passion for actual building assumed tremendous
proportions, the passion for dream building and for
speculating upon that dream building, as it developed in the
extravagant, romantic, and Progress-haunted South, was
Gargantuan. For every real new factory, for every real new
skyscraper plastered with mortgages, ten imaginary ones
leaped up.1
--W. J. Cash, The Mind of the South (1941)
The roads are now of concrete or gravel and there are
thousands of miles of ugly wires crossing the landscape
bearing messages of light…We have gone forward our
progress is ever so evident. And the river? It is changed and
eternally the same.2
--William Alexander Percy, Lanterns on the Levee
By the early 1970s, commercial nuclear power was no longer a technocratic
dream. It had become a widespread, visible reality. It sparked admiration and it instilled
fear. And it led to a regional uprising of sorts over the meanings of technology and
progress. An emergent anti-nuclear rebellion sparked rancorous debates and grassroots
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protests. Their warnings about a nuclear present and future were central to the decade’s
larger discussions about energy production, environmental fragility, and technological
risk. In their rebellion against nuclear power, anti-nuclear activists organized public
protests, engaged in legal battles, encouraged whistle-blowers within the nuclear
industry, aspired for a diverse coalition across class and racial lines, and challenged
nuclear experts, vigorously fighting the region’s growing number of nuclear plants from
the early 1970s to the mid-1980s. Peaking in 1978, a year before the accident at Three
Mile Island, the South’s largest anti-nuclear rally occurred in Barnwell, South Carolina,
drawing protestors from across the region. Over 1500 people gathered in opposition to
the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant, the global nuclear economy, and what they perceived as
the “South’s disproportionate burden,” seen most visibly in South Carolina, where the
state’s nuclear complex included the Savannah River Site, a low-level radioactive waste
repository, a number of operating or planned nuclear reactors, and an under-construction
nuclear fuel reprocessing facility.1 Nowhere had the atomic aspirations of the region’s
mid-century boosters developed so fully as in the Palmetto State, or as some called it, the
“Plutonium State.”2 From the Oystershell Alliance in New Orleans to the Catfish
Alliance in Alabama, anti-nuclear rebels formed local groups and built a regional
network dedicated to challenging the nuclear industry and offering alternative visions for
the South’s future. These activists helped shape a nuclear “mind of the South,” to borrow
the provocative phrase of Wilbur J. Cash.

1

Palmetto Alliance materials, Folder: Topical Files: Barnwell, Nuclear Reprocessing
Plant, 1979, Box 24, Palmetto Alliance Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of
South Carolina.

2

Dave Mullis, Letter to Editor, The State, August 23, 1978.
239

In their shaping of the South’s thinking about the nuclear world, the region’s antinuclear activists were the heirs to a tradition of “regional self-scrutiny” that reached its
pinnacle during the 1930s to 1950s. If they lacked the eloquence of writers like William
Faulkner or Lillian Smith, these rebels nonetheless shared a place in a long line of
thinking about progress, modernity, ignorance, and change in southern history. At the
heart of that tradition is Wilbur J. Cash’s The Mind of the South, published in 1941. Part
indictment and part reflection, Cash portrayed the southern mind as stubbornly solid,
violently wedded to tradition, and in the twentieth century, enraptured by a sort of crass
materialism. Southerners, in Cash’s view, paid lip service to “Progress” and a “New
South” but were unable to free themselves from racism, class exploitation, and willful
ignorance. As scholar Robert Brinkmeyer describes, Cash saw southerners not as
“prisoners of authoritarian forces,” but rather as “prisoners of their own thoughtlessness
and their determination not to analyze.”3
Critics in subsequent decades found fault with much of Cash’s interpretation.
Cash’s vision appeared too homogenous, it over-simplified black southerners and poor
whites, and it imbued southern planters with a guilt out of sync with historical reality.
Despite its shortcomings, The Mind of the South, as Richard King asserts, remains “a
quintessential expression of the regional self-scrutiny,” one that found good company
during the southern literary “Renaissance” in the 1930s to 1950s.4 Writers like William
Alexander Percy, William Faulkner, Lillian Smith, James Agee, Thomas Wolfe, and the
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Nashville Agrarians, produced meditations on the South, its history and its identity, while
also exploring their own roots. In the process, many of these writers looked at the
changing world around them, as the flawed region they loved stood at the precipice of the
“Bulldozer Revolution,” to use C. Vann Woodward’s phrase.5 Even before Will Percy
lamented the “thousands of miles of ugly wires crossing the landscape,” other writers,
like W.E.B. Du Bois expressed skepticism and ambivalence towards the promises of
“Progress.” Traveling back to his old haunts in Tennessee, Du Bois looked upon the
former site of a log schoolhouse, where “in its place stood Progress,” and Progress, and
he understood it, was “necessarily ugly.”6 Of course, southerners have no monopoly on
impugning modernity or the façade of Progress, but these critics rarely disentangled those
views from a regional context.
However tempting it may be to interpret the South’s anti-nuclear rebellion in
national or even global frameworks (and those links exist) that mode risks shortcircuiting their critiques to a narrow time-span, where the only meaningful connections
occur at the specific historical moment. In other words, by divorcing the anti-nuclear
critique from a longer historical trajectory, grounded in southern history, a good deal of
meaning is lost. The region’s anti-nuclear activists found inspiration and resembled
movements elsewhere, but their power came from a slightly different well, one that
rebelled against a southern way of suppressing dissent, encouraging conformity, and
kneeling at the altar of Progress and New South schemes. It chiseled away and further
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fractured what Cash saw as a mind of the South, solid and total in its ability to keep
certain people in their place and reinforced older, dangerous tendencies. In this sense, the
mind of the modern, nuclear, South is fragmented; with the determination “not to
analyze,” foundering, but still Progress-haunted as ever.7
The mind of the nuclear South, in its fragmentation, left room for an ongoing
commitment to Progress, material advancement, and technological euphoria, and the
region’s anti-nuclear rebellion produced critics, who viewed their activism as antiprogress, hysterical, and overly paranoid. Faced with nuclear controversies in his home
state, South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) lamented anti-nuclear activism as
“most illogical.” To the 75-year-old politician, the movement’s “frequent forecasts of
doom” were “the product of unthinking opposition to progress.” The “miracle of modern
technology” had turned “our nuclear sword into a nuclear plowshare.” Leaving that plow
idle, he warned constituents, was a dangerous thing.8 Thurmond’s reference to nuclear
plowshares merely recycled the language of the Atomic Energy Commission’s
experimental “Project Plowshare,” the agency’s attempt to utilize atomic energy for
peaceful purposes.9 Thurmond’s biblical language would have resonated with his
constituents and further underscored the New South’s long-standing gospel of growth—
the doctrine that espoused industrial progress as a means of regional advancement and
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that stretched back almost a century.10 Anti-nuclear activism challenged that New South
creed, that boosterish way of thinking that emphasized industry, progress, development,
and an optimism that glossed over the deep issues of inequality and corruption facing the
region.
The history of the post-WWII South, has often been cast as a tragic tale of hasty
development, wherein the “Bulldozer Revolution” steamrolls cultural tradition and rural
life. Eager boosters and Sunbelt politicians play the part of villain, bargaining with the
federal government and corporations for development at any cost, and southerners serve
as hapless by-standers, politically inert and disengaged with the transformation of their
region. The South was “sold,” and by most accounts, despite a few writers and scholars
penning Dixie’s epitaph, the rest of the region’s citizens embraced economic and
technological development at any cost.11 In the case of the nuclear industry’s
development, historian James Cobb has argued that “many southerners expressed little
doubt about the safety of nuclear facilities, choosing instead to accept at face value the
assurances of utility officials that such operations promised more jobs and a better
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standard of living and were far more of a blessing than a threat.”12 Perhaps
unintentionally, the masses appear much in the way W.J. Cash portrayed them, concerned
with material things and acquiescent in the maneuvers of a more powerful class.
To be sure, popular accounts of southern economic development have contributed
significantly to our understanding of the American South’s industry and economy and its
relationship to the federal government and military. And yet, by their very focus, a topdown narrative emphasis on groups like state economic development boards has obscured
the grassroots rebellion that occurred in the 1970s-1980s, one that fostered widespread
debate about energy, the environment, and technology. Responding to these debates, antinuclear activists delivered jeremiads that offered another perspective on a changing
South, replacing what writer Marshall Frady called the “old fierce tragic theologies” of
the region’s past with newer warnings of ecological doom, nuclear meltdowns, and grave
threats to public health. Anti-nuclear activists supplied the region’s “old fierce tragic
theologies,” and like any good old-time religion, their work forecast foreboding for the
future. Their vision of the next-New South ran counter to the prevailing feel-good
regional identity prompted by the growth of the Sunbelt South and its newly affluent,
sprawling metropolitan areas like Atlanta and Charlotte.13 The “mind” of the nuclear
South, then, offers historians a more complex picture of how southerners viewed
technological and environmental change, in addition to placing anti-nuclear activism
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within a longer-trajectory of southerners who sharpened their own swords against the
region they loved.
Anti-Nuclear Jeremiads as “Old, fierce tragic” sermons in the Prosperous and Bland
South
Southern anti-nuclear activists drew upon regional history, environmental
discourse, and fears about out-of-control science and technology rooted in long-standing
suspicions. Their apocalyptic tone resembled anti-nuclear screeds elsewhere, but their
jeremiad also contained distinctly “southern” elements, bound explicitly to the region’s
history and its New South quest. Activists recast the region’s lust for development,
progress, and cheap energy as a morality tale, where nuclear power constituted the final
chapter in a century-long drive toward modernity and economic development at
seemingly any cost.14 From their correspondence, newsletters, speeches, protests, and
imagery used, anti-nuclear thinking appears not only fragmented, but also deeply
14
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troubled by the consequences of modernity. In part, activists likely exaggerated the
menace as a rhetorical strategy, and yet, their devotion to fighting nuclear projects
suggests they sincerely feared the destructive possibilities and a future South defined by
technological risk, environmental degradation, and untrammeled development.
The South’s most prominent critics of modernity lived in a pre-nuclear world, or
at the very least, wrote at the dawning of the nuclear age. Some, like William Faulkner
and James Agee, grappled with the atomic bomb, but nearly all passed away before the
commercial nuclear industry developed in the South. Companies might blight the air with
smoke-stacks, or ruin the landscape with transmission lines, but atomic energy and
nuclear technology offered a new threat to infuse southern perspectives on modernity and
progress. While these threats were and are global in nature, and have transformed our
planet fundamentally, those changes also reverberated and altered the form of “regional
scrutiny” propagated by southern observers in the past.15 Southerners constructed anti-
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nuclear jeremiads which incorporated broader fears of nuclear catastrophe with older
themes.
Anti-nuclear activists gravitated towards this confluence of apocalypse and
southern history. For instance, William Reed Moore, a Georgia native and early nuclear
opponent, inveighed against South Carolina’s leaders for their greed and blind faith in all
things atomic, warning that “deadly radioactive fission garbage” would put “future
generations of South Carolinians, and to the people of neighboring states” at too much
risk for the “short term profits for the industry and the utilities.”16 Moore served as
president for one anti-nuclear and environmental organization—Environmental Inc., and
like many of his peers, exhaustively wrote letters to politicians and newspapers. Moore’s
letters warned of the doom brought about by greed, and his writings are riddled with
references to biblical passages that criticized the “perverse disputings of men of corrupt
minds…supposing that gain is godliness,” and pointed readers to passages in the New
Testament that cautioned against a “love of money and greed.”17 While Moore’s antinuclear activism possessed a greater religious tone than other activists, the underlying
critique resembled popular portrayals of utility executives as oversized, gluttonous
tycoons and southern politicians as swindlers and peddlers of radioactive death—in both
anti-nuclear publications and political cartoons.
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Echoing these themes, the left-leaning publication Southern Exposure published a
special issue dedicated to the region’s nuclear industry in 1979, tracing the connections
between utility executives and southern politicians, denouncing another New South
scheme, and hinting at impending disaster:
The South has long fallen prey to the purveyor of the simple solution, the savior
who would lift the region from economic stagnation to new heights of
prosperity and national prestige. Our history is littered with such demagogues,
and though we now sneer at them with New South sophistication, we are still
often blinded by the Big Promise of renewed fame and fortune. Witness the
uncritical acceptance—and prideful defense—of Jimmy Carter by even the liberal
minded Southerner. More importantly, witness the region’s love affair with
nuclear power.
Every day brings new revelations of the dangers and mismanagement of nuclear
technology. It is not our primary purpose to add to that overwhelming evidence,
but rather to reveal the score of the industry in the South and the importance
of the region to the larger nuclear dream/nightmare.18

In this rendering, the South no longer faced some sort of cosmic retribution for
slavery, but rather for its unthinking acceptance of industry at all costs. Cheap energy,
specifically nuclear energy, assumed the role of savior—a new Christ swathed in
radioactive linens—in the eyes of southern boosters and politicians. For many antinuclear activists, cheap energy was “false salvation,” devoid of any substantial economic
virtues and carried with it unimaginable risks.19 The Tower of Babel allusion, if
somewhat debatable in its interpretation, nonetheless carried the weight of an old fire and
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brimstone sermon. The less than subtle subtext of biblical language in this context
warned audiences that without action the region’s quest for nuclear supremacy would end
in a fashion worthy of the Old Testament.
Accordingly, visions of apocalypse and catastrophic accidents pervaded antinuclear materials published by groups in the region, and while these imaginings were
shaped by larger discourses, they remained grounded in a specific sense of place, a fear
of permanent alteration or even mass exodus. In this sense, anti-nuclear writing and
imagery echoed the sense of loss incurred by modernity’s encroachment, seen perhaps
most vividly in Will Percy’s Lanterns on the Levee or the Nashville Agrarians’ manifesto
I’ll Take My Stand, but the threat of nuclear annihilation or mutation from radiation
added a menacing, dystopian quality. The “imagination of disaster,” as Susan Sontag put
it, changed the warp and woof of regional self-scrutiny.20 Employing this imagery, one of
South Carolina’s major anti-nuclear organizations, the Palmetto Alliance, warned the
public about the dangers of the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant, a proposed commercial
nuclear fuel reprocessing facility:
You don’t have to be a nuclear engineer to understand the dangers associated with
nuclear fuel reprocessing…such an accident could require the EVACUATION
OF MAJOR CITIES ON THE EAST COAST AND LEAVE SOUTH
CAROLINA UNINHABITABLE FOR MILLENIA.21
For the alliance, nuclear reprocessing technology represented a threat not only to
the Barnwell community but to the entire East Coast, one that possessed catastrophic
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potential unimaginable in a pre-nuclear era. Like the Palmetto Alliance, the North
Carolina-based group, Coalition for Alternatives to Shearon Harris (C.A.S.H), described
that state’s battles over the nuclear industry in apocalyptic terms, characterizing the fight
as one against “the 4 Horsemen of our region’s nuclear apocalypse.”22 Likewise, locals
living near the Shearon Harris nuclear plant, then under construction and located outside
the Tri-Cities area in North Carolina, saw the site in menacing ways. Cecil Morris, a
farmer living nearby, described the cooling tower as a “tombstone over Wake and
Chatham Counties.”23 Another local resident, Teresa Dixon, told reporters she planned to
buy her family gas masks and radiation suits.24 The fears and anxieties of people like
Morris and Dixon gave activists fodder for their anti-nuclear publications, which often
mixed serious reporting with dark-apocalyptic tinged humor.
In their fight against the Shearon Harris nuclear plant, CASH produced flyers and
pamphlets that starkly portrayed the issue as one of life or death, but they reserved the
most horrifying imagery for mothers. Radiation from the Shearon Harris plant, according
to the organization, could cause “birth defects” and “spontaneous abortions,” effectively
rendering a vision of the future where the disabled and deformed were no longer
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outliers.25 Living in a risk society thus created a trade-off of cosmic retribution; the
Faustian bargain of nuclear power would reap devastating consequences for all. This
image, of course, served as a vivid contrast to the depiction of a future with alternative
energy. Through solar and wind power, and conservation, the ugliness of disability and
death would be diminished in the utopian landscape. Central to CASH’s construction of a
nuclear controversy, mutation, disability, and aborted radiated fetuses, appealed to
maternal anxiety and a broader fear of a society plagued with poor health. Good mothers
opposed nuclear power.
Conjuring images of mutated babies and environmental catastrophe served as one
way to terrify people into opposing nuclear power, but they also spoke to deeper fears
about modernity and technological risk, where the “imagination of disaster” left the big
screen and became visibly imprinted upon the region’s environment and their way of
thinking. When Will Percy looked at the ugly transmission lines, he feared losing a way
of life defined by southern gentility, and a brutally reimagined landscape perhaps. The
power of nuclear warfare only visibly materialized three years after his death in 1942.
Greenville, Mississippi might be transformed but not obliterated by newly powerful
weapons or abandoned for hundreds of years after a catastrophic nuclear accident. These
dark possibilities haunted the mind of the nuclear South and no doubt encouraged
impassioned, creative warnings. In North Carolina, activist Wells Eddleman offered a
revised, nuclear-infused version of “Jingle Bells” that encapsulates the mixture of
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gallows humor and sincere horror in anti-nuclear thinking: “Dashing through the glow, of
atomic waste/ Running for our lives, fleeing our home place.”26 Another activist, Bo
Lozoff, wrote an inspired version of “Downtown,” originally recorded by Petula Clark:
First there’s a problem because something starts wobblin’ in de inner core;
Meltdown!
And de first backup system maybe go on de fritz and not do what it’s for;
Meltdown!
When all the backup systems fail to cool off the container,
Executives evacuate with lawyers on retainer…
You might miss seeing Apex wiped off of the map, from a MELTDOWN!
Consumers can hardly wait, MELTDOWN! I hear it lowers de monthly rate,
MELTDOWN! It’s gonna be such a great show!27

Both songs emphasize a loss of place, whether by a nuclear accident wiping Apex “off
the map” or residents fleeing for their lives. Scholar Ursula Heise has explored the
detachment from local places and customs, the disappearance of a sense of place in light
of risks created by large-scale technological systems, and others have explored similar
questions in the face of climate change and living in a risk society more generally.28 In
the 1970s and 1980s, a more distinct southern regional identity had begun to slip away, as
cities like Atlanta and Charlotte embodied a newer South, one more connected to
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suburban Los Angeles and Phoenix than the Mississippi Delta or South Carolina
Lowcountry. How fitting then, that Lozoff and Eddleman’s nuclear songs imagine a
literal loss of place, where people are forced to abandon their homes and lose their
connection to North Carolina, and more broadly, the South.
While imagining disaster was central to anti-nuclear thinking generally, activists
found other ways to critique the region’s nuclear build-up. Even as activists
acknowledged the battles over the nuclear industry were global, going so far as to phrase
the fight as planetary in significance, anti-nuclear opponents harnessed meaningful
symbols from southern history and culture to ground their commentary on environmental
inequity, showing how risk supplanted other markers of regional identity. The modern
South’s theology may have shifted from one of “old fierce tragic theologies” to a “feelgood” evangelical Christianity, but anti-nuclear activists offered another reading of the
region’s future—where doom and destruction still loomed but redemptive possibilities
existed too.
In April and May of 1978, the largest anti-nuclear rally in the US South occurred,
a demonstration against the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) and nuclear power,
attracting approximately 1500 protestors, and a slew of high-profile critics of nuclear
power, including Drs. John Gofman, Helen Caldicott, the controversial Ernest Sternglass,
and musician Jackson Browne. Of those attending, 280 protestors were arrested as they
approached the gates of Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant, a nuclear reprocessing facility
under construction, and refused to leave until Allied-General Nuclear Services officials
met with them.29 Holding hands and singing “Love each other as ourselves, for we are
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one,” the anti-nuclear protestors deliberately fashioned their spectacle to counter a
nuclear industry many perceived as destructive, violent, and part of a machismo culture
that threatened not only human life but “mother earth” as well.30 The anti-nuclear
organization, the Palmetto Alliance, spearheaded the opposition to BNFP. The group’s
organizational materials shows how anti-nuclear thinking in the South embodied both a
global consciousness but also a locally grounded perspective; and in this sense, it spoke
to a tension that nuclear power provoked – even as local and regional distinctions eroded,
to the point that some would call the region the “No South,” activists spoke of planetary
destruction but also employed rhetoric and imagery that placed nuclear technologies in a
regional context. Thus, in Palmetto Alliance newsletters, writers compared Barnwell’s
climate to the French reprocessing facility, La Hague, but also characterized their actions
as “southerners mobilizing for survival” and deplored the region’s political leaders who
chose “radioactivity over the sun’s warm rays, cancer over health, death over life.”31
When Ronald Reagan’s administration considered using the facility for either a
federally managed reprocessing center or an Away-From-Reactor storage facility,
activists again appealed to southerners using familiar language invoked many times in the
past, emphasizing the importance of states’ rights and claiming such action “usurps the
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rights of the citizens of South Carolina.”32 In their opposition to nuclear power, the
Palmetto Alliance readily re-appropriated the language of southern demagogues, looking
back into the region’s past while also envisioning catastrophe reaching far into the future.
Similarly, Alliance activists cited their opposition to subsidizing BNFP’s future by
characterizing such a bill as a “blatant violation of states rights,” one that according to the
Palmetto Alliance, South Carolinians “never asked the federal government to dictate the
use of a major section of South Carolina real estate for hundreds of years.”33 Echoing
southern political leaders railing against an expansive federal government, the Alliance
declared that “the people of South Carolina, not bureaucrats in some federal agency
should decide if we want to become an area of national sacrifice.”34 No doubt the
activists’ strategy was, in part, a rhetorical one, aimed at galvanizing South Carolinians
who might otherwise be suspicious of groups that appeared radical or fringe.
Palmetto Alliance publications also reached further into the past, evoking South
Carolina’s dubious honor as the first state to secede from the Union in 1861, and
challenging the federal government’s prerogative to force South Carolina to accept spent
nuclear fuel: “Denying a South Carolina Governor the right to disapprove a federal site
for spent nuclear fuel –in this state?? Why, it practically calls for another secession!”35
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While the calls for secession were tongue-in-cheek, it nonetheless drew from the state
and the region’s past, and relied upon a deeply embedded resentment to federal intrusion,
one long associated with slavery and civil rights. In one photo of Barnwell protestors, a
larger banner depicts the Grimke´ sisters, the 19th century abolitionists from South
Carolina.36 In this sense, the references to a southern past contained mixed messages,
incorporating language of white supremacists but also imagery of another, more
redemptive history.
Like the gallows humor evoked by activists, anti-nuclear groups also employed
southern symbols in a comedic manner that also delivered serious commentary. The
Oystershell Alliance, an anti-nuclear group in Louisiana, encouraged protestors to attend
a mass demonstration in Barnwell, describing the protest as a “south-wide event” and a
“fertile meeting” ground for “clean energy people all over the South,” calling on
southerners to “flex your grits.”37 Thus, the publication not only emphasized the event’s
regional nature, one where like-minded southerners converged, but also pointed to a
staple of southern cuisine, transforming a southern symbol into one that conveyed
strength and a different sort of unity. C.A.S.H activist, Wells Eddleman used another
southern trope, derived from the expression “bless her heart” or “bless his/her soul,” in a
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letter to the editor that criticized the Raleigh News & Observer’s coverage of nuclear
issues: “Bless your editors! …I’m sure the editors will give up their space, and some
more, for the ‘blessings’ of this wacky waste. ‘Blessings’ include huge Duke Power rate
hikes, possible leaks, waste transportation on our roads and maybe disease and mutations
down the road.”38
Likewise, an Oystershell Alliance publication pointed to the long history of
negative perceptions of southerners as ignorant and poor, citing the high number of
cancelled or deferred nuclear plants in Louisiana as proof that “Us ignorant, dumb
Southern folks will buy anything; just as long as it’s in the name of progress!”39
Significantly, the writer’s usage of “us” implicates the activists as well, instead of
creating a division between the anti-nuclear forces and other southerners. Moreover, the
publication pointed to the region’s history of accepting projects of questionable value in
the name of progress and modernity. Another Oystershell newsletter infused their critique
of the nuclear industry and Louisiana’s friendliness to polluting industries with a nod to
southern customs and language:
How has our own State of Louisiana government protected us? Our politicians,
besides winking at all the poisonous wastes produced here in Louisiana, have now
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made this state a national dumping ground, inviting every polluter in the
country to bring their garbage down here! Southern hospitality, y’all.40

With the same biting humor present in many anti-nuclear publications, the Oystershell’s
criticism emphasized the environmental costs of the state’s pro-industry, anti-regulation
attitudes and the calculated ignorance of southern politicians, while also illustrating the
disjuncture between the “commodified vision of southernness” and an uglier reality.41
The South depicted in Southern Living, the magazine created in 1966 that quickly became
the handbook for southern women and southern hospitality, showed a region where
educated, affluent southerners nonetheless maintained a more-benign version of southern
identity, where Frito-Pie and using the term “y’all” constituted regional charm not
markers of inferiority.42 For the region’s anti-nuclear and environmental activists, the
region’s badge of exceptionalism had shifted from Jim Crow segregation to one defined
by gross environmental inequity and an acceptance of technological risk.
For the South’s anti-nuclear activists, the nuclear industry presented an urgent
situation that threatened the public’s health and the environment. These feelings
sometimes appeared acutely localized, bound by one community or state borders. As
Palmetto Alliance publication stated, “In every state of the nation, nuclear power is a
controversial issue. In South Carolina, it is an emergency.”43 If the statement lacked
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verifiable accuracy, it underscored a larger sense of crisis, where certain people and
places were more susceptible to high-risk, technological systems. While the notable
presence of the nuclear industry in South Carolina encouraged activists to highlight the
state’s disproportionate burden, the Palmetto Alliance also highlighted the problem in a
regional framework. According to Alliance members, the South bore the “burden of the
most diversified and the most concentrated collection of Nukes,” and was “the nuclear
dumping ground for the world.”44 We increasingly credit systems like nuclear power for
giving way to a more global sense of connectedness and vulnerability (and a detachment
from a localized sense of place), and controversies like the Barnwell Fuel Plant
heightened an awareness of the ways nuclear technologies carried risks beyond state and
national borders. In the words of a Palmetto Alliance publication, there was “no where
[sic] to hide.”45 These systems encouraged a type of mediation from communities that
utilized local or regional symbols language but also found new ways to define a “sense of
place” through inequities and risks. If the Dixie had experienced an “Americanization”
of sorts, prompting some to write an epitaph for the region’s identity or describe the
region as the “No South,” activists found news ways to define the South’s identity, one
that starkly contrasted the commercially viable “southern” identity sold on television, in
magazines, and in stores.46
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Critics of the movement levied a series of invectives against anti-nuclear groups,
often portraying activists as paranoid, hysterical, and unrealistic about necessity of
nuclear power. In one screed against the Kudzu Alliance, an anti-nuclear group in North
Carolina, John Graham of the American Nuclear Society described the Alliance’s
members as “sore losers” and “outraged rebels” who believed “they were performing a
democratic act, when actually they were doing the opposite.”47 Another critic, Scott
Greig, writing for the Daily Tar Heel (UNC’s student paper) caustically lampooned
protestors of the Shearon Harris plant. Noting the uproarious nature of public hearings
and the vitriolic exchanges between Carolina Power & Light officials and C.A.S.H.
activists, Grieg proposed, in jest, that a journalist like “Hunter S. Thompson who’d
probably be drinking Wild Turkey over ice” watching the two groups “go at it verbally
with everything but knives and the Municipal Building’s folder chairs.” Grieg wondered
if CASH’s supporters were opposed to Shearon Harris, a plant located approximately 25
miles from Chapel-Hill, merely because of a “paranoid reaction to Chernobyl” or a
“cosmic embalance [sic]” that prevented the protestors from playing their Bob Dylan or
Grateful Dead albums on a turntable powered by nuclear energy.48 Grieg’s portrayal of
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CASH activists as aged hippies fighting battles of days gone by, while comical, is
perhaps more representative of hostile views towards anti-nuclear groups and
environmentalists in general.
Others found anti-nuclear activists dangerously anti-progress, weak-hearted,
hysterical, and incapable of understanding different perspectives. James Davis of South
Carolina, a hot-bed of nuclear opposition but also pro-nuclear sentiment, surmised that if
the anti-nuclear Palmetto Alliance had existed in the 19th century, “the wagon trains
might never have rolled Westward.”49 Davis accused Ralph Nader and his followers for
the “Chicken Little Syndrome” “taking over,” and worried that “such faint-heartedness”
held “ominous implications” for the United States, who might “become a ‘pitiful,
helpless giant.”50 For Davis, Uncle Sam “must stand up and fight like a man, not hide in
the closet, fearful of taking any risks.” Others echoed Davis, like Roy Mendelson of
Columbia, South Carolina, who warned the such a “faint hear[t]” would lead America
back to the “dark ages,” unable to confront the Soviets “with boundless energy
supplies.”51 Both letters, written in April 1979, responded to the calls for a nuclear

49

13. Letter from James Davis to Senator Hollings, April 11, 1979, Folder; Hollings,
Public, Senate, Top., 96th, Energy, Nuclear, Gen., Box 271, Legislative Files and
Constituent Correspondence, Senate Papers, 1977-1986, South Carolina Political
Collections, University of South Carolina.

50

Ibid.

51

Roy Mendelson, April 24, 1979, Folder: ; Hollings, Public, Senate, Top., 96th, Energy,
Nuclear, Three Mile Island, NY, Box 271, Legislative Files and Constituent
Correspondence, Senate Papers, 1977-1986, South Carolina Political Collections,
University of South Carolina.

261

moratorium in the aftermath of Three Mile Island, but also underscored a deeper fear that
the nation’s supremacy could be undercut by dwindling energy supplies and a more
general “crisis of confidence” that Jimmy Carter addressed in July 1979.
Still others assailed anti-nuclear activists as unthinking radicals who failed to
represent the majority of Americans or southerners alike. One South Carolinian expressed
his “firm belief” that a large pro-nuclear “silent majority” existed in the state. Floridian
Jeffery Shulman described anti-nuclear activists as “the product of leftist political
elements who appeal to sensationalism and rely on widespread ignorance.”52 Shulman
warned that “freedom has never been gained without risk,” and “without nuclear power,
we compromise our strength, independence and assertiveness.” Another letter described
activists as “unthinking anti-nuclear freaks,” while another questioned whether or not
Americans wanted to become a “second-rate nation because of a few protestors that get
all the publicity?”53 To be sure, many people felt undecided about nuclear power, and in
fact, found themselves as neither pro or anti-nuclear power, but the letters nonetheless
testify to the perception of activists as unrepresentative of the average person and bent on
reducing the nation to “second-rate” status. These views resonated with Americans
generally, but they also pointed to a strand of continuity in the southern mind, where
dissent or questioning larger systems of authority appeared heretical and hysterical.
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To counter negative portrayals of anti-nuclear forces as a fringe minority, and
perhaps to further undermine the South’s history of conservatism and exclusion, southern
anti-nuclear groups advocated for diversity within their organizations. From archival
sources and interviews, it seems that southern anti-nuclear groups aspired for greater
diversity than they ever achieved, but hope for a movement that cut across class and
racial and ethnic lines is evident. In a 1978 memo to South Carolina Senator Ernest
Hollings, a staffer warned him of the “broad base of political support” anti-nuclear
groups had garnered, describing the coalition as one comprised of “people typically
aligned with various liberal causes –folks involved in ACLU, women’s rights,
conservationists, and various community activists, as well as moderate, middle-class
types who are scared to death of anything nuclear.”54 Continuing further, the staffer
described the widely publicized anti-nuclear events in the state, which attracted highprofile musicians and reached national television:
Furthermore, a fund-raiser rock concert was held in Columbia last Friday,
starring Jackson Browne and John Sebastian. While these names may not mean
anything to you, they are top-level rock stars, and raised a great deal of money for
this effort.
The point being, Barnwell is taking on national significance. It was even
mentioned on Saturday Night Live on television, this past weekend.55

Hollings, must have remained unconvinced, because in 1980, he promised one political
supporter that “We are going do everything to keep Duke Power and nuclear power
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growing and growing.”56 If southern anti-nuclear activists seemed paranoid to some, they
were right in their suspicions that many politicians shared close alliances with utility
executives.
In their efforts to fight pro-nuclear attitudes, groups across the South sought
broader participation, expanding beyond the white, middle-class, and well-educated
activists that typically comprised anti-nuclear groups in the South and elsewhere.57 The
Oystershell Alliance, an anti-nuclear group in Louisiana, envisioned fundraisers with
“different kinds of music for different kinds of people. Black music for blacks, Cajun
music for Cajuns, c*un*try music for country folks. Poor white boy music for Po*boys.
ETC.”58 Commenting on the reluctance for locals in Barnwell, South Carolina to align
with activists protesting the Allied-General Nuclear Reprocessing facility and ChemNuclear’s low-level waste site, a contributor to the Palmetto Alliance’s newsletter wrote,
“Some of them still distrust the activists, some of them come up to the Natural Guard
members on the street, and whisper, ‘Can’t say anything in public, but I’m with you all
the way.’ ” The writer then noted the sympathetic disposition of Barnwell police officers
towards anti-nuclear activists and envisioned a day when officers would “sit down by the
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fences and in the roads with us.”59 Local residents in rural communities, police officers,
construction crews, minorities, and Third World groups represented a large and
amorphous presence for the anti-nuclear movement, and activists likely exaggerated the
diversity of the movement to combat popular stereotypes of activists as a small group of
radicals detached from reality.
Anti-nuclear organizations, in the South and presumably elsewhere, eagerly
sought information from workers within the nuclear industry, particularly those on
construction crews (which would satisfy the working class credentials). In part, this
desire to glean information from “the inside” spoke to a need for legitimacy. If activists
were limited to outsider status, their jeremiads about the dangers of nuclear power, while
provocative and potentially terrifying, lacked the authenticity of workers building the
plants and measuring radiation levels. Some scholars have argued that the commercial
nuclear industry’s credibility was damaged from dissension within the community of
nuclear experts, but this is only one reason why Americans doubted the safety of nuclear
power.60 Studying anti-nuclear groups from a local vantage point illustrates the ways in
which activists utilized the expertise of scientists and engineers, but also how they sought
the observations of less-high profile figures, such as construction workers and health
physicists.
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In other cases, activists sought employment at local power plants with the
objective of discovering information about safety violations. Activist Darryl MalekWiley, one of the chief organizers of the Catfish Alliance, was hired at a Alabama
nuclear plant and absconded with documents, an act of mischief and political protest.61
Karen Silkwood became an anti-nuclear icon not simply because her story exposed
unsafe practices within the industry. The blue collar revival in American culture helped
transform her into a working class hero, although not in the same vein as Archie
Bunker.62 Enlisting working class insiders was an important maneuver for a movement
that attracted the upwardly mobile, the college educated, and the ecologically sensitive.
And in the eyes of activists, the problems surrounding the nuclear industry were matters
of life and death that affected everyone, even if the problems disproportionately impacted
some communities more than others.
In building their nuclear controversies, activists interviewed “whistle-blowers”
who generally focused on construction-related issues such as improper welding and
radiation monitoring for currently operating sites. Stories of whistle-blowers found their
way into newspapers across the US during the 1970s and 1980s—scandalous exposés of
lax standards, drug use among workers, and shoddy construction were not a southern
phenomenon but frequently appeared in local papers (and were encouraged by antinuclear groups). One alleged employee on the construction crew at Shearon Harris
reported that workers widely abused “downers” and “even the supervisors were drunk” in
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a feature with the ominous headline “A Disaster Waiting to Happen.”63 Finding whistleblowers and portraying the movement as diverse served as vital strategies both in terms
of countering their critics but also fit within a larger cultural fetishism of the workingclass and attack of the so-called “nuclear priesthood” that activists accused of shrouding
industry misdeeds in secrecy and using their expertise as a cudgel over lay people.64
The South’s anti-nuclear rebellion reached small towns in Mississippi, flourished
in well-heeled places like Chapel Hill, and meandered its way into the hills of western
North Carolina. To some extent, the expansive nature demonstrated how far-reaching the
region’s embrace of nuclear industry had become—as activists warned, there was “no
where [sic] to hide.” No place appeared too remote for the nuclear industry’s reach.
Capturing the many themes shaping the mind of the nuclear South, the small community
of Beaverdam, North Carolina sprung to life after plans for storing nuclear waste
threatened their township and their mountain-homes.
In 1986, the same year as the disaster at Chernoybl, the Department of Energy
investigated the feasibility of housing a high-level nuclear waste site, one that would
store spent fuel rods and military wastes, in western North Carolina, near the township of
Beaverdam. In one report the DOE’s plans included: “condemning up to 20,000 acres of
surface area, constructing a 400 acre facility, building 200 miles of tunnels, 1500-3000
feet below the surface, burying 77,000 metric tons of spent fuel rods and military wastes
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and then isolating this area for the next 10,000 years.”65 This “prospecting” mission by
the DOE galvanized the community to organize an opposition movement, which resulted
in the formation of the group “Beaverdam Against Nuclear Dumping,” or BAND, with
meetings held at several local churches.66 In a speech by Rev. Kyles Wallace of
Beaverdam Methodist Church, an “expert” on his own turf, holding a Masters in
Theology from Duke and a Doctorate from Emory, he pointedly questioned the
infallibility of the DOE’s methods and their knowledge of the area, while also
underscoring theological reasons for the community’s opposition.
Perhaps in response to the growing anti-environmental, anti-regulatory rhetoric of
the 1980s by the New Right, Wallace opens his speech, with the assurance that the people
of Beaverdam “are for a great deal more than we are against,” and continued to “let the
record show” that the township was for the lives of those living now and in the future, the
responsible use of the earth’s resources, for “those places where we gather to worship
freely the God who gave us this earth and entrusted us with it,” and for the “tracts of land
which contain the remains of our families and loved ones.” Continuing, Wallace warned
that the township would “stand toe to toe if need be” in opposition to DOE policy for
siting high-level nuclear waste. Citing the DOE’s own study, Wallace noted the seismic
risk in the area, along with the potential for contamination of shallow groundwater, and
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the proximity to Asheville, North Carolina. Moreover, Wallace vocalized the
community’s concerns about how a high-level waste repository would damage the area’s
agricultural sector, in addition to harming any mountain-related tourism and recreation.
Going further, Wallace pierced the gospel of growth, noting that any jobs created by the
waste facility would be “short-level” and urged the DOE to consider the “potential
consequences for now and our future lives in the name of a high-salary for a short
duration.” Wallace lamented the short period of time the “lay people” of Beaverdam had
to prove “scientifically what we already believe emotionally.”67
Concluding his speech, Wallace again pointed to the earth as God’s creation, and
reminded his audience of their responsibility in protecting the “water, soil, plants, animal
life, and human beings,” and the value and irreplaceable nature of each. Wallace mused,
“what is the price of a person’s life or a family heritage in Beaverdam township?” and
then declared “You cannot buy people’s lives off, we consider Beaverdam township
justifiably worth keeping…On the basis of scientific data, civil outcry, and rational,
intelligent protest, we in Beaverdam township will persist, endure and stay put…so help
us God.”68 As seen in other nuclear controversies, Wallace’s speech depicted a system of
gross inequity, where certain communities paid an unspeakable price for the nation’s
commitment to nuclear power and weapons (in this case, high-level radioactive waste
from the military). For Wallace and those involved in BAND, no “price” could substitute
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for the preservation of the area’s heritage and its people; they rejected the trade-off model
that government officials and corporations readily espouse. The calls for persistence and
endurance, as well as the warning that the DOE could not “buy people’s lives off,”
challenged the authority of the federal government and its experts, in addition to
demonstrating how the rural community perceived these incursions. The South’s
Bulldozer Revolution, rather than steamrolling public opinion into acquiescence, often
encouraged unexpected opposition. While many in Barnwell, South Carolina clamored
for Chem-Nuclear’s low-level waste site, residents living in the mountains of western
North Carolina recognized the value in their environment for several reasons. Among
them, angry citizens foresaw the negative effects, whether because of actual
contamination or imagined dangers, of radioactive material in the caverns of the
Appalachian mountains.
At stake then, as Rev. Wallace carefully outlined, were the lives of Beaverdam
residents but also a sense of place, one threatened by a powerful government agency with
experts, an agenda, and little knowledge of why this place mattered to the people that
lived there. If the anti-nuclear movement was given, on occasion, to exaggerated
apocalyptic imaginings, this way of thinking coincided with a tempered, yet forceful
commentary on a changing, Progress-haunted region, one that W.J. Cash indicted for its
inability to question and its ever-fixedness. The buildings and the landscapes changed,
but Cash saw an immutability in southern thinking—in the southern mind—that left little
room for hope. Anti-nuclear activists challenged an older southern “mind” and embraced
the model of regional self-scrutiny.
Conclusion
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The mind of the nuclear South is fragmented, torn between impulses of rebellion,
preservation, and New South scheming. Walker Percy’s short story, “Young Nuclear
Physicist,” originally written in 1937, captures the contradictory impulses of the nuclear
South. The protagonist, Ralph, hails from Arkansas, but studies nuclear physics in New
York. Ralph worships at the altar of pure science and believes that nuclear physics offers
an escape from his past, his heritage, and his region. It is only at the end of the story
when Ralph realizes, in order to impress a young bohemian woman, that “pure science”
endears him to no one, and performing a series of folk-songs from Arkansas will give
him the cultural legitimacy he sorely needs. The songs of “sourwood trees and the
stillness of the mountains” represent his past, which despite his best efforts, he can never
abandon.69
Few other southern writers in the mid-twentieth century explored the possibilities
of nuclear physics or atomic energy at length; the writers of the Southern Renaissance
gave halting, attenuated renderings of a world transformed by scientific discovery and
technology. In her memoir Killers of the Dream, Lillian Smith only hints at the
transformative qualities of atomic energy, Albert Einstein’s theories, and of “men in
laboratories,” who “wrapped their invisible theories” around the world, making it appear
“so small a thing” humanity could “not believe it.”70 Recounting a play performed by
children at a summer camp, Smith noted the children chose four traveling companions for
the little Prince, inspired by Antoine de Saint Exupery’s The Little Prince. “Conscience,
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Southern Tradition, Religion, and Science,” who had only one “ardent defender,” a
“quiet, withdrawn” girl. The defender of Science “asserted “we live in an age of science,”
and warned that it was “too dangerous” to leave the Prince with only conscience,
Southern Tradition, and Religion as his companions through the universe, for Science
implied a “search for the truth.”71 In the end, the question “twisting in their minds,” the
ghosts of racism and segregation in the South, prompts the children into a debate about
equality and love for all mankind, with the “young scientists” overturning Conscience’s
argument that science is only “good for making bombs and planes,” and banding together
with Religion to oust Southern Tradition and Conscience—the two forces denying the
Prince a better universe.
Similar to Smith, W.J. Cash contrasted the southern mind with a “modern mind,”
one presumably transformed by casting off tradition, and perhaps guilt, in the search for
truth. Others, like James Agee, reacted in horror to the atomic bombing of Nagasaki and
Hiroshima. In what historian Paul Boyer has described as a “five thousand word
fragment,” Agee left his atomic-bomb novel incomplete, leaving only a brief snapshot
called “Dedication Day.”72 As the title suggests, Agee depicts a dedication day for a
“uranium fused” arch in Washington D.C., built to commemorate the atomic bomb.
Underneath the arch burns an “Eternal Fuse,” powered by chemically-treated cotton,
grown by “members of a Sharecropper Rehabilitation Project in one of the richest of the
condemned areas of the Delta,” with bales of cotton furnish “alternately, by a white and a
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Negro family.”73 Even after humanity created a weapon of apocalyptic magnitude, the
bales of cotton remained segregated. Workers toiled beneath the Arch keeping the Eternal
Fuse lit. Among them, a scientist whose intellect helped create the atomic bomb,
agonized over his guilt, and after pleading to have the ceremonial honors on dedication
day, he commits suicide shortly thereafter, as a “sacrifice” for the “triumphal moment.”
Buried with military honors at Alamogordo, New Mexico, where the first successful
nuclear test, “the Trinity test,” occurred in July 1945, the atomic scientist’s body
decays—no doubt with a much shorter half-life than the radiation left behind.
Like Agee, William Faulkner’s 1950 Nobel Prize speech probed the central
question in an atomic world: “When will I be blown up?”74 Lamenting the “general and
universal physical fear,” Faulkner observed the problems of modern society were “no
longer problems of the spirit” but far simpler questions about when the end would come.
Rejecting the “basest of all fears,” and “leaving no room in his workshop for anything but
the old verities and truths of the heart,” Faulkner believed mankind would “prevail.”
Faulkner’s speech is perhaps more famous for his conclusion—an optimistic rendering of
humanity’s fate as not inevitably doomed. Faulkner’s speech, fusing the menacing with
faith in the human spirit, embodies the roots from which the mind of the nuclear South
sprung.
Atomic energy’s destructive possibilities infused southern perspectives after
World War II. The thoughts of nuclear meltdown or annihilation combined with a
growing sense of larger transformation. For over a century, the New South crusade

73

James Agee, “Dedication Day,” Politics, no. 13, April 1946, 121-125.

74

William Faulkner, Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech, 1950.
273

reconfigured the region’s environment, contributed to an exodus from rural communities,
and uprooted a sense of place. And yet, none of this occurred uncontested or in the
sweeping fashion as commonly depicted. Throughout the South, people looked at
changes afoot and asked if southerners could do better and if the bargains paid for
“Progress” were worth it after all. When writer Dennis Covington searched the hills of
northern Alabama for snake handlers, he found the hallmarks of the bland, modern South
in the form of civic centers, but he also found a countryside “littered with burned-out
house trailers, automobile graveyards, collapsed chicken farms, and those ubiquitous
totems of cultural anomie—tanning beds and late-night video stores.”75 Like Will Percy,
who bemoaned those dreaded transmission wires, or the protagonist of John Kennedy
Toole’s A Confederacy of Dunces, Ignatius J. Reilly, whose disdain for fluorescent lights
prompts him to wonder if the world “will someday get him on some ludicrous
pretext…and drag me to some air-conditioned dungeon and leave me there beneath the
fluorescent lights,” the South’s gigantic cooling towers, electrical systems, and low-brow
commercialism mutated the once rural landscape.76
These broader changes, along with the new threats nuclear things evoked, sparked
the anti-nuclear rebellion. It was a continuation of older themes, reminiscent of the
Nashville Agrarian’s manifesto against the modernity’s assault upon the region, but one
that lacked their nostalgia for pastoralism bound by white supremacy and older southern
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traditions. The South’s anti-nuclear rebels envisioned a different future, with
decentralized forms of energy and a more conscientious relationship with the
environment, and sought to preserve other aspects of heritage and tradition. Following in
James Agee’s footsteps, perhaps the South’s finest documentarian voyeur, Ross
McElwee’s documentary Sherman’s March (1986) captures the region’s anti-nuclear
spirit by way of Jackie, the filmmaker’s former paramour and activist in South Carolina.
Jackie explained her activism by citing her deep ties to the state; her roots made it
impossible for her to ignore the nuclear threat. These roots also prompted her to consider
leaving South Carolina and head westward instead: “I’m trying to get out of here and go
to California. Here…I’m compelled to say something…being of this place – out
there…real shallow roots out there – everybody lives in a yogurt cup.”77 Westerners were
no strangers to anti-nuclear activism, and California had its own share of nuclear
controversies, but for Jackie, her sense of place kept her ensnared. “Men in laboratories”
made the world “smaller and smaller,” changing our sense of perspective and
highlighting the fragility of our planet, but roots and ties to a place, despite arguments to
the contrary, did not uproot southerners entirely. “Being of this place,” as Jackie said,
implied a state of consciousness that made imagining disaster a global project but also
one of an intensely local and even regional nature. Like the “backwoods prophets” of
another era, the South’s anti-nuclear rebels preached their own sermons, issuing forth dire
warnings, while pointing towards another kind of salvation, only found by renouncing
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crass materialism, the false promises of progress, and harnessing alternative energy.78 In
this, they shaped a mind of the nuclear South—not solid—but one more able to sustain
dissent, foster inclusivity, question authority, and challenge unsavory southern traditions.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

NUCLEAR GHOSTS: RELICS OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY
AUTHORITY’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
The people fell before the word, like corn before a storm of wind,
and many rose from the dust with a divine glory shining in their countenances.1
---John McGee (1821)
Along Highway 25, near Hartsville, Tennessee, a cooling tower looms over the
pastoral landscape. Locals derisively call the giant, concrete tube a “used beer can”— a
fitting label for an object that seems discarded and conspicuously out of place.2 In 1973,
the Tennessee Valley Authority announced their plans to build the “world’s largest
nuclear plant,” a massive four reactor complex in rural Hartsville. For over six years,
construction proceeded, and crews bulldozed the home of John McGee, one of the area’s
first settlers, and then exhumed his body from his grave. In its place, a cooling tower and
partially built containment structures emerged, unsettling the land along the Cumberland
River. Despite TVA’s bold intentions, external and internal factors conspired against the
agency’s nuclear program. In 1979, TVA deferred two of Hartsville’s four reactor units,
eventually cancelling the project entirely in 1984, after spending four hundred million
1
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dollars. Of the seventeen reactors planned for the nuclear division, only six operate
today.1 Some cancelled reactors exist only as blueprints, while others are fragments
dotting the valley’s landscape—curious monuments of metal, concrete, and vegetation.
When southern writer Dennis Covington searched for snake handlers in rural Alabama,
his journey began in “a ghost town in the shadow of the twin cooling towers” at TVA’s
partially constructed, idle Bellefonte nuclear plant.2 In those shadows, where modern
technology and rural spaces meet, Covington found a primeval brand of Christianity
practiced by people revolting against contemporary society. TVA’s nuclear relics
symbolize the uneven process of “modernizing” the Tennessee Valley, and by extension,
the American South.
Like Barnwell and Grand Gulf, the history of Hartsville’s abandoned nuclear
plant is a local story. As with other rural communities affected by nuclear developments,
the arrival of a costly, high-risk energy system illustrated the divide between a rural and
urban South, where power flowed from the periphery to growing metropolitan
communities with ravenous appetites for electricity.3 Nuclear power plants, while
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promising economic benefits and increased revenue, also threatened to disrupt “the
individual’s relationship to the local.”4 Although some residents, including area native
and former Vice President Al Gore, supported the plant’s construction, others opposed it.
To some degree, common fears about radiation and catastrophic accidents provoked
opposition, but local residents also viewed the project as destructive in more subtle
ways.5 If nuclear power threatened lives, the plant also threatened a way of life, one
intimately connected to the environment and to Hartsville’s history. In their quest to
build the “world’s largest nuclear plant,” TVA planners discounted local environmental
knowledge, the area’s history, and a community’s values.
More broadly, Hartsville’s nuclear ruins intersect with a regional and an
institutional history. Harnessing and distributing affordable electricity proved central to
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the project of modernization in the American South.6 For many, modernity, progress, and
“regional salvation,” especially in the Tennessee Valley, were closely connected with
energy production, first seen with the TVA’s development of hydroelectricity, then coal,
and later atomic energy.7 From its inception in 1933, TVA embraced the principle of
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cheap, widely accessible energy as a means for economic development and improving the
quality of life for Valley residents.8 Leading the nuclear charge, the Tennessee Valley
Authority built some of the region’s earliest nuclear reactors but soon found itself
embroiled in controversy in the 1970s. TVA’s nuclear program faced serious budgetary,
management, and safety issues; it became the thorn in the institution’s side, and by the
1980s, TVA’s nuclear agenda stood tottering on the brink of extinction. Capturing this
moment of crisis, TVA executive John G. Stewart lamented, “The problem is not that
[the] TVA has made mistakes (although that, too, has happened). The problem is with the
perception that TVA as an institution is a failure…It is more serious because it calls into
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question the reasons for TVA’s very existence.”9 TVA’s approach to the Hartsville
project embodied the agency’s institutional crisis. In many ways, TVA’s practices
resembled other utility companies, but they strove to appear as something more than their
rivals—as a benevolent force in the valley. The disjuncture between TVA’s mythic image
and its practices no doubt heightened the sense of injustice from Hartsville residents,
forced to rearrange their lives for a failed project that altered the environment, erased
local history, and left residents with that giant “used beer can.”
With the passage of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act in 1933, TVA rapidly
pursued its goals of producing cheap and plentiful electricity, improving river navigation
and flood control, along with a host of other aims.10 Guided by Arthur Morgan, who
served on TVA’s original Board of Directors and espoused “physical and human
engineering,” and Franklin Roosevelt administration’s observation that the South
remained the nation’s “number one economic problem,” TVA’s identity was tightly
bound to a New Deal ethos, one that imbued the federally owned corporation with loftier
objectives. Regionalism and technocracy, both strong currents in social science in the
1920s and 1930s, characterized TVA’s early years. As historian Thomas Hughes has
observed, the era’s technocrats viewed electricity as the technological agent for regional
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transformation, and nowhere was this belief more strongly directed than at the American
South.11
TVA’s leadership differed with respect to how the agency would transform the
Valley. Arthur Morgan viewed electricity as a means “to create a new society,” where
TVA operated as a “social planner.”12 The other original board members, David
Lilienthal and Harcourt Morgan, adherents to a “Jeffersonian ideal of grass-roots of
democracy,” saw TVA’s role as vital for improving infrastructure that would
subsequently encourage “private initiative.”13 With Morgan’s resignation in 1938, the
agency directed its attention towards power production and resource development rather
than social engineering.14 Even as TVA planners forced Valley residents from their
homes, many supported TVA in the 1930s because the agency offered potential
employment and promised a better quality of life. Although TVA garnered criticism from
its inception, its identity in the 1930s and 1940s strongly reflected a New Deal theme:
“the heroic worker back on the job and the benefits of new technologies.”15
Writing in 1944, David Lilienthal detailed the TVA’s objectives and guiding
philosophy in his book Democracy on the March. Lilienthal underscored the agency’s
belief in technology and technocrats as instruments for regional transformation and
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democratic aims. Imbued with a moral, democratic purpose, TVA existed in a loftier
realm than ordinary power companies. “Indeed,” Lilienthal mused, “this valley even in
the brief span of twenty years, supports a conviction that when the use of technology has
a moral purpose and when its methods are thoroughly democratic, far from forcing the
surrender of individual freedom and the things of the spirit to the machine, the machine
can be made to promote those very ends.”16
Lilienthal advocated a moral technocracy, one in which TVA’s “dreamers with
shovels” would use technology as a means of sweeping societal and economic change.17
Lilienthal and TVA planners eagerly crafted a narrative where the agency stood apart
from “the smooth-talking centralizers, the managerial elite, cynical politicians, everyone
without faith in the capacities of the people.”18 These efforts to shape TVA’s public
image offered a rebuttal to contemporary critics who characterized TVA as statesponsored socialism.19 Describing the agency’s planners as “dreamers with shovels,”
however, posed a problem for TVA in subsequent decades, as it wrestled with the
grandiose ideals of a different era in a new political climate.
By the 1950s, TVA expanded its power division from primarily hydroelectric to
include nuclear power, and it purchased land throughout the Tennessee Valley for this
16
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purpose, first scouting property in Alabama in 1953. Breaking from earlier aspirations,
director Aubrey Wagner narrowed TVA’s mission to producing cheap, plentiful power.
The maneuver required a diversification in power sources, and in response, TVA first
increased its coal-fired plants. In 1950, TVA drew only 15 percent of its power from coal.
By 1960, coal plants supplied 67 percent and increased further a decade later.20 Next,
TVA ambitiously committed to nuclear power, envisioning that eventually 80-90 percent
of any new generating capacity would be nuclear powered.21 Acting on this, by 1974,
TVA’s estimated investment towards nuclear power hovered at six billion dollars, which
was, according to one study, “the largest commitment in the entire United States by a
single utility to nuclear power generation.”22 TVA hedged their bet upon estimated “firstcost” investments, which forecast that coal plants required more capital investment than
nuclear over the long term.23
TVA’s first nuclear power reactor, Brown’s Ferry, went online in August 1974 in
Limestone, Alabama. By the time the first reactor began operation, TVA’s potential
nuclear projects dotted the valley, with construction permits issued for at least twelve
more reactors during the 1970s. In order to fund this building frenzy, Congress raised
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TVA’s debt limit –from $1.75 billion before 1970 to $15 billion in 1976.24 As one
journalist described, TVA had “long treated by Congress as a child to be seen but not
heard,” asking few questions about their rapid expansion and its financial requirements.
Moreover, “projected load growth,” which forecast electricity consumption over several
decades, supported TVA’s expansion. Writing to Congress in 1975, TVA chair Aubrey
Wagner justified the agency’s commitment to building new facilities by rehashing the
connection between economic growth and affordable electricity. Wagner assured
Congress the facilities were “essential” for the “economy and creation of jobs,” and
without an increasing in borrowing authority, TVA could not “carry out its responsibility
to meet the needs for electricity in its area.”25
The gospel of growth drove TVA’s nuclear program until the bubble burst in the
1980s. As Erwin Hargrove has noted, “for most of the past half-century in the mid-South,
there was an almost religious belief in the growth of electric power as a measure of
progress, and the generating plants of the Tennessee Valley Authority were the
tabernacles of the faith.”26 The belief in the agency’s vital role in transforming the
valley’s economy reinforced its generally positive image until the late 1960s.
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Although not the first TVA project to provoke opposition, the Tellico Dam
controversy signaled a marked shift in the relationship between TVA, valley residents,
and the public. Critics argued the project made little economic sense, displaced a
community, and threatened one of the last “wild” rivers, the Little Tennessee River.
Southerners, historically less vocal about environmental protection than their western
peers, joined the growing number of Americans who found pollution and reckless
development alarming.27 The controversy also spoke to other anxieties about the “bland,”
modern South, where southerners felt disconnected from nature and from a sense of
place, seen most vividly in James Dickey’s novel Deliverance, where four men,
attempting to escape the complacency and boredom that characterize their lives, canoe
down a wild river before it is dammed and new lakeside properties are parceled into timeshares.28 In part, the Little Tennessee River embodied a disappearing southern landscape.
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While the Tellico Dam drew ire from area residents, the discovery of the snail
darter, an endangered species of fish found in the Little Tennessee River, transformed it
into a national debate over the environmental impact of dams.29 Some dismissed the fight
over the tiny snail darter’s habitat as the absurd logic of extreme environmentalists given
to blocking any and all development. But as Marc Reisner has argued, with or without the
snail darter, one could still characterize Tellico as “a bad project proposed by a
dinosaurian bureaucracy; a needless destruction of one of the last wild rivers in the East;
usurpation of a quiet valley; and a cynical Congress sneaking around one of its own
laws.”30 Even though TVA prevailed through Senators Howard Baker and James
Duncan’s machinations, the Tellico controversy put the organization on notice. No longer
could TVA expect to have its projects rubber-stamped by Congress, subvert
environmental law, steam-roll communities under the guise of “progress, jobs, and
modernity” and avoid public scrutiny. The Tellico Dam controversy portended future
conflicts, as valley residents found themselves questioning TVA’s haphazard nuclear
program.
In the late 1960s, TVA began scouting land for a future nuclear plant in middle
Tennessee, eventually acquiring land in Trousdale County and Smith County for the
Hartsville nuclear project. TVA planned a four reactor plant, making the plant the
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“world’s largest,” as at least one billboard in town advertised.31 Because building a
nuclear power plant is neither simple nor fast, communities with nuclear projects could
count on potential job growth during construction, tax payments during its operation, and
additional revenue for rural areas with limited funds. Initial studies conducted by TVA
indicated that 65 percent of Hartsville residents were in favor of the plant, while 25
percent opposed the plant, and another 10 percent were undecided. 32 The study showed
cautious support, but even a minority of opposition could slow the licensing process
down, one that TVA planners ignored. Despite the Tellico showdown, TVA’s history
suggested that squelching even fierce opponents simply required a capable legal team and
powerful political allies.
TVA, however, encountered numerous obstacles in the licensing process. TVA
management failed to adjust to a new regulatory landscape, one that more closely
considered environmental impacts and allowed public input.33 Even in the 1970s,
licensing a nuclear reactor required detailed consideration of environmental,
socioeconomic, technical, and safety issues. Almost immediately, TVA confronted
resistance for the Hartsville nuclear site. During the licensing process, no less than nine
attorneys representing 59 individuals intervened. It was the TVA’s most intense licensing
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struggle yet, foreshadowing a troubled future for their nuclear program.34 Among the
complaints levied, a petition submitted on behalf of the state of Tennessee, suggested that
TVA had overestimated future needs for electricity and appeared financially unqualified
to build multiple reactors simultaneously.35 Governor Winfield Dunn’s administration
demanded sounder justification for building so many nuclear reactors, and questioned the
wisdom of relying upon forecasts that predicted future energy consumption. If those
forecasts or cost estimates were wrong, ratepayers might suffer exorbitant rate increases.
Their chief objections proved prescient, as TVA conceded a decade later.
The most sustained and meaningful resistance came from the Hartsville
community, and like state officials, residents opposed to the project or to aspects of the
plant’s siting wasted little time expressing their concerns. Even in TVA’s golden years,
when its mission seemed firmly connected to the New Deal’s higher purpose, the removal
of valley communities for dams, reservoirs, and recreational areas aroused hostility
between agency planners and local people.36 Dams permanently alter the landscape with
their construction; flooding the land irrevocably wipes away the homes, habitats, and
34
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history of a place. The construction of nuclear plants is less imposing but does require
large tracts of land. In Hartsville’s case, the nearly two thousand acres contained valuable
farmland, forests, 19th century homes, and several graves. For some residents, TVA’s
assessment of property values, historic sites, and environmental impact largely served as
a self-serving charade. As an institution, TVA acted very much like an ordinary utility
company, employing a hard-nosed legal team to achieve its objectives and overrule
community objections. Despite this, TVA’s leadership, and even its employees, remained
attached to an image of TVA as a force for public good.
Pasture and farmland dominated the Hartsville site, with woodland areas
interspersed, possibly home to “a myriad of songbirds, reptiles, and small mammals.”37 In
the adjacent Cumberland River, many fish species thrived, ranging from walleye to
catfish. According to Hartsville resident, Tom P. Thompson Jr., ducks and geese
regularly flocked to the area, and hunters frequented the site.38 While not pristine
wilderness, TVA had poached viable farmland, woodlands, and riverside areas, which
local families had used for centuries prior.
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The nearly two thousand-acre acquisition yielded, among other things, several
homes dating to the early nineteenth century. TVA’s purchase included land once settled
by John McGee (1763-1836), one of the state’s earliest Methodist ministers. McGee
traveled from North Carolina to Tennessee, leading revivals along the way, impressing
congregations with his “unreined emotionalism” that led to parishioners to believe “God
himself was at work.”39 Settling near present day Hartsville, John McGee built a home
along the Cumberland River, perhaps sometime after 1816. Until his death on June 16,
1836, McGee lived in this home and was buried on the same property. For over two
hundred years, McGee’s home and grave remained relatively undisturbed, surviving the
American Civil War and the wiles of modernity. By TVA’s own admission, the house
remained in “good condition, although substantially altered since its construction.”40As a
piece of local and state history, the property represented something distinctive about
Hartsville in an era of eroding distinctions and disappearing rural communities.41
During the licensing process, TVA assessed John McGee’s significance, along
with his home, and proved at odds with those who saw the home as worthy of
preservation despite the changes to its architecture. Enlisting the help of an architectural
historian, TVA concluded that based upon Dr. James Patrick’s study and “their own
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investigations” McGee’s home was a “fine example of a brick farm house of its period,
but architecturally… not unique,” and argued that the “historical relationship of this site
is only associated with the activities of John McGee.”42 TVA ruled that because the home
possessed no unique architectural qualities, and had no direct relationship to John
McGee’s religious activists, which were ironically – immaterial – as his role in the
religious revival movement came through itinerant preaching, that the house could be
demolished.43 The agency promptly bulldozed McGee’s home and then exhumed his
body.
TVA’s plans for McGee’s new grave including adding a historical marker at a
“suitable site” for “appropriate recognition.”44 For several decades prior, TVA exhumed
the bodies of countless individuals for their projects. When exhumation was deemed
unnecessary, TVA catalogued the graves on purchased land, producing a vast record of
gravesites across the valley—over thirty thousand bodies approximately.45 By
comparison to earlier projects, TVA’s nuclear sites intersected with very few burial sites.
According to TVA’s records, only Brown’s Ferry (10 graves) and Hartsville (4)
contained burial sites. Nonetheless, if TVA’s projects intruded upon people’s lives and
their livelihoods, they also intruded into their afterlives, and McGee was no exception. In
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1976, TVA moved McGee’s body to the Hartsville Methodist cemetery and four others to
nearby Dixon Springs.
Among those dissenting, the State of Tennessee’s Office of Urban and Federal
Affairs and local attorney Tom P. Thompson each wrote letters to TVA in 1975, urging
the agency to reconsider John McGee as historically significant enough to warrant the
home’s preservation.46 In response, TVA defended their choices, concluding that
McGee’s influence in the state’s Methodist history occurred years before the home was
built, and the building had no relationship to his role in history. In their approach, TVA
differed little from other government agencies or private companies pursuing
construction permits. Arguably the difference lies in TVA’s desire to reinforce the image
that the agency was something more, and strove to develop strong relationships with the
people in the valley, value their history and play a pivotal role in it. Eminent domain laws
gave TVA an unusual degree of power; and coupled with their appeals to progress,
economic development, and modernity, the agency could freely take land, demolish
buildings they ruled insignificant, and exhume bodies whose location interfered with their
designs. The “dreamers with shovels,” once bearers of light, transformed into plunderer,
fundamentally altering the valley’s landscape and erasing remnants of the area’s history.
The Hartsville plant threatened more than local history; it also threatened a way of life.
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Writing in 1975, local lawyer Tom P. Thompson Jr. expressed concern about
TVA’s draft environmental statement, listing forty-seven different points of contention.
Thompson’s extensive engagement with TVA’s environmental assessment, cost-benefit
analysis, and alleged distortion of property values reveals a deep suspicion of the agency
and the licensing process generally. Through its dismissal of local, lay knowledge, TVA
widened the chasm between the agency and the Hartsville community.47 Thompson’s
correspondence also illustrates the porous nature of property lines in the Hartsville
community versus TVA’s approach to land as inventory. To be sure, Thompson
represented the landowners forced to sell their land for the Hartsville plant, and his
appeals reflected his professional interests as well. But Thompson, an area native, who
lives on a farm in Hartsville to this day, gave an impassioned plea that far exceeded the
bounds of legal wrangling and demonstrated his close connection to the community.48
Throughout Thompson’s correspondence, he underlined how construction of the
plant threatened, beyond the life and limb of residents, a particular way of life , one
bound to local traditions for men in the community. His letters shed light upon the
complexities of TVA’s relationship with Hartsville residents, and how the agency
approached purchasing land and assessing environmental impact. According to
47
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Thompson, the 1,940 acres TVA set to purchase had long hosted local hunters, and he
implored the agency to include this aspect of Hartsville life in their cost-benefit analysis:
“Quantify the loss of hunting land (as recreational costs). The wooded areas have long
been hunted for squirrel and the pastures for rabbits and birds. The river areas have been
used to hunt ducks by the local residents.”49 Thompson questioned TVA’s knowledge of
waterfowl habits, pointing out that construction would significantly alter the patterns of
ducks and geese in the area, further underscoring his point that the land was “one of the
best duck hunting and goose hunting areas in the county.”50 For Thompson, despite
TVA’s vast resources, they failed to understand how waterfowl behaved and what value
such spaces held for the area’s residents. In response to Thompson’s concerns, TVA
conceded that the area may have been “one of the best duck hunting sections in the
county,” but emphasized that goose hunting was illegal in the area, another reminder that
the agency’s way of “seeing” conflicted with local practices.51 Duck hunting and duck
hunting clubs have long been part of southern culture and a rite of passage for young men
in the South. Of the many things at stake then was arguably southern manhood – one that
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had a direct connection to soil, to blood, and to the Cumberland River.52 Nuclear power
represented something precise, sterile, and opposed to local practices, knowledge, and
values, and TVA stood in stark contrast to the lingering vestiges of rural and southern
life.
TVA’s arrival meant a new way of life, one with enforced boundaries. As
Thompson’s description of local hunting practices indicates, property lines often bled into
one another, particularly for collective activities such as hunting. For some, the Hartsville
project spelled more substantive changes to local practices and local ways of being. For
Linda Gentry, “born and raised in Macon county,” directly north of the nuclear plant,
TVA’s incursions threatened the “blessings” of a rural existence:
At night, you still sit outside and listen to the whipporwill [sic] call. You can still see
owls and chase ‘possums, rabbits, and raccoons. Maybe the area behind your house or
across the road is a meadow with wildflowers…Your children can still wander over the
hill and explore for themselves…Many doors are left unlocked in the country…This is a
fast-dying tradition. As urban sprawl hit Macon County, so will the prospect of a locked
up experience.53

As she states elsewhere, the well-known risks associated with nuclear power, while
relevant, only represented one component to her opposition. Large-scale, high-risk
technological systems reordered environments and rural practices. Local wildlife and
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rural people faced a “locked up experience;” one that restricted movement, curiosity, and
potentially altered their very being.
At nearly every turn, TVA approached Hartsville like other utility companies:
relying upon cost-benefit analysis, marshaling forth expertise, and exploiting legal
loopholes. The emotional ties the community held with certain areas or homes, along
with their anxiety surrounding the changes the Hartsville site would bring, carried little
weight in the face of a sprawling organization with a powerful legal team. Borne out of
New Deal idealism, TVA’s leaders struggled to rectify their actions with their roots. In
TVA’s dealings with rural communities, the agency appeared like a wolf in sheep’s
clothing, bringing promises and then betraying the trust of local people.
As the licensing process for Hartsville continued, debates ensued over property
values and adequate compensation for landowners. Beyond the question of economics
and legality, these concerns took on new meaning in the context of a rural community
with different values. TVA’s cost-benefit analysis lacked the capacity to factor in the
largely intangible consequences of eminent domain practices. Writing to TVA chairman
Aubrey Wagner in February 1975, Tom Thompson, the Hartsville native and legal
counsel for the landowners, detailed the sense of loss, both financial and emotional:
the land that you are taking is the best farming area of our county…It is with great
difficulty that these men are having to accept the fact that they are losing their
ability to earn a living from agriculture in this county.54
Continuing on, Thompson underscored the feelings of injustice, stating “…if you [TVA]
had come into this area and paid the farmers what this land was worth then 70% of your
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opposition would have fallen to the wayside.”55 If the condemnation of the land was
inevitable due to the sweeping powers allotted to state and federal government through
eminent domain laws and definitions of “public good,” Thompson’s clients hoped for a
fair price, one that reflected more than their loss of land and homes but also their
livelihood. Thompson noted the disparity between TVA offering farmers “pitifully low
prices for his land while…they have no qualms about paying a large industry to wit.”56
Ed Gregory, a farmer who owned 200 acres on the future Hartsville site, complained
about TVA’s appraisal of land value, noting that while the agency quoted $840 per acre,
he deemed the land more valuable, “at least $1500 per acre,” in part because the land
included his brick home which Gregory considered “to be of great value.”57 Others
echoed these sentiments but also underlined, again, the precarious nature of southern
manhood with its ties to land ownership and the ability to cultivate it: “2100 acres of the
best crop and grassland of the county will be taken out of production. Some of this land
has been in the same family for many years. Neither gold nor silver would purchase this

55

(1-2) Letter from Tom P. Thompson Jr. to Aubrey Wagner, February 28, 1975, Final
Environmental Statement Related to Construction of Hartsville Nuclear Plants of the
Tennessee Valley Authority Vol 2, 1-2.

56

Letter to Asst. Gen Counsel, David Power, TVA from Tom P. Thompson, Jr. of
Thompson & Thompson Law Offices, Hartsville TN Feb. 3, 1975, Final Environmental
Statement Related to Construction of Hartsville Nuclear Plants of the Tennessee Valley
Authority Vol 2.

57

“TVA Begins Land Acquisition at Dixon Springs Nuclear Site,” Macon County Times,
Februrary 14, 1974, in Betty C. Meadows Scott, A Newspaper and Magazine Account of
the Hartsville Nuclear Plant and Louisiana Energy Systems (Ridge Runner Publications,
2007). Scott, an area local, collected newspaper and magazine articles for a Daughters of
the American revolution project and self-published the collection. All newspaper articles
cited from Macon County Times, Hartsville Vidette, and The Tennessean are found in this
collection, located in a few libraries in Middle Tennessee.

299

land…A man’s home is his castle that is valued greater than diamonds and pearls.”58 In
1975, the twenty-four landowners settled with TVA, and the agency paid a total of
$1,425,900 dollars.59 Today, the land’s value has risen to over two million dollars, even
after TVA sold a small parcel, while one portion of the land has no reported value.60
Again, at odds with the realities on the ground was TVA’s cost-benefit analysis,
which critics charged inflated Hartsville’s benefits, while diminishing the project’s
drawbacks for the Hartsville plant. TVA argued that “electric power was a tool for
economic development,” one that “has helped ease the burdens of drudgery; provided
more jobs and more productive employment; brought the amenities of life to an ever
increasing number of people.”61 In its cost-benefit analysis, the agency described the
plant as a lever for economic growth and a source of “increased payments to local
governments,” but Tom Thompson alleged the payments were barely more than property
taxes.62 One could reasonably predict that cheap electricity might encourage economic
growth, but electricity is not necessarily a “local” resource. TVA acknowledged their
plan to sell excess electricity via transmission corridors, which connected to other utility
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companies. Moreover, even if the plant created jobs, local economic benefits would be
tempered by its proximity to the Nashville metropolitan area, only forty-five miles away.
Finally, TVA’s environmental assessment largely overlooks the consequences of
major accidents, giving the reader or local residents little, if any, indication of how a
serious mishap could impact the surrounding area. Nearly every reactor in the region
received its construction permit before Three Mile Island, and the nuclear industry
tightened safety measures following TMI in 1979. Thus, the major gaps in environmental
statements indicate, to some extent, the more cavalier attitude toward nuclear technology
so prevalent before 1979.
Tom Thompson urged TVA to reconsider how they measured the effects of
serious accidents. Noting that nuclear power necessitated rural or less populated
locations, Thompson argued that TVA valued the lives of rural populations less than
others, and that this value judgment should be stated explicitly. In its response to
Thompson, TVA surmised that “because of the low probability of the occurrence of these
accidents…no significant hazard to the persons residing in the vicinity of the Hartsville
Nuclear Plant exists.”63 If socioeconomic cost and benefits of nuclear power could be
measured, as the EIS attempted to do, then not measuring the human cost also challenged
TVA’s image as a benevolent force in the rural South.64 TVA could uproot bodies buried
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for over two hundred years, but the agency avoided articulating what would happen to the
bodies of the living if an accident occurred.
In tandem, TVA dismissed Thompson’s concerns about an adequate flood plan,
by defining major floods as “an extremely rare occurrence.” While acknowledging that at
least twenty-percent of the site sat below flood level, TVA believed it could shut the plant
down in case of a major flood. In March 1975, a month after Thompson’s correspondence
occurred, Nashville and the surrounding areas experienced a major flood, as the
Cumberland River swelled to over 47 feet, over seven feet above flood stage, causing
extensive damage. This environmental reality underlined the depth of local knowledge
and the extent to which TVA’s risk analysis faced shortcomings. The “bureaucratic
logic” of TVA’s analysis, to borrow James Scott’s phrase, impeded more thorough
assessments of the area’s climate and susceptibility to flood.65 Today, FEMA flood maps
highlight a portion of the site in the flood zone.66 Adding further credence to Thompson’s
concerns decades earlier, in 2010, the Nashville area and surrounding counties, including
Hartsville, experienced a 1000 year flood, which according to NOAA has a .01% chance
of occurring in any given year.67 To be sure, TVA’s plans including locating the reactors
at an elevation of 520 feet, over fifty feet above estimated hundred-year flood levels.68
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Flooding remains a serious concern for nuclear sites, and in 2011, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission issued forth new recommendations regarding flood risk and dam failures.69
The plant’s construction also prompted organized resistance, spearheaded by
William and Faith Young, whose historic home and farm were located across from the
Hartsville site. To fight the plant, the Youngs formally intervened in the licensing process
and organized an anti-nuclear group: Concerned Citizens of Tennessee. Built in the late
1780s, their home, “Dixona,” was named after the original owner – Tilman Dixon. The
“long famed stopping place” had hosted a number of visitors, including Louis Phillippe,
Duke of Orleans and later King of France in 1797.70 The Hartsville plant, with its four
imposing cooling towers planned, threatened as Faith Young pointedly argued, “the
beauty and integrity of the historic, rural vicinity, a treasure for future generations, so
long preserved with care and pride,” and concluded that TVA’s plans were the “ultimate
act of insensitivity and hostility to man, his surrounding, and his physical, aesthetic, and
emotional needs.”71 Although TVA planners gestured towards a consideration of noneconomic and non-energy related needs in their cost-analysis, visiting the area today
raises questions about why the agency found the site suitable for the “world’s largest
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nuclear plant.” TVA’s approach to siting appears wildly out of sync with shifting cultural
and environmental values in the 1960s and 1970s.
William and Faith Young’s first legal challenge to the Hartsville project
contended that the Hartsville site was not located on the Tennessee River or any of its
tributaries, violating the original intention of the TVA Act in 1933.72 In 1977, one year
after construction began, a court ruled in favor of TVA, a decision that no doubt made
many further question the agency’s motives and potential misuse of federal power.
The second legal challenge initiated by the couple concerned an endangered
species residing in Cumberland River’s warm waters: the Lampsilis orbiculata, or the
pink mucket mussel.73 Classified as an endangered species in 1976, the pink mucket is
one of many freshwater mussels in the Tennessee Valley threatened or eradicated by
human activity, particularly dams and man-made reservoirs, which flood mussel
habitats.74 TVA’s projects significantly contributed to the decline in riverine mussel
populations. For hundreds of years, humans harvested mussels for their pearls and shells,
which decreased local populations, but the rivers remained wild, allowing mussel beds to
grow again. Only when large-scale human intervention occurred did the freshwater
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mussel population in the valley plummet.75 According to Donald Edward Davis, the
“TVA system of reservoirs collectively destroyed hundreds of miles of important mussel
waters,”76 In many ways, mussels are a more apt symbol for the vast ecological changes
produced by TVA’s manipulation of the valley’s environment than the snail darter, but
the Hartsville case offered less clear cut evidence that the nuclear plant’s thermal
discharge would irrevocably harm local mussel species.77
While neither legal intervention proved successful, they demonstrate how antinuclear and environmental activists used the new regulatory landscape to, at the very
least, slow the licensing process down and highlight neglected environmental impacts.
Moreover, these lawsuits underscored the vulnerability of TVA and the nuclear industry
generally. The industry needed some semblance of public transparency to successfully
site plants anywhere—a necessary public relations measure to assure anxious residents.
These openings in the licensing procedure for public involvement created headaches for
power companies because nuclear power generated more interest than many other riskladen industries.
Legal interventions, while vital to opposing nuclear plants, comprised only one
part of a larger anti-nuclear playbook. In Hartsville, Faith and William Young
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spearheaded public protests against the Hartsville plant with their organization Concerned
Citizens of Tennessee (CCT). Although some applauded their efforts, local plant
supporters, who looked forward to employment opportunities and increased local
funding, drew connections between anti-nuclear activities and other sources of
polarization. Even sleepy, rural enclaves in the South proved vulnerable to the
aftershocks of the 1960s and 1970s, where Watergate, Vietnam, the civil rights
movement, and the myriad of other changes seeped into unexpected places. Leading the
anti-nuclear charge, Faith Young helped organize a local collection of books and
pamphlets on nuclear power and gathered signatures for a nuclear moratorium in 1974.78
The opposition to Hartsville had a strong, local base, but it also attracted protestors from
Nashville, the Farm in Summertown – a left-leaning commune, and from anti-nuclear
groups in surrounding states.79 After Three Mile Island in 1979, public demonstrations
occurred in Hartsville, with CCT holding “truth days” outside the site.80
Early on, William and Faith Young grounded their opposition in terms of truth,
credibility, and fraud. Their appeals covered many issues, but trust and “truth” remained
central, and rural communities, from their perspective, lacked the means to uncover the
truth or challenge claims from experts or industry figures. In 1975, Faith Young
denounced a public opinion survey conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory, which

78

“Nuclear Moratorium Signers Near 5,000 Mark,” Macon County Times, July 10, 1974;
“Books, Papers Available on Nuclear Hazards,” The Hartsville Vidette, April 11, 1974.

79

Martha Highers, “Urge Shutdown of Hartsville Facility, N-Plant Demonstrators
‘Orderly,’” The Tennessean, June 4, 1979.

80

“Anti-nuclear demonstration Set Sunday, August 5th at Plant,” Hartsville Vidette, July
19, 1979.

306

showed most residents in favor of the plant, calling the survey a “ ‘fraud on the people’
and a coercion and intimidation of a politically unsophisticated populace.”81 Two years
later, Young again concluded, “isn’t it a shame to have the wool pulled over the eyes of
us poor, uneducated, rural, old people living near a nuclear plant?”82 Faith Young was
neither poor nor uneducated; she attended the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
and lived in New York and France before moving to the area. Faith Young’s values and
experiences marked her as an “outsider,” even when she considered herself to be a
“local” too. Like many area residents though, Faith and William Young lived on a
working farm, albeit one with an exceptional historic home. In response to their
antinuclear activism, one Hartsville resident complained: “This is the same crowd that
was against the war in Vietnam. We were for the war in Vietnam; we wanted to win it.”83
The issues surrounding nuclear power blurred with other polarizing events,
especially the war in Vietnam; protestors’ concerns appeared unpatriotic or anti-progress.
One resident found the media’s attention to anti-nuclear activists had obscured a
supportive majority, likening the situation to Vietnam: “You remember the Vietnam war
and other wars…there were only a few that made the headlines in the news media while
the 99 percent were true American citizens who fought the wars and carried the flag.”84
In response to critics, William Young, Jr., legitimated his anti-nuclear stance with his
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military service, “I’ve been under fire before but never in as much danger or as real
danger as from this proposed nuclear plant.”85 Others, such as Mrs. Andrew Welch,
found her opposition to the plant placed her in the unpatriotic category of locals, to which
she responded:
I was unaware that objecting to a government agency’s attempt to take land, that
is not for sale at any price, with a non-negotiable bid of less than current market
value is unpatriotic. I was unaware that asking for proof of the need for a $2.5
billion expenditure to supply power in this area is unpatriotic. I was unaware that
wishing to maintain our rural community rather than converting to an
industrialized area is unpatriotic. I was unaware that question the safety of nuclear
power is unpatriotic.86
Opposition and support for nuclear power, at least in the US, was not a strictly
partisan issue, and this likely stems from the very clear catastrophic threat people feared,
along with the rising anxiety about health effects from radiation exposure.87 Moreover,
nuclear power generally increased utility rates, which made it less appealing, particularly
as the American economy tanked in the 1970s. In Hartsville, support for the plant came,
disproportionately, from the local business community, elected officials, and those who
believed economic development outweighed the downsides. Writing in 1975, state
representative Hugh Dixon, disapproved of TVA’s hunger for land and their propensity
for under-valuing that land, but expressed a dim view of those opposed to the plant,
arguing that, “most environmentalists are people who have never worked for a living.
They have had everything given to them all their lives and have no experience at
85
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anything,” a common if unfair representation.88 Dixon’s assault overly generalized what
was often a diverse group of people, but his words reveal the ways “work” became a
coded term that differentiated many activists with the laborers on site and local farmers.89
The debate about Hartsville also demonstrates how environmental and technological
issues intersected with the era’s other polarizing events, and to some, environmental and
anti-nuclear organizations appeared anti-progress, anti-jobs, and anti-American.
Despite the opposition, construction began in April 1976—later than anticipated
and only with a limited work authorization initially. 90 For five years, construction at the
“future home of the world’s largest nuclear facility” continued, even as TVA continually
revised the site’s anticipated completion date. Early in the construction stage, TVA
betrayed the touted benefits promised to the Hartsville community through its hiring
practices, straining an already unsteady relationship between TVA and local people.
Residents in Hartsville and the surrounding rural counties anticipated that in exchange for
their land and their dutiful tolerance of the risks associated with nuclear power, they
would find steady work for at least a decade. To some, TVA had a greater moral
obligation, unlike other utilities, to train locals and to raise the standard of living by direct
benefits: i.e. jobs. This problem first appeared after construction began in 1976, when
TVA began its hiring process. TVA assured residents that the Hartsville project “would
not be a closed shop,” primarily because union membership posed a hurdle for
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economically disadvantaged residents.91 As the project proceeded, the very definition of
“local” came under scrutiny, with the agency and residents in the five-county area (those
immediately adjacent or containing the plant) defined “local” in very different ways. For
TVA, “local” workers included anyone from a sixteen county area, a broad and expansive
definition, whereas residents living near the plant defined “local” as those in Trousdale,
Smith, Macon, Sumner, and Wilson county.92 TVA vacillated on the question of union
labor, promising to consider non-union workers, while also assuring the Tennessee
Trades & Labor Council preference to union workers.93 The labor issue reflected larger
changes in the American economy in the 1970s, where manual labor jobs operated in a
boom, bust cycle that gave the working class little stability.94 Moreover, TVA’s
equivocation on labor matters reflected a general inconsistency with the agency’s
promises and their actual practices.
TVA’s early difficulties with the Hartsville project were symptomatic of larger
problems. The agency’s aggressive, foolhardy strategy towards building power facilities,
coupled with internal dysfunction, inflation, and tightening regulations, created a
cataclysmic situation. By the late 1970s, construction costs soared, demand for power
dropped, and in a post-Three Mile Island world, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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reevaluated standards for ensuring plant safety. Although utilities across the nation faced
similar circumstances, TVA’s sites were perhaps the most beleaguered in terms of safety
issues, which slowed construction and allowed costs to soar upward.
When construction began in 1976, TVA moved the goal operation date for
Hartsville to 1983-1984.95 By May 1979, TVA’s Board voted to defer four units in the
nuclear program: two at Hartsville (B-1: 17% complete, B2: 7%), one at Yellow Creek
(MS), and another at Phipps Bend (TN).96 The estimated date of operation for
Hartsville’s other two reactors, by 1980, extended into 1987-1989. In light of the
deferrals, TVA board member S. David Freeman attempted to assure the public that the
agency would not turn their “backs on investments of billions,” even as the forecast for
nuclear power darkened.97
In subsequent years, between the initial decision to defer two units at Hartsville in
1979 and to defer all units in 1982, TVA’s board and high-ranking employees wrestled
with the decision to defer or cancel the units at Hartsville, Yellow Creek, and Phipps
Bend. Initially TVA cited a decline in energy demands and construction costs as the
primary reasons for deferral.98 At stake, beyond TVA’s reputation, was the considerable
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investment, hovering around two billion dollars, in unfinished nuclear projects.
Responding escalating crisis, director Robert “Bob” Clement asked, “Has our nuclear
program gone too far to turn this cost picture around? If not, this is one of the most
serious issues facing TVA today.”99
As early as August 1981, TVA officials started planning their exit strategy, which
included draft “options” papers detailing possibly approaches to cancellations, deferrals,
and possible mitigation efforts for affected communities.100 Less than two years after S.
David Freeman’s assurances that nuclear power remained a viable option, internal
memorandum displayed a different picture. A changing energy outlook forecast lower
consumption demands for the next decade.101 When coupled with an inability to
accurately predict construction costs, in addition to other issues, all signs pointed to a
grim prognosis for TVA’s once lofty nuclear ambitions.
By late 1981 and early 1982, an options paper laid out the central issues clearly:
The important issue which TVA faces is whether to continue to borrow and spend
an additional $8.2 billion to complete three nuclear units …These numbers
reflect the staggering increases in construction costs that have occurred as the
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impact of inflation has been multiplied by very long construction times and by
record high interest rates.102
These were industry-wide problems, and utilities cancelled nuclear projects across the
country in response. And yet, TVA’s situation stood apart because it represented
something different than the average utility company. Duke, SCE&G, Middle-South—all
of these utilities received public scrutiny over increases in rates and their nuclear plants,
but few people held these companies in the same regard as TVA. Perhaps more
importantly, changes in the American economy and the nation’s energy outlook forced
TVA to reconsider a fundamental principle that had driven the agency’s decisions for
decades: cheap electricity and economic growth strongly correlated to one another.103
This principle of cheap and plentiful electricity propelling economic growth intersected
with TVA’s mission to improve the quality of life for Valley residents. As TVA scaled
back their nuclear ambitions, the socioeconomic effects of those decisions and the
communities affected by them proved a formidable challenge, which strained political
alliances and further damaged their public image. Rather than the prodigal son returning
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home, lessons learned and forgiveness afforded, the agency’s nuclear program cast a
permanent shadow on its legacy and image.
From TVA’s vantage point, scaling back their nuclear division required slight
adjustments in the local government budget, some out-migration from workers, and
creating certain temporary mitigation efforts such as job training to ease the
socioeconomic costs of stopping construction. According to TVA estimates, deferring the
two additional reactors at Hartsville resulted in a loss of approximately 1,962 jobs.104
TVA drew workers from essentially a five-county area: Smith, Trousdale, Macon,
Wilson, and Sumner. Smith and Trousdale comprised the counties where the plant
property was located; and thus, those counties in many ways served as the most critical in
terms of mitigation. Bordering Nashville, the other two counties, Wilson and Sumner,
underwent major growth during the 1970s and 1980s. Surrounding rural counties
experienced declining populations or limited growth, making this a tale of the two
Souths: one rural, one metropolitan.
For Smith and Trousdale counties, TVA anticipated laying off over two hundred
local workers, a small but visible portion of the labor force, considering the community’s
sacrifices.105 After the first wave of deferrals and cancellations in 1979, residents pressed
the agency to lay off local workers last, with one stating, “It’s not right for people who
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have to live in this county, right under the plant, not to be able to work for it.”106 As it
planned for the deferrals, TVA considered the extent of its obligation to the affected
communities, questioning the social and economic planning ethos of an earlier period:
“Should TVA try to address the short-term problems caused by the construction
cutbacks….or should TVA strive for long-term improvements…recognizing that these
improvements will not resolve the project impacts?”107 Centrally, TVA’s troubled nuclear
program underscored the agency’s personality crisis. Did TVA have a “moral
responsibility” to local communities affected by their half-finished projects?108
In January 1982, the death knell sounded for the Hartsville project. With the
release of the “options paper,” TVA officials laid out various paths for cancelling,
deferring, or transforming the sites into coal-fired plants. A risky move politically, the
agency endangered their alliances with members of Congress, state, and local
governments. Governor Lamar Alexander acknowledged “the numbers might not work,”
but proposed to TVA board member Richard Freeman that “if the laws need to be
changed to make it work, then let’s try to change the laws,” a move possibly inspired by
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Senator Howard Baker’s sleight of hand with the Tellico Dam.109 Al Gore Jr., then a
Congressional representative for Tennessee’s 4th district (which included Gore’s
hometown of Carthage and nearby Hartsville), disputed the very nature of TVA’s options
paper, concluding “TVA’s analysis appears to be not so much an option paper as a
blueprint to justify a predetermined judgment to defer construction,” and warned the
agency of the “grave consequences” of such action.110 For Gore, beyond the problem of
job loss in his Congressional district, stalled nuclear projects threatened the valley’s
economy, and he affirmed his faith in the connection between power supply and
economic growth.111 Gore chastised the agency’s about-face move, recalling TVA’s
vigorous defense of their nuclear program only one year earlier, finding the change in
policy “disturbing.”112 TVA’s relationship with southern politicians, both Democratic and
Republican, provided crucial leverage in Congress; and in return, an expectation of
reciprocity existed. If not stated explicitly, in return for projects in their district or state,
109
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the agency gained political support. TVA’s waffling endangered a long-standing
symbiosis.
Two months after releasing the options paper, TVA’s Board of Directors voted to
defer, indefinitely, the remaining two reactors at Hartsville and cancel the two previously
deferred reactors, and passed similar measures for Yellow Creek in Mississippi. With a
period of suspension over, the reckoning began, as the local community and the agency’s
political allies reeled over the decision. Residents in Hartsville and the surrounding
community, along with prominent Tennessee politicians, sought recourse from TVA: lost
jobs and lost revenue created a headache for locals and their elected representatives. State
legislators in Tennessee feared what the deferrals and eventual cancellation would do to
their state revenue. 113 In the 1981 fiscal year, the state of Tennessee received $87.4
million dollars in payments. Backing utility projects, especially nuclear power, while less
desirable for rate-payers and ultimately damaging to TVA’s bottom line, generated
increase revenue and reduced unemployment—albeit temporarily. With the onslaught of
TVA projects stalled, the cycle of construction projects and increased revenue reached an
untimely end for the area’s elected officials.
For Hartsville locals, the deferral and eventual cancellation, brought the sting of
lost employment and feelings of betrayal.114 James Donoho, Mayor of Hartsville, wrote
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TVA’s board in 1982 after the second wave of deferrals, acknowledging TVA’s
“awesome responsibility” to provide power, and noting TVA’s past record of
encouraging industrialization and improving quality of life. Despite giving credit to TVA,
Donoho emphasized the large-scale investment of Hartsville locals, at the behest of TVA
according to Donoho, thus underscoring TVA’s obligation to help the community even
as it jumped shipped with their nuclear reactors:
In a large area around the Hartsville plant several people made investments in
trailer parks, apartment houses, garages, road side markets, homes, etc., to serve
TVA workers, many of these investments being at the direct request or suggestion
of TVA because they were promised that construction would continue for 10 to
15 years. The closing of this plant now will cause great loss and damage to these
investors and further damage to TVA’s credibility which is low enough. 115
Then U.S. Congressman, Al Gore Jr., publicly opposed the shutdown, and like
Donoho, reminded the board of the “the “human impact” of TVA’s decision to halt
construction of its Hartsville Nuclear Facility, and of TVA’s “clear responsibility to the
workers, businessmen, and county leaders who changed their lives and planned their
futures based on what once seemed to be an unchangeable decision to build the Hartsville
plant.”116 While TVA continued to employ a reduced workforce after the 1982 deferral,
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and offered some funding for economic mitigation, it nonetheless committed an
unpardonable sin in the eyes of many. TVA acquired and modified the land, leaving
behind partially built containment structures and cooling towers, and retaining the land
for possible use. One Trousdale county official wrote in 1983 wrote to Chairman “Chili”
Dean, in what would soon become a common request, to use the land for some other type
of industry in order to offset high unemployment. 117
In August 1984, TVA officially cancelled the Hartsville and Yellow Creek
projects, after investing 4 billion dollars.118 TVA estimated it would cost 6.5 billion to
finish the project, which seemed economically untenable and unreasonable as demand for
power dropped. Some applauded this decision, due to anti-nuclear sentiment and growing
concern about utility rate increases. By the end of the 1980s, TVA’s reactors at Brown’s
Ferry and Sequoyah (Chattanooga) had successfully gone online, while work on one
reactor, Watts Bar reactor 1 (Spring City, TN) continued but was plagued with problems.
Other projects were cancelled or permanently deferred, leaving the once
ambitious nuclear program tattered, with visible nuclear ruins looming in the valley
landscape. With a major stall in its nuclear program, TVA knew the problem extended
beyond resolving financial matters, the agency had an image problem—once a beacon of
progress and enlightened regional planning (with all its loaded meanings) in the Valley
Freeman, 1977-1978 and 1981-1984, Tennessee Valley Authority Records, Record
Group 142, National Archives and Records Administration—Atlanta.
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and nation at large, TVA now seemed like another unwieldy, cumbersome institution, far
removed from its innovative beginnings. TVA’s Board spent much of the 1980s trying to
reshape their mission and public image, save the nuclear division, and justify the
agency’s existence. An internal memo captured the feeling among the board well:
There appears to be a growing perception among certain academics, journalists,
public officials, and students of public policy that TVA has “failed.” This view
replacing the earlier opinion among many of the same people that TVA was one
of the few grand governmental experiments that “worked.”…There may have also
been changes to TVA’s organizational style, values, and attitudes…the
experimental, open, progressive spirit, that was attributed to TVA in its first two
or three decades has progressively been replaced by a defensive, legalistic, coveryour-ass, don’t cause any trouble and mind-your-own business mentality.119
Publicly, TVA acknowledged their “mistakes,” albeit in vague terms, but as late
as 1985, they whitewashed a damning safety record in their nuclear plants. Behind the
scenes, TVA correspondence reflected a far more candid view. Still, TVA’s board
vacillated between identifying actual problems and focusing on how to change public
perception. The failures of the agency’s nuclear program posed a serious problem,
especially because President Ronald Reagan’s administration sought to reduce TVA’s
role to power production exclusively, aiming for eventual privatization.120 As a symbolic
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engine of development, progress, and modernity, TVA’s disastrous nuclear program, if
not entirely damaging its legacy, certainly complicated the public’s perception and its
viability in Washington.
Beyond an image problem though, safety issues ensnared TVA’s nuclear
program, and the agency tangled with the NRC in the late 1970s and 1980s over technical
problems and violations. In March 1975, a fire at the Brown’s Ferry nuclear plant in
Alabama caused a stir among the public and generated alarming headlines, among them
“How We Almost Lost Alabama.”121 Publicly, TVA blamed its safety problems on the
agency’s salary cap because no TVA employee could be paid more than a member of
Congress, and they argued that their inability to keep effective management hindered the
nuclear program.122 Despite this, TVA’s records indicate a lax attitude towards safety
existed among employees. TVA executives acknowledged that “poor attitudes towards
safety/quality still prevail, even after the Brown’s Ferry fire.”123 After cancellations and
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increased scrutiny, TVA issued what appears to be an internal memo listing the factors
“contributing to poor performance” in their nuclear program, among them: “high
turnover,” “poor attitudes towards safety/quality,” “poor definition of work
requirements,” “management problems,” and “lack of recognition by management that
performance was inadequate.”124
In 1985, TVA shut down its entire nuclear operation for several years, leaving the
only operating plants, Brown’s Ferry and Sequoyah, in a temporary holding pattern while
the agency addressed a litany of problems. With this, TVA reached a bitter interregnum,
one that left its once ambitious nuclear program damaged and endangered the agency’s
future. The nuclear program restarted in 1988, and finally, in 1996, the long-delayed
Watts Bar Unit 1 went online—twenty-three years after receiving a construction permit.
More recently, TVA has led the way in the recent nuclear revival, invigorated by
increasing concerns about climate change, and Watts Bar Unit 2 should go online in
2016.
Today, remnants of what TVA once heralded as the “world’s largest nuclear
plant” slowly decay in rural middle Tennessee. 125 The site’s scattered warehouses
function as TVA’s storage unit, a glorified closet for miscellaneous parts the agency
periodically auctions, and the agency categorizes the land as “inventory.” While the
majority of the site remains in TVA’s possession, in 2002, the agency sold 554 acres to
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the Four Lake Regional Industrial Development Authority, now known as Tennessee
Central Economic Alliance.126 The organization, TCAE, orchestrated the development of
the land into an industrial center, and soon thereafter, a new conflict emerged when
Louisiana Energy Services (LES) sought to build a uranium enrichment facility on the
recently purchased land. The local community reacted swiftly, pointing out the absurdity
of placing the facility on the banks of the Cumberland River. Echoing criticisms from an
earlier era, one resident lamented the inequity:
I know in today’s climate that any job is a good job, but can’t the Tennessee
Economic and Community Development office find jobs for Trousdale county
residents that don’t involve mopping floors or cleaning toilets? This would
be a much safer choice than a uranium enrichment plant.127
While LES’s plans for the enrichment facility failed, more recently TCAE attracted
Correctional Corporations of America (CCA) to build a prison on the site.128 Over forty
years later, rural communities like Hartsville continue to search for means of survival,
even if that entails choosing mass incarceration over uranium enrichment.
For those born in the region after World War II, accustomed to the region’s
sprawling metropolitan areas, the presence of a cooling tower in an otherwise rural,
bucolic setting thwarts expectations. Its presence feels wrong, taking with it a certifiable
and authentic southern landscape not yet occupied by the hallmarks of modernity. As a
sense of place grounded in the environment disappears, perhaps the desire for locating a
more authentic South, amplifies the disorientation produced by Hartsville’s nuclear ruins.
The lone cooling tower begs for the folly parable, where man toils relentlessly for an
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unrealized goal that brings unforeseen costs. The tower’s presence evokes the uneven
process of “modernizing” the Tennessee Valley, and by extension, the American South.
While not yet canonized in southern history, the cooling tower memorializes
TVA’s sprawling restructuring of the landscape and a period in which an overriding faith
in the relationship between cheap electricity and economic growth energized the nuclear
boom. By bulldozing local history and replacing it with an idle cooling tower, TVA left
Hartsville with nuclear ruins and nuclear ghosts. Over the course of its existence, TVA’s
reordering of the Valley has required tabulating over thirty-thousand human graves, some
moved and others merely recorded—never mind the waterways, the vegetation,
environments destroyed or permanently altered, the wildlife forced into new habitats, and
communities submerged underwater.
The locals, decades later, still feel betrayed, and some are suspicious of TVA’s
project. From a pragmatic perspective, TVA’s continued ownership of the land and the
scattered warehouses are merely a product of bureaucracy and business. TVA maintains
the land as an asset, thereby boosting its financial picture, while justifying its continued
existence in Hartsville by storing inventory in the site’s warehouses. But at least one
local, suspects otherwise, and believes the Hartsville site is part of a larger government
conspiracy, where helicopters cloaked in darkness move covertly around the site, strange
humming noises infiltrate local airwaves, and electrical problems suggest a secret
agenda—all occurring behind the site’s gates.129 If most locals dismiss the cooling tower
as a “used beer can,” and more likely, dismiss TVA, others spin yarn, desperately
searching for other explanations. The history of nuclear power, and the complicated
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relationship people had with it during this period, is characterized by more than fears of
radiation or rising utility bills. Hartsville’s history suggests that debates about nuclear
power also exposed a rural and urban divide, and a complicated matrix of bureaucratic,
legal, and political forces that subordinated local autonomy, knowledge, and history for
another New South scheme.
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CONCLUSION
Still, comrade, the running of beasts and the ruining heaven
Still captive the old wild king.
---James Agee, Let Us Now Praise Famous Men
I’ve lived in at least two Souths. One is an affluent South, with slick shopping
centers, gated communities, and feel-good religion. The other is a dirt-poor South in
eastern Tennessee. In that South, I spent time in manufactured homes, found nothing
unusual about defunct cars in front-yards, and swam in abandoned quarries filled with
unnatural, milky blue-green water. I became well-acquainted with poor, white people
who lived hard and died sooner than the rest of us. While I had the benefit of privilege,
the strange geography of south Knoxville, Tennessee meant neat, middle-class homes
mixed with trailer parks and Superfund sites. Less than a mile away from my childhood
home were two sites of staggering industrial contamination.1
One, the David Witherspoon, Inc. site, located in a dilapidated section of south
Knoxville known as Vestal, operated as an “industrial landfill.”2 From the 1950s to 1974,
the landfill legally operated, but evidence suggests illegal dumping activities continued
until 1983. From 1966 to 1969, the Atomic Energy Commission licensed the David
Witherspoon company to receive radioactive metal from the weapons installation
1
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complex in nearby Oak Ridge, Tennessee.1 Over two decades, a slow, incremental
process of environmental contamination occurred, or rather, what scholar Rob Nixon has
called “slow violence.”2 An assortment of toxic contaminants, like PCB, lead, and
mercury consorted with the radioactive isotopes of enriched uranium and thorium. What
the people living around the landfill had suspected for years became publicized after a
former Witherspoon employee, Dorothy Hunley, died from a rare type of bone cancer.3
Sparked by Hunley’s death, some members of the community formed “Project
Witherspoon,” and in 1990, the group and approximately one hundred people, held a
“March Against Toxic Waste” in Vestal. Future Vice President and Tennessee Senator Al
Gore Jr. (D-TN) attended the event and echoed the calls for action.4
Because the Witherspoon site did not fulfill the EPA’s requirements for a
Superfund site, the responsibility for remediating the area fell to the state of Tennessee.
Like many other cases of hazardous industry run amuck, the entities so willing to ship
their waste to sites, were rarely willing to take responsibility for the cleanup unless
legally compelled to do so. In 1992, David Witherspoon claimed his company could not
pay for the site remediation, and the Department of Energy begrudgingly removed 232
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drums of waste from the site.5 After years of sporadic action and nearly thirty-two million
dollars spent, officials declared the Witherspoon site cleanup complete in 2009. The DOE
shipped 15,647 truckloads of materials from Witherspoon back to Oak Ridge for
disposal.6
The history of Vestal’s atomic landfill resembles others in the environmental
justice oeuvre, but in this case, I lived near it. As a child, I had a vague notion it was
polluted, but it seemed unremarkable—simply another junkyard in a place full of trash,
biker bars, and run-down buildings. Like the “strange juxtaposition” of Louisiana’s
chemical corridor and former sugar cane plantations, I knew a dirt-poor South, where
objects of supreme ugliness nested in the foothills of the Appalachian mountains and
along the banks of the Tennessee River.7
The recent trend in southern history post-World War II, with some exceptions, has
emphasized another South: affluent or middle-class, Republican, suburban, metropolitan,
and evangelical.8 These studies are important, but they only tell part of the story. The
transformation of the modern South only reached so far. Look twenty or thirty miles
beyond the edges of Atlanta or Charlotte, or travel to the decrepit corners of post-
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industrial Appalachian cities, and the absurdity of the modern South appears fully on
display.
In that vein, the impetus for “Radioactive Dixie” came after reading about
Barnwell’s nuclear waste site. Barnwell piqued my interest because it defied
expectations; a community not only wanted a radioactive waste dump, they expressed
pride in their twenty-seven million cubic feet of atomic garbage. The reasons for their
stance appeared more complicated than the accusations of ignorance levied at them.
Barnwell’s history suggested that the rural South still existed and still mattered after
1945. Those histories, however, have largely fallen out of favor as the “Dixie Rising”
narrative has come to dominate.9
Grand Gulf and Port Gibson, St. Charles Parish, Hartsville, and Barnwell
comprise, if not a counter-narrative, an important addition to modern southern history.
They are the kinds of places where cooling towers are built and discarded with little care,
and more importantly, where the rural, sparsely populated areas located near nuclear
plants and radioactive waste disposal sites are mostly ignored. Studying the region’s
nuclear sites further illustrates how technological and environmental risks reflect an
ordering of sorts, and how the systems devised to manage, to tax, and to regulate these
large-scale, high-risk technologies bear the “imprint” of society, culture, and politics.10
The power plants and the communities studied here tell us about these arrangements of
power, one that many groups sought to reorder to their benefit.
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Beginning in the 1950s, southern politicians, industry figures, federal officials,
and the region’s universities sought power through atomic energy. They sought to wrest
power from the federal government in nuclear regulation, pursued subsidies from the
Atomic Energy Commission to better compete with other regions, and wanted to wave
the “atomic talisman” to ward off perceptions of a backwards, anti-modern South. During
the 1970s and 1980s, a new class of moderate, southern governors, led by Jimmy Carter
and Bill Clinton, challenged the region’s nuclear enthusiasm. Those battles sometimes
proved politically expedient and paved the way for future political success, while others
backfired, as Carter’s fight over the Clinch River Breeder Reactor and the Barnwell
Nuclear Fuel Plant shows. Buoying these efforts, the South’s anti-nuclear rebels never
shared the numbers of anti-nuclear groups in California or Germany, but they offered an
important critique of unmitigated development and unchecked technology. Their efforts,
along with the journalists who relentlessly covered the period’s utility scandals, helped
expose shoddy construction, substandard safety assurance measures, and encouraged
greater accountability from energy conglomerates.
Nuclear power survived two decades of controversy, albeit not unscathed, but
continues to send power to the grid today. In South Carolina, nuclear power supplies
approximately fifty percent of the state’s electricity. Growing concerns about climate
change and federal subsidy programs supported by the administrations of George W.
Bush and President Barack Obama encouraged a small nuclear power revival in the past
decade. While a number of utilities sought new reactor licenses, the resurgence has been
tempered by construction costs.11 Despite those obstacles, the South’s nuclear reputation
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holds true; the only new reactors currently under construction or nearing commercial
operation are located in Tennessee, South Carolina, and Georgia.
When nuclear revival began in 2003, Entergy reconsidered finishing Grand Gulf
Unit 2 in Claiborne County, Mississippi, and the community largely supported the
announcement. Mayor Imelda Arnold told reporters that Grand Gulf’s presence offered
Claiborne County “tremendous help,” and concluded “it would be very hard to live here
without the tax money.”12 However, in 2009, Entergy suspended its plans, and so today,
Grand Gulf Unit 1 quietly operates alone, powering Jackson, Vicksburg, and the other
forty plus service counties.
Even as the plant quietly operates, the road to Grand Gulf is dotted with
evacuation signs, reminding visitors and residents alike that danger lurks. At a split in the
road, one sign points drivers to Grand Gulf Unit 1, while another sign directs drivers to
the Grand Gulf Military Park. When the sun goes down in Grand Gulf, amidst the nuclear
plant’s blinking lights and the crumbling remains of an older, tragic place, no doubt it
appears “progress-haunted.”13 In The Mind of the South, W.J. Cash juxtaposed the New
South’s skyscrapers with the image of Confederate ghosts, in the oft-cited line: “Softly;
do you not hear behind that the gallop of Jeb Stuart’s cavalrymen?”14 When C. Vann
Woodward reviewed the book in 1941, he found W.J. Cash’s claims about a progresshaunted South overwrought, and slyly responded that no skyscraper had “called up any
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such ghostly echoes.”15 If only Woodward had stood before Grand Gulf Unit 1,
surrounded by the “most broken country” General Ulysses Grant ever saw, he too might
have heard the gallop, softly behind, the whirring of machines.16
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